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l\HSUNDERSTANDING POSITIVISM 
Anthony J. Sebok* 
If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to 
worry about the answers. 
- Thomas Pynchon1 
INTRODUCTION: AMERICA'S LoVE-IfATE RELATIONSHIP WITH 
LEGAL POSITIVISM 
The past forty years have not been kind to legal positivism. 
Ever since H.L.A. Hart's famous debate with Lon Fuller over the 
charge that German legal positivists were partly responsible for the 
rise of Hitler, positivism has been the target of frequent attacks by 
American lawyers.2 Its critics have tried, at various times, to con-
nect positivism with a diverse and jointly inconsistent group of the-
ories, such as legal formalism,3 legal realism,4 and originalism.s 
Furthermore, since the 1960s, legal positivism has been associated 
almost entirely with politically conservative forces in this country, 
especially with an approach to constitutional interpretation known 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A. 1984, Cornell; M.Phil. 1986, 
Oxford; J.D. 1991, Yale; Ph.D. 1993, Princeton. I would like to thank Walter Murphy, Jules 
Coleman, Fred Schauer, John Goldberg, Robert George, Andrew Koppelman, Spencer 
Weber Waller, Bailey Kuklin, Gary Minda, Susan Herman, Amos Shapira, Bruce Ackerman, 
and an anonymous reviewer for their advice and encouragement. I am also very grateful for 
the assistance of my research assistants, Peter Bucklin, Brooklyn Law School class of 1995 
and Thomas Uhl, Brooklyn Law School class of 1996. This research was supported by a 
summer research grant from Brooklyn Law School. 
1. THOMAS PYNCHON, GRA VITY's RAINBow 293 (Bantam Books 1974) (1973). 
2. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. 
L. REv. 630 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. 
L. REv. 593, 595 (1958) (citing Gustav Radbruch, Die Emeuerung des Rechts, 2 Dm WAN· 
DLUNG 8 (1947); Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und Obergesetzliches Recht, 1 son. 
DEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 105 (1946)}. 
3. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 362 n.19 (1973}; William 
E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in 
Nineteenth Century America, Erl HARv. L. REv. 513 (1974). 
4. See, e.g., LoN L. FULLER, THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITSELF 47 (1940); John Dickinson, 
Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 19 U. PA. L. REv. 833 (1931}; Rufus 
C. Harris, Idealism Emergent in Jurisprudence, 10 TuL. L. REv. 169 (1936); Hermann 
Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE LJ. 1240 (1934); Philip Mechem, 
The Jurisprudence of Despair, 21 IowA L. REv. 669 (1936); Charles C. Miltner, Law and 
Morals, 10 NoTRE DAME LAw. 1 (1934). 
5. See Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 
CHL-KENT L. REv. 1001, 1009 (1988}; James G. Wilson, Constraints of Power: The Constitu-
tional Opinions of Judges Scalia, Bork, Posner, Easterbrook and Winter, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 
1171, 1172 (1986). 
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during the 1970s as "judicial restraint."6 Given the various contexts 
in which the term positivist has been used, it is clear that in recent 
years the term has become a pejorative in modern American legal 
circles.7 
Legal positivism's critics have also noted that positivism is so 
pervasive in American legal culture that at various times it has been 
the dominant jtµisprudence of America. Thus, in 1976, Ronald 
Dworkin called positivism the "ruling theory of law" in America 
and England.8 Looking into our past, Robert Cover characterized 
positivism as the major jurisprudence of post-Revolutionary 
America and attributed the failure of Northern judges to subvert 
the proslavery aims of the Fugitive Slave Acts to the influence of 
positivism on the antebellum legal mind.9 
As H.L.A. Hart noted in his debate with Fuller, the assumption 
that positivism is somehow inherently conservative is a peculiarly 
American attitude.10 Furthermore, the immediate identification of 
positivism with the nation's "dominant" legal theory means that lib-
erals who wish to reform or challenge the status quo begin with the 
presumption that their analysis must reject legal positivism.11 In 
6 .. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-32 (1977). Positivism's 
conservative reputation in America is especially ironic, given that Jeremy Bentham and 
H.L.A. Hart, positivism's chief spokespersons in England in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, were also outspoken liberal reformers of the law. See, e.g., H.LA. HART, LAW, 
LIBERTY AND MoRAUTY (1963) (responding to the REPORT OF nm CoMMJ.TIEE ON HOMO-
SEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITUI10N, 1957, CMND. 247 ("THE WOLFENDEN REPORT") and 
Lord Devlin's criticisms thereof); Hart, supra note 2, at 594-96 (stating that Bentham was 
one of "the most earnest thinkers in England about legal and social problems and [among] 
the architects of great reforms"). 
7. See Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 797, 798 (1993) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Constitutional Positivism] (noting that positivism was "until recently" 
viewed as "simultaneously irrelevant and pernicious"); Frederick Schauer, Positivism as Pa-
riah, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAw: EssAYS IN LEGAL POSITIVISM (Robert P. George ed., 
forthcoming 1995) [hereinafter Schauer, Positivism as Pariah]; Robert S. Summers, Legal 
Philosophy Today -An Introduction, in EssAYS IN LEGAL PHu.osOPHY 16 (Robert S. Sum-
mers ed., 1968) (claiming that the use of the term positivism "is now radically ambiguous and 
dominantly pejorative"); see also James Boyle, Thomas Hobbes and the Invented Tradition of 
Positivism: Reflections on Language, Power, and Essentialism, 135 U. PA. L REv. 383 (1987); 
William H. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE LJ. 945, 964 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT 
M. CoVER ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988)). 
8. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at vii; see also 1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDou-
GAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE & POUCY 8 (1992) 
("The frame of reference commonly described as 'analytical' or 'positivistic' jurisprudence 
.•• dominates thinking in much of the world today .••• "). 
9. ROBERT M. CoVER, JusnCE AccusEo 26-29, 121-23 (1975); see also Anthony J. 
Sebok, Judging the Fugitive Slave Acts, 100 YALE LJ. 1835, 1837 (1991). 
10. Hart, supra note 2, at 594-95. 
11. It is ironic that liberals might feel obliged to reject positivism in order to criticize the 
status quo, since natural law has become increasingly attractive to politically conservative 
constitutional scholars. See, e.g., HADLEY ARKEs, THE RETuRN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND 
(1994); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MoRAL (1993). The nomination of Justice Clar-
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this article I will attempt to demonstrate that the association of pos-
itivism with conservatism reflects a response in America to a partic-
ular version of positivism and that for various historical reasons, 
only the narrow version of positivism was fully developed on this 
side of the Atlantic. I do not imagine that my argument, which sim-
ply proves that positivism does not have to be conservative, proves 
the converse, that positivism must support a liberal approach to the 
Constitution. The relationship between legal positivism and pro-
gressive constitutionalism is a separate argument that this article 
makes possible.12 
This article sets out a historical account of the evolution of legal 
positivism in American jurisprudence. Although scholars today 
treat legal positivism as a major - if not the major - jurispru-
dence in America, no such theory was discussed by name in legal 
literature before the late 1920s. Part I argues that although legal 
positivism did not properly emerge as a major theory of law in 
America until Fuller's attack in 1940, positivism had been playing a 
major role in shaping American jurisprudence since the late nine-
teenth century. The fact that the term "legal positivism" was rarely 
used before 1940, and probably never used before 1927, does not 
mean that the theoretical content of legal positivism was absent 
from legal discourse before that date. The foundational principles 
of nineteenth-century positivism - what I will call "classical posi-
tivism" - were represented in jurisprudential debates in America 
under a variety of different names. 1\vo other historical schools of 
jurisprudence provided the "aliases" that concealed classical posi-
tivism's influence: formalism and "analytic jurisprudence." 
This article will reevaluate the relationship between classical 
positivism and formalism. For while it has been a popular truism 
that formalism embraced the separation of law and morality 
through "mechanical jurisprudence,"13 it has also become equally 
popular to attribute to formalism a commitment to supranatural 
ence Thomas gave the issue of conservative natural law theory new immediacy. See, e.g., 
Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 6-21 (1991) (state· 
ment of Sen. Biden); Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 63 (1989). 
12. It should be noted that a number of American scholars are beginnmg to recognize the 
liberal potential of legal positivism. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE nm PEOPLE: FoUN-
DATIONS 320-22 (1991) (describing how constitutional positivism could be used to promote 
greater equality in America); Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, supra note 7. I try to argue 
in support of a position similar to Ackerman and Schauer's in ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL 
POSITIVISM AND nm GROWIH OF MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (forthcoming Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1996). 
13. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908). 
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principles of law that exist independent of human authority.14 This 
latter position is inconsistent with the "sources thesis" of classical 
positivism and commits formalism to a form of natural law theory 
similar to Blackstone's.15 American formalism may have been 
guilty of many sins, but natural law is not one of them. 
Part II argues that the attack on formalism by legal realism 
reveals to us how classical positivism was defined and distorted in 
early twentieth-century American legal scholarship. Despite - or 
perhaps because of - the fact that classical positivism completely 
agreed with realism that law and morality were analytically separa-
ble, the realists focused their attention entirely on formalism's the-
ory of legal reasoning. According to the realists, the formalists 
believed that every legal conclusion could be logically deduced 
from a set of authoritative rules. This view of legal reasoning - if 
it indeed was ever embraced by American formalists - would have 
been an unwarranted reinterpretation of the sources thesis of classi-
cal positivism, which merely said that every valid legal command 
was the result of a command of the sovereign. 
By 1930 - before legal positivism was discussed by name - the 
rough outlines of American positivism had been set by the debate 
between realism and formalism. The degree to which this picture of 
positivism was entrenched in American jurisprudence can be best 
illustrated by the rejection of the reconstituted form of positivism 
known as legal process. Part ill shows that, in response to the real-
ists' attack, American positivists modified two of the main elements 
of classical positivism, the command theory of law and the sources 
thesis, so as to rebut the charges against formalism.16 To this end, 
in the 1950s a younger generation of constitutional law scholars -
themselves weaned on realism - attempted to reevaluate the force 
of realism's attack on legal rules. They readily conceded that law 
could not be a deductive or mechanical system of rules but noted 
further that realism's solution - skepticism about ·whether rules 
can constrain at all - was itself an extreme view. Classical positiv-
ism, which had been described by the realists to include the unreal 
assumption that legal rules could form a deductive system, was ulti-
mately reinterpreted by the legal process ~chool so that its model of 
14. See, e.g., M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdel~ 
30 .AM. J. LEGAL Hlsr. 95, 110-12 {1986). 
15. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN Gooo FAnH 3-4 (1992). 
16. There was no need to reform the remaining third principle of classical positivism, the 
separation of law and morals, since the realists and formalists were in complete agreement on 
this point 
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legal reasoning embraced the elements of classical positivism but 
rejected mechanical jurisprudence. 
One goal of Part m is to explain why legal process did not flour-
ish after it appeared as an alternative to realism. On the one hand, 
the legal process school represented a fundamental rejection of 
mechanical jurisprudence, while on the other hand, contingent his-
torical reasons led the legal process school to saddle itself with a 
variety of other liabilities. There were two distinct movements 
within the legal process school. The first, defined by Hart and 
Sacks's The Legal Process,17 laid the foundation for the kind of pos-
itivism I think is defensible and is not an obvious ally of political 
conservatism. The second, defined by Herbert Wechsler, Alexan-
der Bickel, and Robert Bork, came later and twisted Hart and 
Sacks's theory of law into a conservative theory of adjudication. 
The later legal process scholars' interpretation of Hart and Sacks 
relied on a controversial form of moral skepticism that assumed 
that legal norms cannot command judges to enforce moral princi-
ples because moral principles did not have any cognizable exist-
ence. Nothing in Austinian positivism requires such a crabbed 
interpretation of legal rules. 
American positivism has gone through at least three major 
transformations. In the first transformation, classical positivism was 
turned into an absurd form of formalism, in which the realists 
claimed that Austin's command theory of law necessarily implied a 
belief in law as a deductive system. In the second transformation, 
legal process stripped mechanical jurisprudence from positivism. 
As soon as the second transformation was complete, the third trans-
formation occurred, in which politically conservative legal process 
theorists argued that the sources thesis and the model of rules nec-
essarily implied a theory of original intent. It is telling that 
throughout the past century American positivism has been put into 
the service of conservatism because of the desire of both its ene-
mies and allies to add unnecessary and implausible elements to 
classical positivism. 
It is important that I point out the limited purposes of this arti-
cle. I cannot, in the context of the argument I make, prove that 
positivism will not inevitably collapse into a conservative theory of 
law. Nor can I prove that positivism is not vulnerable to jurispru-
dential arguments unrelated to the attempt to link positivism with 
17. HENRY M HART, JR. & ALBERT M SACKS, THE LEoAL PRoCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN nm MAKINo AND APPUCATION OF LAw (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994). 
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formalism, legal process, and originalism. I recognize that strong 
arguments have been made that modem positivism's attempts to 
divorce itself from classical positivism's command theory of law has 
opened up more problems than it has solved.18 I have certain views 
on whether that divorce is possible and the form it should take, but 
this is not the place to raise them.19 My single goal in this article is 
to disprove a set of bad arguments against positivism, which, in my 
opinion, have given it a peculiarly conservative profile and have dis-
tracted us from investigating alternative versions. 
I. LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGAL FORMALISM 
The best place to begin any discussion oflegal positivism and 
American juri~prudence is 1940, which is when Lon Fuller accused 
legal realism of being merely a subspecies of positivism. Fuller 
thought that legal realism and legal positivism were part of the 
same jurisprudential family tree. He thought that legal realism was 
a modem American modification to the legal positivism of Jeremy 
Bentham and John Austin: 
We may say of modem positivistic theories that they diverge .... 
[One view that] may be called the "realist" view is represented by 
numerous American writers . . . . These men represent that direction 
of legal positivism which seeks to anchor itself in some datum of na-
ture, which considers that the law's quest of itself can end successfully 
only if it terminates in some tangible external reality.20 
It is clear that the association of realism with positivism was sup-
posed to weaken realism, which suggests that however obscure pos-
itivism may have been, it was perceived as quite unpopular among 
Fuller's intended audience.21 It seemed quite natural to Fuller to 
attribute the rise of fascism to the European embrace of positivism: 
"[Legal Positivism] played an important part ... in bringing Ger-
many and Spain to the disasters which engulfed those countries."22 
18. Fuller was convinced that H.L.A. Hart's repudiation of Austin's command theory in 
favor of a "social rule" theory was doomed to collapse back into Austin. See Fuller, supra 
note 2, at 640-42. Dworkin argued that it made no difference whether Hart rejected or em-
braced the command theory: for Dworkin, both the command theory and the social rule 
theory suffered equally from the "semantic sting." See RONALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 
31-35, 45-46 (1986). But see H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAW 244-48 (2d ed. 1994) (re-
sponding to Dworkin's argument in a posthumous postscript). 
19. But see infra note 213. 
20. FULLER, supra note 4, at 46-47 (footnotes omitted); see also Martin P. Golding, Juris-
prudence and Legal Philosophy in 1\ventieth-Century America - Major Themes and Devel-
opments, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 441, 475-77 (1986). 
21. Fuller represents a tendency among American natural law theorists to conflate legal 
realism and legal positivism. See FuLLER, supra note 4. 
22. Id. at 122; see also INoo MOLLER, Hm.ER's JUSTICE: THE CoURTS OF THE 'fHIRD 
REICH (Deborah L. Schneider trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991) (1987). 
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Fuller's comments gave support to others who were mounting a 
campaign to connect legal realism and fascism. For example, after 
Fuller linked legal realism and legal positivism, natural lawyers in 
American Catholic law schools cited his arguments with approval. 
Francis Lucey, a major figure in the neo-scholastic movement at 
Georgetown, completed Fuller's equation by adopting the connec-
tion between legal positivism and legal realism,23 and then linked 
legal realism to totalitarianism: "Realism is being tried out today in 
Germany and Russia .... There is not a single tenet of Realism that 
these dictatorships do not cherish, adhere to, and try to apply."24 
Curiously, in 1940 many other theorists considered legal realism 
and legal positivism as antithetical and contradictory approaches to 
law. H.B. Yntema, a prominent realist, observed in 1941 that 
Fuller's 1940 lecture represented a basic misunderstanding of legal 
realism: 
[T]he classification of American legal realism in the category of posi-
tivism along with Austin, Kelsen, etc., is so superficial as to border on 
the perverse. As the author [Fuller] truly states, the typical interest of 
a genuine legal positivist is in logic and form, while the interest of the 
legal realists in these aspects of law is in a degree incidental to their 
interest in the ... substance[ ] of law.25 
It may be supposed that only realists emphasized the conflicts be-
tween legal realism and legal positivism, since in their own minds 
they felt a need to distinguish themselves from the earlier English 
and European theorists of legal positivism. Yet there were many 
23. Realism is "only a further development and refinement" of nineteenth-century legal 
positivism. Francis E. Lucey, Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective 
Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEO. LJ. 494, 494-95 {1942). 
24. Id.; see also Brendan F. Brown, Natural Law and the Law-Making Function in Ameri-
can Jurisprudence, 15 NOTRE DAME LAw. 9, 23-24 (1939); Paul L. Gregg, The Pragmatism of 
Mr. Justice Holmes 31 GEO. L.J. 262, 293-95 {1943); Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes and 
Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569 {1945). Natural lawyers were not the only theorists who drew a 
connection between legal positivism and totalitarianism. F.A. Hayek argued in 1960 that, by 
dismissing the idea of the "rule of law" as a metaphysical superstition, positivists prepared 
the way for fascism and communism. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CoNSTITUTION OF LmERTY 236· 
47 (1960). 
25. Hessel E. Yntema, Jurisprudence on Parade, 39 MICH. L. REv. 1154, 1164 (1941). 
After the Second World War, the younger realists - apparently unpersuaded by the claims 
made by Fuller and others - continued to take for granted the incompatibility of legal real· 
ism and legal positivism. For example, McDougal and Lasswell's magisterial textbook on 
"policy science" was very critical of positivism, which was described as "more a 'science' of 
logical derivation of syntactic forms than an empirical science" like sociological jurisprudence 
or legal realism. See 1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGALL Jurisprudence for a 
Free Society: Studies in Law, Science, and Policy 9 {1992); see also W. MICHAEL REISMAN & 
AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE 269-307 {1987). Along with McDougall & Lass-
well's book, Reisman & Schreiber's textbook also noted how important the attack on legal 
positivism was to the development of realists like Walter Cook and Karl Llewellyn. McDou-
GALL & LASSWELL, supra, at 272; RmsMAN & SCHREIBER, supra, at 449-50. 
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critics of legal realism who did not agree with Fuller's formulation 
and instead understood legal realism and legal positivism to be two 
rival and incompatible. theories of law. In 1958, Edgar 
Bodenheimer, a long-time critic of realism, observed: "Analytical 
positivism and legal realism constitute basic approaches to the sci-
ence of jurisprudence which are customarily regarded as represent-
ing sharply antithetical viewpoints with respect to the nature of law 
and the method of its application in judicial practice."26 Roscoe 
Pound distinguished analytical jurisprudence - which is what many 
early theorists called legal positivism - from realism in his treatise 
on jurisprudence. Pound drew the following contrast: "As the ana-
lytical jurist insisted on the pure fact of law, the new realist seeks 
the pure fact of fact. "27 
Even without a precise definition of the theory of legal positiv-
ism, one can conclude simply by using the principle of transitivity 
that either Fuller and the realists meant something different when 
they referred to "positivism," or one or the other side was simply 
making a logical error. Positivism cannot be both identical and in-
consistent with legal realism. Legal positivism overlaps with both 
legal realism and formalism, although it is identical to neither. The 
critics of realism identified only those aspects of positivism that 
were consistent with realism, and used this association with positiv-
ism to tar realism, while the realists identified only those aspects of 
positivism that were consistent with formalism, and used this associ-
ation with positivism to justify their attack on formalism. Thus, one 
of the only points of agreement between the realists and their critics 
was that both sides felt completely secure in using legal positivism 
as the obvious theoretical evil that, if they could only identify with 
their opponent, would discredit their opponent's argument. 
A. Classical Positivism 
Classical positivism is the theory of law developed in England 
by Jeremy Bentham and John Austin that formed the foundation 
for any subsequent theory that can be characterized as "positivist." 
Few modem positivists look upon classical positivism uncritically; in 
fact, much of the most important work of H.L.A. Hart was dedi-
cated to correcting the errors of classical positivism.28 Nonetheless, 
classical positivism set out the parameters, or minimal content, of 
26. Edgar Bodenheimer, Analytical Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Future of Legal 
Method, 44 VA. L. REv. 365, 365 (1958). 
27. 1 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 258 (1959). 
28. See HART, supra note 18, at 79-99. 
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any positivist theory of law. We must use classical positivism as a 
baseline in order to determine just how far afield Fuller or the real-
ists went in their use of the term. 
The principles of classical positivism were developed in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Bentham and Austin.29 
Bentham and Austin wrote in reaction to Blackstone's theory of the 
common law, which had become the dominant theory of English 
law before the nineteenth century. Blackstone's theory of law, 
which set for itself the task of explaining the source and authority of 
judge-made law, was held to be inadequate by Bentham and Austin 
not only because it failed to explain statutory law, but because it 
failed, in their eyes, even to explain the authority of common law. 
Classical common law theory, as Blackstone's approach is now 
known,30 was based on four claims that, although never carefully 
laid out, were implicit in various arguments that had emerged by 
18()().31 
The first and most famous principle was the idea that the source 
of common law is custom: that "the only method of proving, that 
this or that maxim is a rule of the common law is by showing that it 
hath been always the custom to observe it."32 The second principle 
was that custom itself was the expression of a nation's shared val-
ues, or, as we might say today, of its public conception of justice:33 
"[R]eason is the life of the Law; nay the common Law itself is noth-
ing else but reason .... "34 The equation of the common law with 
reason reflects a very special kind of natural law theory, one in 
which the source of natural justice was as much the people who 
were governed under the law as some independent moral truth that 
could be derived through philosophical reason.35 The third princi-
29. This is not to say that Bentham and Austin were in complete agreement; in fact, 
Austin disagreed with Bentham's critique of judge-made law. See Wtlfrid E. Rumble, The 
Legal Positivism of John Austin and the Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence, 66 
CORNELL L. REv. 986, 1019 n.180 (1981). 
30. See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND nm COMMON LAW TRADmON 3 n.1 (1986). 
31. See Sm MArnmw HALE, A HlsroRY OF nm COMMON LAw (Charles M. Gray ed., 
University of Chicago Press 1971) (3d ed. 1739). 
32. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68. Furthermore, the authority for com-
mon law was bound up in its source: "[I]n our law the goodness of a custom depends upon its 
having been used time out of mind; or, in the solemnity of our legal phrase, time whereof the 
memory of man runneth not to the contrary. This it is that gives it its weight and authority." 
Id. at *67. 
33. See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980, 
77 J. PHn.. 515, 521 (1980). 
34. 1 EDWARD CoKE, INSTITUTES§ 138 (London, 12th ed. 1738). 
35. As A.W.B. Simpson explained: "In the common law system no very clear distinction 
exists between saying that a particular solution to a problem is in accordance with the law, 
and saying that it is the rational, or fair, or just solution." A.W.B. Simpson, The Common 
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pie was that the law was not susceptible to being expressed as a rule 
or set of rules; that is, in a form which could be set down in any 
specificity and used to guide future action.36 The fourth principle 
was that while it remained theoretically possible that a sovereign 
could create new laws, the logic of classical common law theory sug-
gested that laws promulgated by the sovereign would often be un-
reasonable, unjust, or jointly incoherent.37 Th.us, Blackstone was 
deeply skeptical of legislation.38 
Classical positivism developed in reaction to classical common 
law theory. If we look at Bentham and Austin's arguments against 
Blackstone, we see that they focused on the four features described 
above and proposed a set of principles that would replace them. 
The following represents a general description of the principles pro-
posed by Bentham and Austin. Th.is list is not likely to be precise or 
exhaustive, but it should give us a starting point. It is compiled 
from H.L.A. Hart's discussions of classical positivism as well as 
other sources. 39 
The first principle was the separability thesis: that there is no 
necessary connection between law and morals. Bentham attacked 
Blackstone's use of natural law to explain the authority of common 
law. The appeal to natural law was not only an appeal to an un-
provable chimera, but it allowed each law-applier to inject his own 
morality into the law.40 Similarly, Austin stressed that jurispru-
Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD EssAYS IN LEGAL THEORY 79 (Tony Honore ed., 2d Ser., 
1973); see also PoSTEMA, supra note 30, at 7 (stating that reason refers not to "some in-
dependent standards of justice" but "the expression •.. of .•. the common good"). Postema's 
excellent discussion of Blackstone's "ambivalen[ce]" toward natural law is also worthy of 
comment. Id. at 34 n.75. It is important to note that although the modem mind might find 
the equation of reason and law striking, in adopting this particular formulation of natural 
law, classical common law theory clearly tended toward the scholastic tradition. 
•' 36. As Simpson has noted, "it is a feature of the common law system that there is no way 
of settling the correct text or formulation of the rules, so it is inherently impossible to state so 
much as a single rule." Simpson, supra note 35, at 94. 
37. POSTEMA, supra note 30, at 15-16 ("Since it was thought legislation is the product of 
will, and not of rational reflection on an existing order independent of will ••• there is no 
guarantee that the individual laws will be reasonable or just."). 
38. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *10-*ll; see also POSTEMA, supra note 30, 
at 15 ("Coke and Blackstone regarded parliamentary legislation as the sole, or at least major, 
cause of all that was confused, incoherent, and unjust in the law of England."). 
39. See HART, supra note 18; Hart, supra note 2; JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. CoLE-
MAN, PHn.osoPHY OF LAW: AN lNTRooucrioN ro JURISPRUDENCE 19-33 (rev. ed. 1990). It 
should be pointed out that these theorists discussed positivism in terms of their reaction, to 
some extent, to the theories of John Austin. · See JoHN AUSTIN, LEcruRES ON JURISPRU-
DENCE (London, John Murray 5th ed. 1885) [hereinafter AuSTIN, LEcruRES]; JoHN AUSTIN, 
THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (special ed. 1984) (1832) [hereinafter AUS-
TIN, PROVINCE]. 
40. Gerald Postema explained: 
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dence does not involve any ethical evaluation of positive law.41 
Austin's lectures began with the claim that only positive law is tem-
poral law: "[L]aw, simply and strictly so called [is] law set by polit-
ical superiors to political inferiors."42 
The second principle was the "command theory of law": that 
law was an expression of human will. Bentham criticized classical 
common law theory for proposing norms so vague that "a law is to 
be extracted by every man who can fancy that he is able: by each 
man perhaps a different law."43 According to classical positivism, 
law consisted of general propositions. Bentham believed that a law 
must be reducible to a command that one person might give an-
other.44 Austin was ,not as sure as Bentham that a law had to be 
reducible to a verbal form. He recognized that some intelligible 
commands could be merely expressive.45 What distinguished some 
authoritative commands as law, Austin believed, was that legal 
commands are not only accompanied by sanctions but are general 
- in other words, directed toward a class of the public.46 
The third principle was the "sources thesis": every valid legal 
norm was promulgated by the legal system's sovereign, and the 
norm's authority can be traced to that sovereign. According to 
Bentham, "the authenticity of a law is a question exterior to, and 
independent of, that of its content," and one therefore had to know 
When a man disapproves of a mode of conduct considered independently of any actual 
System of Jurisprudence he says there is a Law of Nature against it. ... If he cannot tell 
why he disapproves of it he begins talking of a Rule of Right, a Fitness of Things, a 
Moral Sense or some other imaginary standard which howsoever varied in description, is 
from first to last nothing but his own private opinion in disguise. 
POSTEMA, supra note 30, at 269 (quoting Bentham Manuscripts in the University College, 
London Library). Thus, as Postema pointed out, according to Bentham, "law can achieve its 
ends and serve adequately its primary tasks only if its content and authority can be estab-
lished without any need to rely upon investigation into either moral or traditional historical 
(or theological) matters." Id. at 315. 
41. AuSI'IN, PROVINCE, supra note 39, at 114 n.*; see also ROGER CoTIERRELL, THE 
Pourrcs OF JURISPRUDENCE 57 (1989) ("[I]t seemed obvious to [Austin] that the starting 
point for the science of law must be a clear analytical separation of law and morality."). 
42. AuSI'IN, PROVINCE, supra note 39, at 1. 
43. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAws IN GENERAL 192 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970). 
44. Bentham stated: 
A Jaw is a discourse - conceived mostly in general, and always in determinate words -
expressive of the will of some person or persons, to whom, on the occasion, and in rela-
tion to the subject in question, whether by habit or express engagement, the members of 
the community to which it is addressed are disposed to pay obedience. 
8 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WoRKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 94 n.IJ[li (John Bowring ed., 
London, Simpkin, Marshall & Co. 1843). 
45. "A command is distinguished from other significations of desire, not by the style in 
which the desire is signified, but by the power and the purpose of the party commanding to 
inflict an evil or pain in case the desire be disregarded." AuSI'IN, PROVINCE, supra note 39, 
at 5. 
46. See CoTI'ERRELL, supra note 41, at 60. 
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by whom and in what manner a norm was promulgated in order to 
determine its status as law.47 Furthermore, Bentham argued, valid 
laws possessed a very specific pedigree: they were promulgated by 
the legal system's "sovereign." Bentham was convinced that every 
legal system had a sovereign, including democracies, where the sov-
ereign was the entire citizenry.48 According to Bentham, "every 
law must come from a sovereign," since every law had to be the 
product of a will that was preferred "to the will of any o:ther."49 
Austin built upon the sources thesis as set out by Bentham and re-
fined the definition of the sovereign. According to Austin, the sov-
ereign was identifiable by two characteristics: habitual obedience 
from the bulk of the population and habitual noncompliance with 
the commands of any other human superior.so The key point for 
Austin, as for Bentham, was to discover the unique source of legal 
norms in a given legal system.s1 
B. Did Legal Positivism Exist in 1900? 
A curious feature of American jurisprudence in the early twen-
tieth century is that the expression "legal positivism" did not appear 
in legal scholarship. As mentioned above, its first notable presence 
in the general debate occurred through Fuller's lectures in 1940. 
Nonetheless, Fuller did not pick the expression out of midair. He 
borrowed it from a discourse that, although obscure, was already in 
motion. 
The occasion of the earliest use of the expression "positivism" in 
modem American legal theory itself presents a curious problem. 
When Pound first used the expression in 1912, it functioned as a 
theoretical homonym. Pound's meaning when he used the word 
"positivism" was not the same as we would understand it today -
even assuming the most expansive or flexible use of the term. In 
the survey essay The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurispru-
dence, s2 he traced the development of sociological jurisprudence -
47. POSTEMA, supra note 30, at 313 (quoting Bentham Manuscripts in the University Col-
lege, London Library). 
48. JEREMY BENrnAM, CoNsnnmONAL CoDE (1827), reprinted in 9 BENTHAM, supra 
note 44, at 10. 
49. BENTHAM, supra note 43, at 18. 
50. AUSTIN, PROVINCE, supra note 39, at 220-22. 
51. For Austin, who was most concerned with modem constitutional democracies, the 
source of law lay with that body of people that has ultimate authority to alter the state's 
constitution - the population at large. Id. at 272-76. 
52. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1-3), 24 
HAR.v. L. REv. 591 (1911) [hereinafter Pound, pt. 1), 25 HAR.v. L. REv. 140 (1911)[hereinaf-
ter Pound, pt. 2], 25 HAR.v. L. REv. 489 (1912)[hereinafter Pound, pt. 3]. 
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an early antiformalist theory and Pound's own contribution to legal 
theory - and listed four stages in its development: the positivist, 
or mechanical stage, the biological stage, the psychological stage, 
and the stage of unification.53 Pound used "positivism" in the sense 
found in traditional sociology, where the term was shorthand for 
the tradition associated with Auguste Comte. Comte's sociological 
positivism was based on his conviction that social life could be ana-
lyzed and reformed through the careful use of the mathematical 
techniques of measurement and analysis.s4 In the late nineteenth 
century, positivistic sociology had become associated with those de-
terministic social theories that posited that some set of forces -
economic or otherwise - "governed" the histories of societies. 
Pound's decision to call those legal theories that borrowed from so-
ciological determinism "positivist" is understandable but fraught 
with potentially confusing consequences. In fact, what Pound re-
ferred to as positivism did not really resemble classical legal positiv-
ism at all.55 "Positivism" as Pound used the term in 1912 did not 
reflect the separability thesis, the command theory, or the sources 
thesis.56 Pound's reference to positivism is most likely an interest-
ing nonstarter with regard to our question. 
After Pound, the next significant discussion of positivism oc-
curred in a debate between Yntema, a realist, and Morris Cohen, an 
antirealist, over Holmes's legacy. In Justice Holmes and the Nature 
of Law, Morris Cohen argued that Holmes's "idealist" thought was 
being abused by realist scholars.57 He argued that one group of 
53. Pound, pt. 3, supra note 52, at 491, 495, 503, 509. 
54. As one commentator explained, for Comte, "uniform organization of the totality of 
human knowledge was indispensable to pave the way for a fully-fledged science known as 
'sociology,' which alone would make it possible to transform collective life." LEsZEK Ko. 
LAKOWSKI, POSITIVIST PHn.oSOPHY 63 (1972). 
55. Pound stated: 
[Positivist theory] cills for search for a body of rules governing legal development to 
which law must and will conform, do what we may. Whatever exists in law exists be-
cause of the operation of these rules. The operation of these same rules will change it 
and will change it in accordance with fixed and definite rules in every way comparable to 
those which determine the events of nature .••• 
"[The theory] treat[s] social forces as though they were mills of the gods which men 
could at most learn to describe, but which they might not presume to organize and 
control." 
Pound, pt. 3, supra note 52, at 492-93 (quoting ALB10N WOODBURY SMALL, GENERAL Socr. 
OLOGY 84 {1905)), 
56. It must be noted that Comtean positivism is related to legal positivism in at least one 
important way. The separability thesis finds support - if not roots - in Comte, since nine-
teenth-century materialist sociology helped support the idea that social forces were moti-
vated by reasons and systexns independent of morality. 
57. "The danger today is not that [Holmes's ideas] will be ignored, but that their rich 
content will be impoverished by being harnessed to some ism ..•• Thus contemporary irratio-
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extremists had wrongly associated Holmes with "positivism," which 
Cohen defined as "view[ing] the law exclusively as uniformities of 
existing behavior, in total disregard of any ideals as to what should 
be."58 Yntema's response to Morris Cohen contained a lengthy and 
detailed defense of the realists' adoption of Holmes. Yntema 
wanted to keep the connection between Holmes and realism but 
discard positivism. He suggested that Morris Cohen confused posi-
tivism, which was not part of the realist position, with empiricism, 
which was an important tool of the realists.59 Yntema agreed with 
Cohen's definition of positivism, but he simply denied that he or 
Holmes were positivists.6° He thought Cohen had the right descrip-
tion of positivism but erred in linking it with realism. The linkage, 
as Yntema would say ten years later, was "so superficial as to bor-
der on the perverse."61 
The history of the definition of positivism employed by Cohen is 
quite interesting. Cohen introduced this particular definition in a 
1927 article entitled Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in the 
Law. 62 In that essay Cohen tried to contrast two competing, yet 
mutually dependent, approaches to jurisprudence - idealism and 
positivism. The idealist realizes that "it is ... impossible to engage 
in [legal reasoning] without exercising one's views as to what the 
policy of the law should be."63 The positivist believes that "the ju-
rist can dispense with any consideration as to what the law ought to 
be."64 Positivism "arises from the fiction that the law is a complete 
and closed system, and that judges and jurists are mere automata to 
record its will or phonographs to pronounce its provisions. "65 
The adoption of Cohen's definition of positivism by Yntema -
despite his other differences with Cohen - is interesting for a 
number of reasons. First, Cohen's 1927 definition captured most of 
nalists frequently support their case by his dictum that 'experience not logic is the life of the 
law.'" Morris R. Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 CoLUM. L. REv. 352, 356 
(1931). 
58. Id. at 360. 
59. "It is just possible that Cohen has thus confused the 'positivism' of continental juris-
prudence and empirical legal science, without noticing their totally different backgrounds and 
objectives." Hessel E. Yntema, The Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 CoLUM. L. REv. 925, 
946 n.62 (1931). 
60. Id. 
61. Yntema, supra note 25, at 1164. 
62. Morris R. Cohen, Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in the Law, 27 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 237 (1927). 
63. Id. at 239. 
64. Id. at 238. 
65. Id. 
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the elements of classical positivism. Its two-pronged test for posi-
tivism - the separation of law and morals and the· idea of law as a 
system of authoritative rules - looks a lot like what Fuller at-
tacked in 1940. Second, Yntema responded to Cohen's attempt to 
associate realism with positivism by denying the association and not 
by denying the accuracy of Cohen's definition of positivism. Both 
Yntema and Morris Cohen agreed that positivism endorsed the 
view that a judge can "attain perfect consistency" and that the law 
can be a "complete and closed system." This yiew of positivism 
was, without a doubt, how antiformalists defined formalism. 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the matters upon which Mor-
ris Cohen and Yntema agreed and disagreed in their confrontation 
over Holmes. They fought over whether realism tended to support 
moral relativism - something that Morris Cohen believed and 
Yntema strongly denied. Yntema, however, did not reject Cohen's 
assertion that positivism endorsed the separation of law and morals 
and the authoritative nature of legal rules. Although there was a 
lot of disagreement between Yntema and Cohen over the extent to 
which realism shared in positivism's moral relativism, they agreed 
that positivism endorsed some form of moral relativism in law be-
cause it was committed to the separation of law and morals and to 
the autonomy of legal reasoning. What Yntema resisted was Morris 
Cohen's suggestion that realism was a form of either positivism or 
formalism. 66 
C. Positivism and Formalism 
That legal positivism was not referred to by name very often 
during the early twentieth century in American jurisprudence may 
be explained by the fact that legal positivism played its role under a 
name not so easily recognized by modem ears. We know the defi-
nition of positivism that antirealists and realists agreed upon: 
"[T]he fiction that the law is a complete and closed system, and that 
judges and jurists are mere automata to record its will."67 Both the 
natural lawyer and the realist said they disavowed legal positivism. 
These clues point to the idea that the basic elements of legal posi-
tivism - the separability thesis, the command theory of law, and 
the sources thesis - could be found hidden within the theory that 
the realists thought they were attacking: formalism. 
66. Morris Cohen's equation of realism and positivism would reemerge as the core notion 
behind Fuller's attack on legal positivism in 1940. In the 1960s both aspects of Morris Co-
hen's definition of positivism were at the center of the debate between Hart and Dworkin. 
67. See Cohen, supra note 62, at 238. 
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1. Austin and Formalism 
One way of discovering the degree to which legal positivism is 
related to formalism is to look at the roots of both theories. In the 
case of modem legal positivism, the roots are easy to find. As we 
saw above, most basic histories of legal positivism explain that it 
originated with Bentham and Austin.68 The curious and important 
fact is that these figures - especially Austin - were closely associ-
ated with American formalism. The fact that legal positivism and 
formalism share the same foundation helps confirm the hypothesis 
that the positivism attacked by theorists like Fuller was similar in 
content and pedigree to the formalism attacked by the realists. 
Bentham and Austin appear as important sources for formalism 
in the writings of theorists of all persuasions in the early twentieth 
century. 69 In his criticisms of formalism, Pound equated mechanical 
jurisprudence with analytic jurisprudence, which he equated with 
nineteenth century English jurisprudence.1° Jerome Frank discov-
ered in Austin the origins of two basic formalist "myths": that 
"every law is a command" from an identifiable human sovereign, 
and that the law can be made into "an all-sufficient code. "71 
Frank's criticism of Austin paralleled his critiques of the leading 
formalists Christopher Columbus Langdell and Jo~eph Beale. Ac-
cording to Frank, they too believed that law was a closed system, 
·and they too were skeptical of the role of judge-made as opposed to 
judge-found law. According to Frank, Beale and Langdell believed, 
68. See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 4, at 26-27; HART, supra note 18, at 124-47 (1983); 
H.L.A. HART, EssAYS ON BENTHAM (1982); l<EEKOK LEE, THE POSITIVIST SCIENCE OF LAW 
16-17 (1989); POSTEMA, supra note 30, at 302-03. 
69. Fuller identified Hobbes and Austin as the sources of twentieth-century positivism. 
Fuller called Austin and his followers "analytical jurists," which seemed to be the popular 
term in the 1940s for nineteenth-century positivism. See FULLER, supra note 4, at 29-31. 
Others who would disagree with Fuller's conflation of positivism and realism agreed with his 
adoption of Pound's terminology and analysis of Austin. Llewellyn claimed that "[f]or the 
nineteenth century schools I am content to accept one of Pound's summaries .•.. With regard 
to the analytical jurists, Pound stresses their interest in a body of established precepts 
whereby a definite legal result is supposed to be fitted to a definite set of facts ..•• " Karl N. 
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next Step, 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 431, 433 (1930) 
(footnote omitted); see also Friedrich Kessler, Natural Law, Justice and Democracy - Some 
Reflections on Three 1)1pes of Thinking About Law and Justice, 19 Tur.. L. REv. 32, 50 (1944) 
(equating nineteenth-century legal positivism and the "emerging new school of thought 
within the legal profession: the school of analytical jurisprudence"). 
70. See, e.g., Pound, pt. 1, supra note 52, at 490-95. 
71. Frank observed: 
There appears to be more than chance in this combination of the advocacy of an exhaus-
tive code and the espousal of the command theory of law. That every law is a command 
becomes a more plausible assumption when law takes on the form of a seemingly com-
plete body of enacted statutes. 
JEROME FRANK, LAw AND nm MonERN MIND 208 (Peter Smith ed., 1970) (1930). 
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like Austin, that legal systems were posited by an authority and that 
the individual act of adjudication was a matter of discovering a pre-
viously unseen element of a preexisting structure. Thus, Frank's 
picture of Austin looked much like his picture of Langdell and 
· Beale.72 
In the period between the world wars, "analytic jurisprudence" 
- understood as Austin's thought and its nineteenth-century elab-
orations - was the main target for realism's attacks. The attack 
usually consisted of a repudiation of "analytic jurisprudence" and a 
statement of realist principle: 
Legal realism, as it called itself, has tremendously influenced the way 
of thinking of modem lawyers about the role of law in our society. Its 
criticism of analytical jurisprudence has made us realize that preoccu-
pation with efforts at making the law consistent and predictable (at a 
high level of abstraction) may afford an easy escape from a more im-
portant task: namely, of constantly testing out the desirability, effi-
ciency and fairness of inherited legal rules and institutions .... "73 
Albert Kocourek, who called Austin "one of the Founders of ana-
lytic jurisprudence," observed how the realists and other an-
tiformalists defined themselves through their definition of 
Formalism: 
The Austin century witnessed the rise and development of analytic 
jurisprudence .... 
. . . [Yet the] development attained by analytic jurisprudence has 
been the result of a struggle of opposing ideas .... 
. . . [Realism] was created in the course of a few years. This school 
combatted the idea that legal systems are closed logical structures .... 
In a word, the judge is not a mere automaton, but has a creative role 
in the application of law.74 
These attacks on "analytic jurisprudence" also demonstrate that 
for the antiformalists there was a close relationship between for-
72. Rumble has also noted the connection between American Formalism and English 
positivism: 
Despite important differences between Austin and Langdell, they were, in a sense, 
spiritually closer to each other than either was to the realists. Both men presumed that 
principles exist which provide a complete map of the law. They assumed that law has an 
underlying unity of doctrine that can be measured by the right kind of approach. As 
such, their position sharply contrasts with the views of the legal realists. 
Rumble, supra note 29, at 1004 n.87. 
73. Kessler, supra note 69, at 52. 
74. Albert Kocourek, The Century of Analytic Jurisprudence Since John Austin, in 2 LAW: 
A Cl!NruRY oF PRooRESS, 1835-1935, at 195, 216-17, 221 (1937). Kocourek distinguished 
between the European "freie Rechtsfindung" ("free adjudication") movement and American 
realism, although he insists that the latter is the "distinct inheritor" of the former. For pur-
poses of this argument, I have chosen to treat Kocourek's statements about the European 
and American movements interchangeably. Id. at 216-18. 
June 1995] Misunderstanding Positivism 2071 
malism and classical positivism. Pound's critique of "analytic juris-
prudence" targeted two of the three central elements of classical 
positivism: 
[T]he analytical method . . . has had two serious ill consequences: 
(1) It led in the nineteenth century to what Jhering called a jurispru-
dence of com;eptions, in which new situations were always to be met 
by deduction from traditional fixed conceptions, and criticism of the 
premises of legal reasoning with reference to the ends to be served 
was neglected. (2) The imperative theory of law - the theory of law 
as no more than a conscious product of human will - has tended to 
lead lawmakers, both legislative and judicial, to overlook the need of 
squaring the rules ... with the demands of reason and the exigencies 
of human conduct ... . 1s 
Pound noted that the analytical jurists regarded the "science of law 
as wholly self-sufficient," because they assumed the existence of a 
complete body of law with no gaps.76 The expression "jurispru-
dence of conceptions" was, for Pound and the realists, code for 
Langdell and Beale. For Pound and the realists, the central flaws of 
formalism could be related back to Austin. But if the antiformalists 
were rejecting Austin, then they must also have been rejecting 
classical positivism. The elements of classical positivism - the sep-
arability thesis, the command theory, and the sources thesis -
when combined, constituted formalism itself. Accordingly, the re-
jection of Austin implies that classical positivism entailed a concept 
of law as a uniform system, as a self-contained legal science, and as 
a complete system, free of gaps. Austin, it turns out, was the father 
of formalism and the original enemy of legal realism.77 
It is crucial, therefore, to understand how Austin's three princi-
ples of classical legal positivism were reinterpreted into formalism. 
A good place to begin is the relationship drawn by Fuller, Pound, 
and Bodenheimer between the "imperative" or command theory of 
law, which is a major element of Austinian positivism, and the idea 
that Formalism was basically a theory of legal deduction or concep-
tualism. Pound CO!fectly identified the cqmmand theory of law -
75. 1 POUND, supra note 27, at 91-92. According to Bodenheimer, in Pound's view: 
[T]he quintessence of the analytical approach to the law consists in a belief in the auton-
omous and self-contained character of legal science, joined with a conviction that it is 
possible to decide legal issues coming before the courts almost completely by the logical 
processes of deductive reasoning from given principles and established norms of the 
positive legal system. 
Bodenheimer, supra note 26, at 365-66. 
76. ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS 43-44 (1924). 
77. It is curious to note that modem realists, who have been surrounded by discussions of 
legal positivism since the 1950s, have abandoned Pound's category of analytical jurisprudence 
and, through the common link of Austin, directly equate legal positivism with that which the 
realists opposed. See, e.g., 1 McDouoAL & LAssWELL, supra note 25, at 53. 
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that law is "no more than a conscious product of the human will"7B 
- as essential to Austin, but then assumed that Austin would agree 
that the command theory entailed the claim that law is a "science in 
which conceptions are carried out logically even at a sacrifice of the 
ends of law."79 It is easy to see why Pound would reject Austin if he 
believed that Austin, like Langdell, was a conceptualist. It is not 
obvious why Pound, and then the realists who followed, conflated 
Bentham and Austin's command theory with the conceptualist 
claim that legal conclusions could be logically deduced from a priori 
premises. Yet the equation of the command theory with conceptu-
alism dominated academic criticisms of positivism until Fuller 
shifted the entire critique of positivism from the command theory 
- which modem positivists like H.L.A. Hart had themselves at-
tempted to repudiate - to the separability thesis and the sources 
thesis, both of which are entirely consistent with Pound's an-
tiformalism. The Fullerian critique has become so pervasive that 
few theorists today recognize the inconsistency between Pound's 
antiformalist/anticlassical positivist critique and Fuller's antirealist/ 
antipositivist critique. One might explain this inconsistency by sug-
gesting that Fuller had a hidden agenda that skewed his picture of 
positivism, or one might argue that Pound simply misunderstood 
the relationship between classical positivism and formalism. I reject 
both explanations - Fuller was a scrupulously honest theorist, and 
Pound and most of the realists were very subtle thinkers. To under-
stand why the postwar picture of positivism varied so much with the 
prewar picture, we must look at how Pound and the realists framed 
their main opponent, formalism. 
II. LEGAL REALISM AND LEGAL FORMALISM 
Frqm the outset, it is difficult to discuss realism because it is 
difficult to define who the realists were and when they wrote.80 On 
78. 1 PoUND, supra note 27, at 91. Pound, of course, read ''no more" to mean "only." 
79. 1 Id. at 92. 
80. "[Legal realism] constitutes a significant, though not always a dominant part of the 
intellectual matrix in which almost all modem lawyers, judges, and scholars of law have been 
formed." EUGENE v. Rosrow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE at xv-xvi (1962). "[M]ost 
legal scholars in the United States, from the late twenties on, have been realists in important 
respects .•.• " JEROME HALL, STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY 136·37 
(1958); see also Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 16 CAL L. REv. 465 (1988) (re· 
viewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REAusM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). 
The legacy of legal realism is difficult to estimate or evaluate. The realists' role in the 
politics of America, or its constitutional development, is an issue debated today for reasons 
of some contemporary import. One can detect its influence from the use of social science in 
the early desegregation cases to the rise of the critical legal studies movement. See Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citing social science evidence of the effects of 
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the one hand, it is possible to find legal scholars such as Oliver 
Wendell Holm.es and John Chipman Gray who were using realist 
techniques as early as the late 1890s.81 On the other hand, most 
scholars defined realism as a movement constituted by a set of au-
thors whose major work occurred during the 1920s and 1930s.82 
Nonetheless, between the late 1890s and the early 1920s, there ap-
peared significant scholarship that was clearly realist in method.s3 
segregation on schoolchildren); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its 
Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDuc. 505 (1986). Social science in the law 
emerged as part of the "prerealist" strategy to combat formalism; the "Brandeis Brief" -
educating an appellate court about general social facts relevant to the issues of rulemaking -
was first used in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908). See John Henry Schlegel, 
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. 
L. REv. 459 (1979). 
81. See, e.g., JoHN Clin>MAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw {Roland 
Gray ed., Macmillan Co. 1938) (1909}; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in 
Law, 12 HAR.v. L. REv. 443 {1899) [hereinafter Holmes, Science]; Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
The Path of the Law, 10 HAR.v. L. REv. 457 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, Path]. 
82. " 'Legal realism' is an expression that has been used most often to refer to the work 
of a group of thinkers, the bulk of whose writings appeared in the 1920s and the 1930s." 
ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTAIJSM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 36 (1982}; 
see also EDWIN W. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAw 538 {1953} 
{listing twenty "realist" authors from 1920s· and 1930s}; Golding, supra note 20, at 453 
("[R]ealism was a movement of the 1920s and 30s."). . 
83. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 13; Pound, supra note 52; Thomas Reed Powell, The Logic 
and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 15 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & Scr. METHODS 645 (1918). I 
agree with Bruce Ackerman that there were three separate phases leading up to and includ-
ing the appearance of realism. FtrSt, Holmesian "proto-realism," based on a historical cri-
tique of the idea that "the Common Law had a fundamental structure discemable by the 
architectonic intelligence." Bruce Ackerman, Law and the Modem Mind, 103 DAEDALUS 
119, 121 {1974). Horwitz described this period as the "attack on conceptualism." MORTON J. 
HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960, at 129 {1992). Second, the 
"prerealist" generation, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and Pound, who were "importantly affected 
by Progressive politics and Deweyite pragmatism." Ackerman, supra, at 121. Horwitz de-
scribed this period as "progressive" jurisprudence. HoRwrrz, supra, at 156-57. Third, "[t]he 
Legal Realists, whose work began in the 1920's and reached its maturity in the 1930's." Ack-
erman, supra, at 121. The realists relied heavily on the antiformalism of the proto- and prer-
ealists. Nonetheless, for the sake of precision, I am going to restrict the term legal realism to 
only those scholars writing during the 1920s and 1930s who self-consciously called themselves 
realists. 
Because realism developed during a period when other disciplines were beginning to ask 
similar questions of their own orthodoxies, it is hard to know at what point legal scholars 
began to regard their realist techniques as a form oflegal theory, as opposed to treating them 
as methods borrowed from other disciplines for the benefit of jurisprudence. According to 
one historian: 
The new legal criticism developed out of the same intellectual environment that gener-
ated new attitudes throughout American intellectual life ..•• Large numbers of Ameri-
can thinkers in many diverse fields began to adopt a more empirical, experimental, and 
relativistic attitude toward the problems and guiding assumptions of their disciplines. 
The impact of science and pragmatism, together with the desire for the improvement of 
man's social and political life that many intellectuals shared, brought new vitality, ideas, 
and methods to the expanding social sciences. 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and the 
Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM. HlsT. REv. 424, 424 (1969) (discussing developments in 
philosophy, economics, history, and political science that affected growth of realism); see, e.g., 
CHAfu.Es A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CoNSTITU110N OF THE 
2074 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:2054 
It is reasonable, therefore, to take seriously the realists' own 
self-description. The writings of Llewellyn, Frank, and others sug-
gest that, as a group, they were irregularly bound together by a cer-
tain kind of critique. The common thread that held them together 
was their antiformalism. But their rejection of the status quo was 
not an entirely nihilistic view. The realists did not attack their con-
temporaries because they believed that law was a meaningless pro-
ject. They believed they were working toward a better view of law. 
As Dean Anthony Kronman pointed out, the "negative side of real-
ism" was the mechanism by which they developed their positive 
views on the answers to the problems of "intelligibility" and "justifi-
cation. "84 Ifwe are to understand legal realism, however, and espe-
cially its relationship to legal positivism, we must take seriously its 
negative project.as 
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1935); EDWARD S. CoRWIN, CoURT OVER CoNS'IlTUTION: A STUDY 
OF JUDICIAL REvmw AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1938}; WILLIAM B. 
MUNRO, THE INvismLE GOVERNMENT (1928); Charles A. Beard, Historiography and the 
Constitution, in THE CoNS'IlTUTION RECONSIDERED 159 (Conyers Read ed., 1938) [hereinaf-
ter Beard, Historiography]; Charles A. Beard, The Living Constitution, 185 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. Par.. & Soc. Sa. 29 (1936) [hereinafter Beard, Living Constitution]. 
This article does not treat the relationship between these scholars and their colleagues 
and the realists, although the influences are significant in both directions. From the perspec-
tive of jurisprudence, the development of realism took place through its interpretation by 
legal scholars, even though scholars in other fields were the originators of some of the ideas, 
or expressed them more forcefully. 
84. Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 
335, 336 (1988). 
85. As Golding pointed out, the realists' negative project was complex and consisted of 
mutually inconsistent claims: 
[Realism's] ''negation" [of the prevailing orthodoxy] was held on a number of different 
grounds. On the basis of purely theoretical considerations it was argued that rules and 
principles have no existence; only individual judicial decisions exist. It was also argued 
that, despite what judges say, rules and principles do not determine judicial outcomes 
and hence are valueless for a science of law. And it was also maintained that since it was 
impossible to discover what the rules are that were actually being applied, they are val-
ueless. Fmally, it was held (by the most moderate realists or by the extreme realists in 
their moderate moments) that rules and principles do exist and exercise some influence 
on decisions, but that there are more interesting and important things to study about the 
law • • • • All these considerations can be found in the literature of realism, and some 
realists seem to have entertained all of them at once. 
Golding, supra note 20, at 452. 
It should be noted that this article deals almost exclusively with realism's negative project, 
which means that its positive project, especially its focus on the role of policy sciences in 
adjudication, will not be explored. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 82, at 60-72 (describing 
instrumentalist theory of law); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education 
and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE LJ. 203 (1943) 
(describing realism as policy science). 
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A. The Cohen-Pound List 
In 1935, Felix Cohen summarized the realists' diagnosis of the 
problems besetting contemporary legal thought.86 His essay sur-
veyed a variety of doctrinal fields, including corporate and constitu-
tional law, and concluded that many "leaders of modem legal 
thought in America are in fundamental agreement in their disre-
spect" for the "traditional legal thought-ways."87 Cohen attributed 
the crisis in American law to the hegemonic grip .of "mechanical 
jurisprudence."88 Cohen also referred mockingly to other estab-
lished jurisprudential scholars as "classical" jurists89 and held out 
the Restatement of the Law by the American Law Institute· as "the 
last long-drawn-out gasp of a dying tradition."90 
Cohen used the term "mechanical jurisprudence." Other real-
ists used other terms, such as conceptualism or "the formal style." 
We know that Cohen was adopting the same antiformalist posture 
of Pound because he selected exactly the same terminology and 
targets as Pound.91 If we reduce Cohen's statement to its elements, 
we see that, in his opinion, mechanical jurisprudence embraced 
concepts and principles that were unverifiable in that they stated 
neither sociological facts nor moral ideals. So conceived, legal pro-
positions and arguments were hopelessly independent or autono-
mous of ethics and the social sciences, and therefore insensitive to 
moral argument and social facts. This conclusion struck the key 
theme that ran throughout Cohen's argument, and one that formed 
the core of the antiformalist position: that, at a minimum, any cred-
ible theory of law had to reject the idea that law was autonomous 
from either moral theory or the social sciences. 
86. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 809 (1935). 
frl. Id. at 821. 
88. Cohen borrowed the term from Pound, supra note 13. 
89. Interestingly, Horwitz adopted the term "Classical Legal Thought" to describe late-
nineteenth-century legal formalism. HoRwrrz, supra note 83, at 10. 
90. Cohen, supra note 86, at 833. From the perspective of more than a half-century later, 
it appears that the reports of the Restatements' death have been greatly exaggerated. 
91. In mechanical jurisprudence, 
Legal concepts (for example, corporations or property rights) are supernatural enti-
ties which do not have a verifiable existence .•.. Rules of law, which refer to these legal 
concepts, are not descriptions of empirical social facts (such as the customs of men or the 
customs of judges) nor yet statements of moral ideals, but are rather theorems in an 
independent system. It follows that a legal argument can never be refuted by a moral 
principle nor yet by any empirical fact. Jurisprudence, then, as an autonomous system of 
legal concepts, rules, and arguments, must be independent both of ethics and of such 
positive sciences as economics or psychology. 
Cohen, supra note 86, at 821. 
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Cohen did not explicitly state what is wrong with treating law as 
if it were autonomous and independent of other intellectual tasks. 
His citation of Pound's essay Mechanical Jurisprudence revealed the 
source of the argument upon which Cohen relied. Pound argued 
that the old system of jurisprudence was built on a "scheme of de-
ductions from a priori conceptions."92 Pound did not resist the idea 
that law was an autonomous system because he rejected the non-
moral/nonempirical content of the principles upon which such a sys-
tem would necessarily rely - although this would be argued by 
later realists. Pound was instead concerned that if legal principles 
were unverifiable, then they must be true a priori, like premises in a 
syllogism, and that if they were like premises in a syllogism, then 
legal reasoning had to be like elementary logic - in other words, a 
matter of proof through deduction. That is why Cohen's first prin-
ciple, that the old jurisprudence was not verifiable, conforms so per-
fectly with Pound's various descriptions of mechanical 
jurisprudence. 
According to both Cohen and Pound, because the formalist the-
ory of law begins with the assumption that legal concepts were a 
priori and thus by definition unverifiable, the formalist theory of 
law entails a theory of legal reasoning, namely that legal reasoning 
is deductive.93 As a result of looking at Pound, therefore, we can 
add one more element to Cohen's scheme: the essence of applying 
a legal rule is that it is applied deductively, in other words, like a 
rule of logic. 94 
Other antiformalists identified similar problems in what they 
saw as the prevalent legal theory of their day. For Frank, some-
thing called "mechanistic law" governed jurisprudence. Like Co-
hen, Frank faulted the old system for its "obsessive interest in legal 
rules" and its naive belief that the science of law could provide 
92. According to Pound, the formalists tried to depict law as a science, but this was an 
illusion: 
I have referred to mechanical jurisprudence as scientific because those who administer it 
believe it such. But in truth it is not science at all. We no longer hold anything scientific 
merely because it exhibits a rigid scheme of deductions from a priori conceptions •••• 
The idea of science as a system of deductions has become obsolete. 
Pound, supra note 13, at 608. 
93. See, e.g., cOhen, supra note 86, at 847 (referring to general legal principles as "legal 
logic or metaphysics"). 
94. Duncan Kennedy explained: 
The decision process is called rule application only if the actor resolutely limits him-
self to identifying those aspects of the situation which per se, trigger his response •••• The 
minute he begins to look over his shoulder at the consequences of responding to the 
presence or absence of the per se elements [he is no longer acting like a judgej. 
Kennedy, supra note 3, at 359. 
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"certainty and predictability."95 Llewellyn, in an ambitious work of 
historical analysis, determined that from the Civil War until the 
1920s, the American legal community had been in the grips of a 
style of judicial reasoning he designated "the formal style." The 
formal style was authoritarian, mechanical, and logical: "[T]he 
rules of law are to decide the cases .... Opinions run in deductive 
form with an air or expression of single-line inevitability."96 
It would appear from a review of the literature that "formalism" 
was not a term found in jurisprudence until after Llewellyn began 
using the expression - or a shortened version of it. In the last 
thirty years, however, the term has become a standard way of 
describing a certain legal perspective. It is currently popular to bor-
row Llewellyn's analysis of the alternating styles of jurisprudence in 
America and to describe the period between 1860 and 1920 as the 
age of formalism.97 It must be stressed that we will be talking about 
a group of thinkers and calling them formalists, even though those 
thinkers and almost none of their critics used that name. Use of the 
expression formalism is a convenience - a concession, almost, to 
modem vernacular. 
Dean Langdell, Joseph Beale, and Harvard Law School are 
commonly identified with formalism and bore the brunt of many of 
the realists' early attacks.98 Langdell was the first dean of Harvard 
95. FRANK, supra note 71, at 142. 
96. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADmoN: DECIDING .APPEALS 38 
(1960). Although published in 1960, this book represents and summarizes Llewellyn's basic 
views since the 1920s. Id. at 508 (commenting that ''the present volume is a direct product" 
of work done in "the late '20's and early '30's"). 
97. "Formalism - the notion that social controversies could be resolved by deductions 
drawn from first principles on which all men agreed or by inductions drawn from the 'evi-
dence' of past decisions - thus became the common denominator of late nineteenth century 
American jurisprudence." Nelson, supra note 3, at 566. 
Nelson's use of the category is especially interesting. He argued that the antislavery juris-
prudence that opposed decisions such as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 
(1857), helped bolster formalism's rise to preeminence after the Civil War. Nelson, supra 
note 3, at 544-66. The number of modem authors who refer to the "age of formalism" is 
large. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 83, at 254; SUMMERS, supra note 82, at 138-56; Ken-
nedy, supra note 3; David Lyons, Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism - A Pathological 
Study, 66 CoRNELL L. REv. 949, 959 (1981}. In The Ages of American Law, Grant Gilmore 
refers to this era as "The Age of Faith" and characterizes the period as one of expulsion into 
"the law's black night." GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41 (1977). In 
contrast to Llewellyn, Neil Duxbury offers an account that emphasizes the continuity be-
tween the Formalist Era and its successors. NEIL DUXBURY, PATIERNS OF AMERICAN JURIS-
PRUDENCE (forthcoming 1995). For recent accounts that offer a revised and more positive 
perspective on formalism, see Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509 (1988); Ernest 
J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988). 
98. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 86, at 821; William 0. Douglas, A Functional Approach to 
the Law of Business Associations, 23 ILL. L. REv. 673 (1929); Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Re-
view, 40 HARv. L. REv. 142 (1926}; see also SUMMERS, supra note 82, at 26 (identifying 
Langdell and Beale as central figures of formalism); Golding, supra note 20, at 444 (noting 
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Law School, and although his reign did not last into the twentieth 
century, his influence was sustained through his writings and 
protegees.99 As Grant Gilmore put it, "if Langdell had not existed, 
we would have had to invent him .... However absurd, however 
mischievous, however deeply rooted in error it may have been, 
Langdell's idea [that law is a science] shaped our legal thinking for 
fifty years."100 In the following section I will determine whether, 
and to what extent, Cohen and Pound's three elements can be 
found in Langdell's and Beale's writings and then examine the sub-
stance of the realist critique of formalism. 
1. Langdell 
Langdell believed that law was a science. He declared in 1886 
that it 
[i]s indispensable to establish at least two things; first that law is a 
science; secondly that all the available materials of that science are 
contained in printed books .... [T]he library is ... to us all that the 
laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists, all 
that the museum of natural history is to the zoologists, all that the 
botanical garden is to the botanists.101 
In his preface to his casebook on contracts, Langdell argued that 
the study of the law could be reduced to the study of a handful of 
significant cases, with each case representing a principle of law.102 
Langdell's "scientific" method resulted in some doctrinal claims 
that confounded other scholars. For example, when Langdell wrote 
his treatise on contracts, the "mailbox rule" had not yet become 
settled law in American jurisdictions. The rule states that a con-
tract becomes binding when it is signed and mailed by the offeree, 
not when the document is received by the offeror.103 Langdell ar-
gued that the very logic of contract law dictated that a written no-
tice stating that a proffered contract had been accepted by the 
that the first attack on formalism was led by Holmes against Langdell); Kronman, supra note 
84, at 335 (equating realism and the attack on "the Langdellian project"); Schlegel, supra 
note 80. 
99. Langdell was dean from 1870 until 1895. See ARnnm. E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAw AT 
HARVARD 162-205 (1967) ("The Langdell Era"); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 
U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1983). 
100. Gil.MORE, supra note 97, at 42 (1977). 
101. Address by C. Langdell to the Harvard Law School Association, 1886, quoted in 
SUTHERLAND, supra note 99, at 175. 
102. c.c. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcrs at vi (Boston, 
Little, Brown 1871) (noting that the number of fundamental legal doctrines is not very large, 
but "to have such mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and 
certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer"). 
103. See 1 ARnnm. LINTON CoRBIN, CoRBIN ON CoNTRAcrs § 78 (1963). 
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offeree must be received by the offeror before the contract could be 
formed.104 Langdell noted that those who supported the mailbox 
rule "claimed that the purposes of substantial justice, and the inter-
ests of the contracting parties as understood by themselves" would 
be best served by the rule.105 His response was "the true answer to 
this argument is that it is irrelevant."106 
There are three aspects of Langdell's treatment of the mailbox 
rule that merit attention. First, Langdell began his analysis of the 
mailbox rule with a very specific picture of the meaning of a con-
tract. Langdell's general definition of a contract relied upon a spe-
cific conception of consideration. While his argument follows 
logically, it does not allow for a more textured, less general concep-
tion of what counts as a contract or the varying roles that considera-
tion might play in the formation of a contract. Second, Langdell's 
rejection of reasons from "substantial justice," or the interests of 
contracting parties, as "understood by themselves" seems counter-
intuitive. Assuming that Langdell was right, and the concept of 
"contract" simply means bilaterally communicated - and received 
- consent, why would a complex society want to retain "contract" 
law, as opposed to some permutation of contract law to which we 
could give a different name? 
Third, and finally, we should note something not in Langdell's 
argument. He did not ignore the fact that the courts either did or 
did not agree with his conclusion that the mailbox rule is bad law. 
He attempted, in at least two ways, to reconcile his conclusion with 
those jurisdictions that decided to the contrary. For the vast major-
ity of courts that upheld the parties who urged the rule, but did not 
104. When Langdell confronted the mailbox problem, the courts of England and New 
York had adopted the rule, but those of Massachusetts had rejected it. See C.C. LANGDELL, 
A SUMMARY OF nm LAw OF CoNIRAcrs 18 (Boston, Little, Brown 2d ed. 1880) (citing 
McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co., (18 Mass. (1 Pick.} 278 (1822); Mactier's Admrs. v. Frith, 6 
Wend. 103 (N.Y. 1830}; Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818)). 
Langdell argued that the priority of the offeror's receipt of the offeree's acceptance followed 
from the doctrine that a promise could not be binding unless it was supported by considera-
tion. The consideration for the offer was the offeree's return promise. But a promise by its 
nature is not complete until communicated; and Langdell reasoned that an unreceived prom-
ise was a promise uncommunicated. Therefore, merely the intention to promise, without its 
receipt, was not consideration. 
Langdell noted that of the many cases that ruled in favor of the party urging a version of 
the mailbox rule, all but three did so with holdings based on other grounds; either they did 
not mention the rule, or they referred to it only in dicta. The remaining three, he felt, were 
"neutralized" by the force of the reasoning of their dissenting opinions. See LANGDELL, 
SUMMARY, supra, at 18 (discussing McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co., 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 278 
(1822); Vassar v. Camp, 11 N.Y. 441 (1854); Thomson v. James, 18 D. 1 (Scot. Sess. 1855)). 
105. LANooELL, supra note 104, at 20. 
106. Id. at 20-21. 
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build the rule in to their holdings, Langdell tried to distinguish: He 
explained why, in individual cases, the specific facts dictated the 
outcome without relying on the mailbox rule. For the three cases 
that flatly contradicted him, Langdell tried to show that they were 
anomalous.107 
Langdell's writings simply do not support the claim that he was 
a "legal theologian" in the sense that he believed that the mailbox 
rule existed independently of what courts actually did.10s Langdell 
was acutely aware of the fact that legal principle, unsupported by 
the actual law found in the judgments of courts, was unlikely to be a 
correct statement of the law. That some might think otherwise is a 
bit of a mystery.109 Langdell treated the decisions of courts as re-
sults from a "laboratory" from which all reliable conclusions about 
the principles of law were drawn.110 Yet, it became commonplace 
to call Langdell a "legal theologian" who believed that legal princi-
ples were eternally inscribed in some "heaven of concepts."111 This 
conclusion, in effect, turns Langdell into some sort of "amoral" nat-
ural lawyer. The claim that Langdell endorsed any sort of natural 
law theory is especially difficult to make sense of, since such a the-
ory apparently would picture law as having an existence independ-
ent and prior to legal practice, but its content would not even be 
107. See supra note 104. 
108. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Review, 14 AM. L. REv. 233, 234 (1880). In cor-
respondence, Holmes had this opinion of Langdell's mailbox rule argument: 
A more misspent piece of marvellous ingenuity I never read, yet it is most suggestive 
and instructive. I have referred to Langdell several times in dealing with contracts be-
cause to my mind he represents the powers of darkness. He is all for logic and hates any 
reference to anything outside of it .... 
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (Apr. 10, 1881), in 1 
HoLMES-Pou.oCK LETTERS 16-17 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941) [hereinafter Letter to 
Pollock]. 
109. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HlsToRY OF AMERICAN LAW 535 (1973) (stat-
ing that Langdell proposed "a geology without rocks, an astronomy without stars"); \Villard 
Hurst, Changing Responsibilities of the Law School: 1868-1968, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 336, 336 
(alleging that Langdell thought law was a fixed body of knowledge). 
110. The idea that the study of law was an empirical science was a very popular formalist 
metaphor. Cases were "specimens"; the facts of cases were like "the apple which suggested 
.... the Jaw of gravitation." William A. Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education, 28 
AM. L. REv. 709, 713 (1894). Grey's picture of Langdell's science of law was that it was a 
deductive science, like mathematics. See Grey, supra note 99, at 16 ("[Langdell's system] 
readily suggests a structural analogy with Euclidian geometry."). However, if one compares 
Langdell's science of law to biology - especially in the inductive Darwinian mode - then 
one sees that "Langdell's return to original sources ••• and his references to the 'growth' of 
doctrine, when seen in their late-nineteenth-century context, suggest organicism rather than 
unitary conceptualism." Marcia Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law as Science: The Begin-
ning of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REv. 1, 35 (1980). 
111. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, Jhering's Heaven of Concepts and Modem Analytical Juris-
prudence, in EssAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHn.osOPHY 265 (1983). 
June 1995] Misunderstanding Positivism 2081 
based on morality but instead on something else - often referred 
to by the critics of formalism as mere or pure logic.112 
The equation of formalism with natural law - which would 
have shocked Lon Fuller - had its origins in Holmes's early an-
tiformalist critique of Langdell.113 In reviewing Langdell's Sum-
mary of the Law of Contracts114 Holmes first coined the now-
famous slogan, "[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience."115 Although Holmes could not help but be impressed 
by the treatise, he found Langdell's treatment of precedent 
cramped and unusable: "[Langdell's] explanations and reconcilia-
tions of the cases would have astonished the judges who decided 
112. It is difficult to imagine a normative system that is based on pure logic; ostensibly 
this is supposed to suggest that the formalist norms do not privilege one value system over 
another - assuming that one accepts a strict contrast between means and ends. Curiously, 
to the extent that one could imagine such a system based on pure process, it might be related 
to certain interpretations of John Rawls made by critics of his argument for the "original 
position." JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LmERAUSM 
AND TiiE LlMrrs OF JUSTICE 122-30 (1982). 
Nonetheless, the most enduring image of Langdell is precisely that of an amoral natural 
lawyer. Thus, Richard Posner claimed that Langdell and other nineteenth-century formalists 
believed that the premises from which judges deduced legal conclusions were "self-evident" 
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 182 (1986). Grant Gilmore accused Langdell of 
believing that "there is one true rule of law which, being discovered, will endure, without 
change, forever." GILMORE, supra note 100, at 43; see also James G. Wiison, The Morality of 
Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REv. 431, 459 (1985) (stating that Gilmore "concluded that formal-
ism's advocates have always assumed that their work was linked to immutable principles"). 
Wtlliam Nelson explicitly equated Langdellian formalism and natural law by attempting 
to demonstrate that the rise of formalism in the late nineteenth century was a backlash 
caused by the suppression of "higher law" or natural law jurisprudence before the Civil War. 
Nelson claimed to find "higher law language" in the treatises of formalists such as Thomas 
Cooley and John Dillon. Nelson, supra note 3, at 565; see also Steven M. Quevedo, Com-
ment, Formalist and Instrumentalist Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 CAL. L. REv. 119, 
132-33 (1985) (noting that "[m]any of the cases Nelson uses to describe nineteenth-century 
antislavery 'formalism' in fact show judges who wholly disregarded existing law in order to 
bring about justice in accordance with higher law"). Nelson's argument brings us full circle: 
for him, formalism required the law-applier to use adjudication as a tool to promote justice. 
As Lynda Paine noted, Nelson's " 'formalism' refers to a position which views law as a means 
for bringing about a society which conforms to Natural Law." Lynda Sharp Paine, Instru-
mentalism v. Formalism: Dissolving the Dichotomy, 1978 WIS. L. REv. 997, 1013. 
113. Holmes's critique of formalism predated the appearance of realism. See MORTON G. 
WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMAUSM 11-27 (1976) 
(maintaining that Holmes, Thorstein Veblen, and John· Dewey were the key figures in the 
"revolt against formalism"); Golding, supra note 20, at 452 (averring that the realists' critique 
of formalism was based on the work of Holmes and John Chipman Gray). Holmes's critique 
of Langdell was readily adopted by the realists; therefore, for purposes of defining formalism, 
this section shall treat the aspects of Langdell's work that Holmes identified and rejected as 
virtually the same as those aspects that realism attributed to formalism. See, e.g., Cohen, 
supra note 86, at 828 (noting Holmes's attempts to reduce legal concepts to empirical 
conditions). 
114. LANGDELL, supra note 104. 
115. Holmes, supra note 108, at 234. 
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them."116 It seemed to Holmes that in embracing formalism, Lang-
dell sacrificed accuracy and imagination in order to gain a spurious 
intellectual tidiness.117 In later essays Holmes expanded his cri-
tique of Langdell to cover formalism as a movement. According to 
Holmes, formalism sought to clothe judicial decisions in the lan-
guage of formal "logical deduction"118 and to reason from "general 
axioms."119 Formalists sought to make law "work[] out like mathe-
matics" and to convince themselves that, if men differed over a 
question of law, "it meant simply that one side or the other were 
not doing their sums right, and, if they would take more trouble, 
agreement would inevitably come."120 By emphasizing the role of 
deduction in formalism, Holmes linked Langdell to the idea that 
there were a priori legal truths, and so connected Langdell - and 
formalism - to natural law.121 
The attribution of natural law to Langdell was groundless. It 
was in fact a strategic move designed to help strengthen the nascent 
antiformalist theories being developed by Holmes and other Pro-
gressive legal scholars like Pound. As Horwitz - who cannot be 
accused of sympathizing with formalism - noted, "the Progressive 
charge that [formalists] turned to natural law [is] [i]n my judgment 
... largely a fabrication of Progressive thought."122 Horwitz under-
stood, better than any other historian of American jurisprudence, 
why so many scholars ranging from Pound to Posner would make 
such a crucial mistake about the nature of formalism. If legal rea-
soning had to be purely deductive, then one needed legal premises 
that were not the product of nondeductive processes, such as discre-
tion or legislation. The only premises that could fit this description 
were a priori claims that were either self-evident or true because 
they reflected some metaphysical reality. Thus, according to Hor-
witz, the first element of the Cohen-Pound list, that legal principles 
116. Letter to Pollock, supra note 108, at 17. 
117. "Mr. Langdell's idea in the law, the end of all his striving, is the logical integrity of 
the system. ••• But ••• he is less concerned with his postulates than to show that the conclu-
sions from them hang together." Holmes, supra note 108, at 234. 
118. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Principle, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. RBv. 1, 7 
(1894). 
119. Holmes, Path, supra note 81, at 465. 
120. Id. 
121. The theory Holmes attributed to Langdell has been described by one contemporary 
scholar as "determinate-formalism." BURTON, supra note 15, at 4. Burton noted that "Lang-
dell's effort to create a determinate-formalist science of law is a now undisputed object lesson 
[in the failure of a legal theory]." Id. 
122. HORWI'IZ, supra note 83, at 158. Horwitz noted that Cover's research on the conflict 
between natural law and formalism in antebellum America undercut the realists' claim that 
the formalists "embraced" "higher law." Id. at 158. 
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are true a priori, was not attributed to the formalists as a result of 
anything they said, but rather because it was a logical consequent of 
the claim - attributed by anti-formalists to the formalists - that 
legal reasoning was deductive.123 
Many sophisticated historians, such as Horwitz, were content to 
leave unquestioned the claim that the formalists believed that legal 
reasoning was deductive and instead focused their critical attention 
on the claims that follow from the claim that legal reasoning is de-
ductive.124 It is not, however, cl~ar that Langdell believed that legal 
reasoning was deductive, at least not in the way that has been at-
tributed to him. If in fact Langdell was following in the footsteps of 
Bentham and Austin, one would expect to see in Langdell the influ-
ence of the separability thesis, the command theory, or the sources 
thesis, since these were the central tenets of classical positivism. 
But one of the most important implications of classical positivism 
was that law was the product of human will, whether by legislation 
or judicial discretion. At its very core, classical positivism rejected 
the idea that legal concepts have an a priori existence: Austin and 
Bentham found Blackstone incredible precisely because classical 
common law theory ignored the contingent and mutable sources of 
law. If to be committed to the claim that law is deductive entails 
commitment to natural law, then it is very hard to understand how 
Langdell could embrace the central principles of classical positivism 
while at the same time believing that legal reasoning was deductive. 
In fact, Langdell's picture of legal reasoning was not completely 
compatible with classical positivism, but not because he believed 
that legal reasoning was deductive. Had Langdell believed that, it 
would be difficult to see how his theory could bear a family resem-
blance to classical positivism at all. Langdell's theory of legal rea-
soning was crippled, as Holmes would say, by being "all for logic," 
but not, as is commonly claimed, deductive logic, but rather induc-
tive logic.125 This slight difference will explain how Langdell could 
123. Horwitz stated: 
If general propositions could not decide concrete cases, it was unlikely that one would 
believe that legal implication from highly abstract conceptions could be non-discretion-
ary. If, by contrast, a concept was thought to have a fixed essence or core of meaning, it 
was correspondingly easier to derive particular sub-rules or doctrines from more general 
principles. Much of the Progressive charge that the ••. [Formalists] turned to higher law 
was really an expression of Progressive disbelief in the claimed power and scope of tradi-
tional legal reasoning. 
Id. at 157. 
124. See, e.g., id. at 199; Posner, supra note 112, at 182; Quevedo, supra note 112, at 123. 
125. See Letter to Pollock, supra note 108, at 17. 
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have been in important ways both the target that the antiformalists 
describe and also the first American classical positivist. 
The difference between the conclusions generated by a deduc-
tive and an inductive system may not be dramatic, but the method 
and assumptions that they require differ significantly. Many of the 
most influential studies of formalism have assumed that Langdell 
meant to model legal reasoning after a deductive science like math-
ematics.126 But Langdell made it clear that he thought that his legal 
method most closely resembled the new science of evolutionary bi-
ology. Langdell believed that the law of contracts could be best 
understood if one were to "select, classify, and arrange all the cases 
which had contributed in any important degree to the growth, de-
velopment, or establishment of any of its essential doctrines."121 
Although he compared the law library to laboratories of "chemists 
and physicists," he was at his most eloquent when he argued that 
the library is "all that the museum of natural history is to the zoolo-
gists, all that the biological garden is to the botanists."128 For Lang-
dell, the "truth" of a legal doctrine was like the "truth" about the 
evolution of an organism: what mattered was not just the final re-
sult, but the specific causes and unpredictable forces that got the 
current doctrine to its current state.129 By treating doctrine as an 
126. One example is Thomas Grey's reconstruction of the role of logic in Langdell's legal 
science. Grey suggested that the best analogy to Langdell's "conceptually ordered and uni-
versally formal legal system" is Euclidean geometry. In geometry, "[w]e believe that ••• 
axioms are not merely human constructs, but rather obvious and indubitable physical truths 
about the structure of space, from which nonobvious truths (like the Pythagorean theorem) 
can be proved by sequences of indubitable deductive steps." Grey, supra note 99, at 16-17. 
Grey looked to Mill's A System of Logic to explain how Langdell, who spoke so often of the 
role of observation in law, could rely on such a nonobservational metaphor like geometry for 
his model of legal reasoning. In Mill's system, the purpose of observation is to discover 
principles about the world that are "so well-confirmed by prior experience that no inconsis-
tent observation could rationally overthrow it" Id. at 19 (citing JoHN STUART MILL, A SYS-
TEM OF Loa1c 151-52 (London, Longmans, Green & Co. 1889)). As Grey noted, the systems 
of reason that rely on these sorts of "objectively true observations" are geometry, in which 
no one would believe an observation that contradicted the principle that parallel lines do not 
intersect, and classical physics, where no one would accept an observation that objects of 
different masses fall at different rates. 
127. LANGDELL, supra note 102, at vii. 
128. RECORD OF THE CoMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FIFili TO EIGHTH 1886, ON THE 
Two HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH ANNlvERsARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 87 
(Cambridge, John Wilson & Son 1887). Pound, for all his criticisms of Langdell, recognized 
the biological foundation of Langdell's theory of legal reasoning: 
As teachers of science were slow to put the microscope and the scalpel into the hands· of 
students and permit them to study nature, not books, so we have been fearful of putting 
reports into their hands and permitting them to study the living law. The merit of revo-
lutionizing legal instruction and putting it on a sound basis in this regard belongs solely 
to Langdell. 
ROSCOE POUND, THE EVOLUTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION 14 (1903). 
129. Sir Frederick Pollock argued that Langdell's method was primarily about recogniz-
ing the dynamic quality of legal doctrine over time: 
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organic living thing, Langdell saw himself as making a dramatic 
break with the Blackstonian treatise tradition that had dominated 
American law schools throughout the early and middle nineteenth 
century.130 
[No one] has been more ready than Mr. Langdell to protest against the treatment of 
conclusions of law as something to be settled by mere enumeration of decided points .... 
• • • Decisions are made; principles live and grow. This conviction is at the root of all 
Mr. Langdell's work and makes his criticism not only keen but vital. Others can give us 
rules; he gives us the method and the power that can test the reason of rules. 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AssOCIATION REPORT OF THE NINIH .ANNuAL MEETING AT CAM-
BRIDGE, JUNE 25, 1895, at 17 (Boston, Harvard Law School Assn. 1895). 
The difference between approaching law as an evolutionary science and approaching it as 
a physical science was most evident in Langdell's view of legal education. Before Langdell, 
law school education typically took the form of lectures that described the law as a fixed 
body of doctrine in the Blackstonian sense. See, e.g., SAMUEL WILUSTON, LIFE AND LAw 198 
(1941) ("In the Harvard Law School before 1870, as well as in other law schools, law was 
taught from treatises and lectures."); see also John H. Wigmore, Nova Methodus Discendae 
Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae, 30 HARv. L. REv. 812, 816 (1917) (stating that before Lang-
dell, the "didactic type was the same - set lecture and memorized treatise, or both"). Often 
the students were expected to memorize the text, and there was little or no discussion, since 
it "was assumed that the author of the textbook had examined the subject and had found out 
the true rules of law relative thereto. Thus the rules were given ... [and] it was assumed that 
the rules were right" Franklin G. Fessenden, The Rebirth of the Harvard Law Schoo~ 33 
HARv. L. REv. 493, 500 (1920). The case method, which Langdell introduced in 1870, de-
manded that students go beyond what Blackstone had said about the law and discover the 
law's principles on their own, through an examination of appellate decisions. See Charles W. 
Eliot, Langdell and the Law School, 33 HARv. L. REv. 518, 518 (1920) ("[Langdell] tried to 
make his students use their own minds logically on given facts, and then to state their reason-
ing and conclusions correctly in the classroom."); see also Edwin W. Patterson, The Case 
Method in American Legal Education: Its Origins and Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL Eouc. 1, 6 
(1951) ("The case method was designed to produce independent and creative thinking."); 
Young B. Smith, The Study of Law by Cases: A Student's Point of View, 3 AM. L SCH. REv. 
253, 254-55 (1913) (noting that the student studied the things to be defined, rather than 
ready-made definitions); Speziale, supra note 110, at 15 ("Essentially active, the mode of 
instruction did not emphasize absorption of information from a book or teacher .•.. "). It is 
ironic that Langdell was considered by his critics to be engaged in a transcendental, 
nonempirical activity, since the premise of the case method was to inculcate in law students 
the view that each lawyer had to determine the meaning of a legal rule from the materials 
before him, and not from a treatise or authority: 
Professor Langdell was always willing to reconsider a conclusion in light of new sugges-
tions. • . . A student recently informed me of a course in which Professor Langdell 
changed his opinion in regard to a case three times in the course of one week, each time 
advancing with positiveness a new doctrine. 
2 CHAru..Es WARREN, HlsrORY OF nm HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CoN-
DIDONS IN .AMERICA 457 (1908) (quoting William Schofield, 46 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 273, 276-
77 (1907)). 
130. The traditional approach to law that Langdell rejected was itself quite dependent on 
the use of deduction to generate legal conclusions from the few legal principles found in the 
Blackstonian universe. See Edward J. Phelps, Methods of Legal Education, 1 YALE LJ. 139, 
142 (1892) (noting that in contrast to the Langdellian method, pre-1870 law schools had stu-
dents memorize a few well-established principles since "[t]he habit of reasoning from princi-
ples to conclusions gave [the lawyer], if he was capable of attaining· it, the large 
comprehension and strong logical power which are the characteristics of the sound lawyer"). 
As Hoeflich noted, "[t]he notion that law must be treated as a deductive science like geome-
try had several American supporters during the first half of the nineteenth century including 
Hugh Swinton Legare, David Hoffman, and Daniel Mayes." Hoeflich, supra note 14, at 112. 
Langdell rejected the treatise tradition that was championed by lawyers like Phelps, 
Legare, and Mayes; that is why "old fashioned" teachers like Phelps despised the case 
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It was the pre-Langdellian scholars who, under the influence of 
Blackstone and other Continental theorists, embraced a quasi-natu-
ral law model, in which legal conclusions were deduced from a pri-
ori principles of law. It is ironic that Langdell was associated 'Yith a 
viewpoint that in an important way was the opposite of what he was 
trying to argue. Langdell certainly believed that law was a science, 
as did the theorists whom he opposed. But unlike the theorists' 
belief that law was a deductive science, like geometry or mathemat-
ics, Langdell's radical break was based on his rejection of the de-
ductive model of legal reasoning and his embrace of an inductive 
model based on the emerging biological sciences. Langdell was still 
working with a model that placed logic at the center of legal reason-
ing, but he had a very different idea of the nature of the principles 
that formed the system of law. Instead of believing, like Blackstone 
and his American followers in the treatise tradition that legal prin-
ciples were true a priori and unchanging, Langdell accepted that 
legal principles were the product of contingent events and could 
have been otherwise.131 
It is precisely Langdell's rejection of the deductive-Blackstonian 
picture of the origin of legal principles that brings us back finally to 
formalism's positivist roots. The classical positivists rejected Black-
stone because his theory of the common law was inconsistent with 
the separability thesis, the command theory of law, and the sources 
thesis. The American treatise tradition of Legare and Mayes was 
clearly inconsistent with the command theory and the sources the-
sis: their picture of law, like Blackstone's, was of a system of a pri-
ori principles - a position that followed logically from their 
embrace of the deductive theory of legal reasoning. But Bentham 
and Austin believed that legal principles were not a priori and un-
changing. The command theory and the sources thesis clearly 
method, and why scholars like Wigmore called Langdell's new approach "daring ••• in those 
days." Wigmore, supra note 129, at 817. On this last point I clearly disagree with Hoeflich, 
who has argued instead that "Langdell's notion of law as a rational science, therefore, was 
anything but unique or innovative. Indeed, to a very large extent, the Langdellian concept of 
legal science simply echoed Mayes, Legare' ••. and other earlier jurists." Hoeflich, supra 
note 14, at 120. I find Hoeflich's claim implausible given that the contemporaneous descrip-
tions of the reception of Langdell's approach universally describe a great break with the past. 
The conflict that followed the introduction of the case method clearly reflected a sense within 
the legal academy that the view of law and law teaching propounded by Langdell was a break 
with the Blackstonian treatise tradition that dominated American law before 1870. 
131. Thus, as Grey noted, Langdell did not believe that a system of contract law must 
include the element of consideration: "[Langdell] believed that the original adoption of the 
doctrine [of consideration] had not been logically required by pre-existing law - indeed, 
going the other way might have been 'the more rational course.'" Grey, supra note 99, at 27 
(quoting LANGDEU., supra. note 104, at 60-61). 
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pointed in just the opposite direction: that legal principles were the 
product of human will and utterly contingent. We should not be 
surprised that Langdell followed Bentham and Austin on this point. 
Langdell's formalism was a product of classical positivism's appear-
ance in America in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
2. Beale 
The other theorist who was clearly associated with Langdell that 
the realists held up as a paradigm of formalism was Joseph Beale, 
Langdell's colleague at Harvard and the American architect of the 
"vested rights" theory in the conflict of laws.132 The problem con-
fronted by the American system of conflict of laws is that a case 
may be connected to more than one state jurisdiction. A suit may 
involve the rights, duties, and disputes among persons and events in 
different places. In such a situation, the forum may decide whether 
to apply its own law or the law of another jurisdiction as the rule of 
decision in the case.133 The vested rights approach began with the 
assumption that in each jurisdiction the legal sovereign has exclu-
sive authority to determine the legal rights of persons within its ter-
ritory and the legal significance of events occurring there.134 In a 
conflicts case, the sovereign can apply its own laws directly or it can 
create rules about applying other jurisdictions' laws. This decision 
is an exercise of legislative discretion undertaken by the legislature 
or the courts in a quasi-lawmaking capacity.13s 
132. In England the vested rights approach was championed by A.V. Dicey. See gener-
ally A.V. DICEY & J.H.C. MoRRIS, CoNFUcr OF LAws (11th ed. 1987}. As Amos Shapira 
noted, "It is not at all surprising that Dicey, usually considered an adherent of Austinian 
Positivism, was inclined to endorse such territorialist ideas. His version of the vested rights 
doctrine, however, is said to display both positivist (effectiveness, convenience) and non-
positivist (justice in particular cases) notions." AMos SHAPIRA, THE INTEREST APPROACH 
TO CHOICE OF LAw 9 n.8 (1970) (citing R.H. Graveson, Philosophical Aspects of the English 
Conflict of Laws, 78 LAW Q. REv. 337, 344 (1962)). 
133. See LEA BRILMAYER, AN lNTRoouC110N TO JURISDICilON IN THE .AMERICAN FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 215 (1986). 
134. See 1 JOSEPH HENRY BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CoNFUcrs OF LAws 219 (1916). 
135. Whenever an event occurs to which the territorial law attaches a legal consequence, 
the consequence vests as a right that "remains" with the relevant legal actor until it is vindi-
cated by that territory's sovereign or some other sovereign. Thus, if an event occurs in a 
jurisdiction - Territory X - that invests it with legal significance, the right has vested under 
Territory X's law. If suit is brought in Territory Y to vindicate that right, it is a matter of 
empirical fact whether the right in question has vested. Y is obliged to recognize the duly 
created right: under the vested rights approach, "[w]henever a forum encounters a duly cre-
ated, foreign based right or obligatio it must accord it respect, by giving it proper effect. 
Otherwise the territorial-sovereign's ••• 'power to create rights entitled to extra-territorial 
effect' would be unduly denied ...• " SHAPIRA, supra note 132, at 9 (footnote oxnitted) 
(quoting Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims 
and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1097 (1956)). Beale 
argued that in order for Sovereign X's unfettered discretion to exist, Sovereign Y was neces-
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Beale's formalistic claim that every sovereign was the ultimate 
source of rights in its own jurisdiction was not some strange form of 
natural law. Realist critics suggested that Beale, like Langdell, had 
postulated an "essential nature of law" that would determine eter-
nal principles of conflict rules, regardless of what the courts or legis-
latures did.136 This charge by the realists simply is not true. Beale's 
purpose, in setting up the vested rights theory, was to avoid the 
natural law orientation of traditional conflict of law theory. From 
Beale's perspective, the old theory created an independent body of 
substantive law that sat above the actual decisions of sovereigns as 
a separate form of "alleged 'international' private law."137 
The problem with conflict-of-laws theory before the vested 
rights approach was that, like other natural law theories, it was im-
possible to know how to identify the objectively true body of rules, 
since each interpreter arrived at a different set of "natural" rules. 
Beale believed that conflict-of-law rules ultimately had to be based 
on the positive authority of sovereigns, and not on an interpreter's 
insight into the order of things. The vested rights theory had the 
advantage of solving multistate cases not according to a suprana-
tional body of law but according to "the law of the country in whose 
courts [the case] arises."138 Thus, Beale, in a sense, created a "tran-
scendental" principle of the conflict of laws in order to protect the 
decidedly nontranscendental foundation of legal rights.139 Beale's 
zeal to protect the unfettered capacity of a legal authority to create 
rights reflected his commitment to classical positivism's command 
theory of law and the sources thesis.140 It is because a sovereign 
has, by definition, unlimited legal authority to create rights,141 that 
the forum sovereign's unlimited power to disturb a vested right 
sarily and logically required to recognize the rights created (if at all) by X, and of course, the 
same was true in reverse - X was obliged to recognize all and any rights created by Y within 
Y's territory. 
136. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 
YALE LJ. 457, 459 (1924); see also FRANK, supra note 71, at 60 (comparing Beale's approach 
to Hooker's theology). 
137. BEALE, supra note 134, at 112. 
138. Id. 
139. See SHAPIRA, supra note 132, at 9. 
140. Thus, Shapira found it easy to link Beale's vested rights approach to Classical Posi-
tivism: "Traditional choice-of-law thinking is deeply rooted in Austinian Positivism and the 
analytical school of jurisprudence. The Positivistic flavor of the traditional approach is 
clearly manifested in its celebrated trilogy of principal underlying dogmas: the interrelated 
concepts of territorial sovereignty, legislative jurisdiction and vested rights." Id. at 9. 
141. See POSTEMA, supra note 30, at 230-37. 
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must, by logic, be curbed.142 While Beale's casebook revealed a 
formalist passion· with abstraction and completeness in the law, it 
plainly undercut the antiformalists' accusation that Beale's formal-
ism endorsed the view that law was based on a priori principles. 
Nonetheless, like Langdell, Beale was a target of the antiformal-
ists. Realists such as Cook and Yntema adopted and refined the 
Holmesian approach. Their attack on Beale had three dimensions. 
First, they criticized him for basing conflict of law rules on "meta-
physical" concepts such as "right" or "duty." For example, Cook 
accused Beale of approaching the conflicts of law with an a priori 
definition of legal terms.143 Cook objected to the vested rights the-
ory because he believed that it did not accurately describe the be-
havior of courts in the American system and because he believed 
that in a conflicts case, other factors should be considered by the 
court than just the "fact" that the law of another sovereign en-
dowed the parties with certain rights and duties.144 Second, Cook 
and Yntema criticized Beale for practicing mechanical jurispru-
dence.145 They claimed that Beale's approach required that vested 
nghts be the product of deduction.146 Third, Cook and Yntema uti-
142. It should not surprise us that Beale chose to include the following principles in his 
casebook on the conflicts of laws: "Whenever, therefore, there is a political society, there 
must be some complete body of law, which shall cover every event there happening .•.. Law 
once established continues until changed by some competent authority." 3 JosEPH HENRY 
BEALE, CASES ON nm CoNFLicr OF LAWS 502 (1902) (reprinting Swift v. Philadelphia & 
R.R.R., 64 F. 59 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894)). 
143. Cook, supra note 136, at 459. 
144. See id. at 476 (" 'Right,' 'duty' and other names for legal relations are therefore not 
names of objects or entities which have an existence apart from the behavior of the officials 
in question ••.. "); see also Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of 
Laws, 37 YALE LJ. 468, 476-77 (1928) (book review): 
One of the primary difficulties with the vested rights theory is the figurative and undif-
ferentiated character of its terminology •..• The difficulty is •.. that the symbols of the 
vested rights theory neither correspond to the social and economic facts with which 
courts deal nor even accurately suggest the things which are done in courts. 
145. Cook observed: 
It must be admitted that the "outrageous bit of nonsense" that men think in syllogisms, 
that they solve the problems of life by deductive reasoning, has apparently ruled in 
[Beale's theory] ...• 
[Realism] points out that the use [of principles and rules] never can be really 
mechanical; that the danger in continuing to deceive ourselves into believing that we are 
merely "applying" the old rule or principle to "a new case" by purely deductive reason-
ing lies in the fact that as the real thought-process is thus obscured, we fail to realize that 
our choice is really being guided by considerations of social and economic policy or 
ethics •••• 
Cook, supra note 136, at 486-87 (footnotes omitted). Yntema warned that the vested rights 
theory presupposed a dangerous form of mechanical jurisprudence: "[A]ny system of 
thought so fragmentary as to base the actual statement or reform of law upon purely logical 
deductions from combinations of abstract symbols without careful analysis of the practical 
purposes of legal traditions and institutions considered with reference to the concrete case is 
.•. socially dangerous." Yntema, supra note 144, at 477. 
146. See Cook, supra note 136; Yntema, supra note 144. 
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lized - or amplified - Holmes's critique that the formalists were 
unscientific.141 
B. The Realist Rejection of Formalism and Classical Positivism 
The realists had good reasons to criticize formalism. The partic-
ular form of positivism that Langdell and Beale tried to promote 
was quite crude and implausible. It took the worst aspects of Aus-
tin's command theory of law and joined it to a confused picture of 
legal reasoning. All versions of positivism rely, to some extent, on 
the identification of a rule of recognition and its commands. But as 
Hart and many others have since argued, Austin's test for sover-
eignty and his rule of recognition were inadequate.148 Further-
more, while Austin's version of positivism required a picture of 
legal reasoning that provided for the constraint of discretion, Lang-
dell and Beale only considered a role for discretion in the origina-
tion of legal principles. 
Austin explicitly embraced the idea that judges sometimes made 
law; unlike Bentham, he felt that a clear-eyed recognition of the 
situations in which judges act in a sovereign capacity would enable 
law-reformers to design changes that would allow the sovereign to 
implement its will effectively.149 Langdell seemed incapable of 
grasping this· important point - perhaps because of his attachment 
to common law - and for this reason formalism's positivist core 
was hobbled with an inadequate theory of legal reasoning. None-
theless, the antiformalist critique of Langdell and Beale did not fo-
cus on the ways in which they were inadequately positivist, but 
147. Cook, supra note 136, at 460; see also Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 6 
AM. L. SCH. RBv. 215, 221-22 (1928). Similarly, Yntema declared that Beale's technique "is 
superficial and, to that extent, unscientific. ••• It suggests almost no correlation with the 
studies of a generation in sociological or functional jurisprudence and in inductive logic and 
scientific method ••.• " Yntema, supra note 144, at 474. By "scientific method" Yntema 
meant something different from the valid operation of logic or the rule-governed operations 
of mathematics. His meaning is perhaps best illustrated by the following contrast he draws: 
"The table of logarithms and the formulae of stresses and strains are invaluable to the engi-
neer, but they cannot tell him whether the bridge is to be built or, if so, where, nor how high 
and how broad it is to be and how much it will cost." Id. at 481. Science, in Yntema's mind, 
had to do with discovering ends and fitting means to ends. 
148. HART, supra note 18, at 50-61 and infra text accompanying notes 212-13; see also 
JoSEPH RAz, THE CoNCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 27-43 (2d ed. 1980). 
149. Austin ridiculed the "childish fiction employed by our judges, that judiciary or com-
mon law is not made by them, but a miraculous something, made by nobody, existing from 
eternity, and merely declared from time to time by the judges." 2 AUSTIN, LECTURES, supra 
note 39, at 634. Austin was clear, however, in his preference for legislation over judge-made 
law: "no judicious or candid man will doubt ••• that a well-made statute is incomparably 
superior to a rule of judiciary law." Id. at 661; see also Hart, supra note 2, at 610-11 (com-
menting on the inevitability of discretion in adjudication because of the penumbra! meanings 
of all legal terms). 
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instead manufactured a set of charges that misstated formalism's 
positivist core. 
The antiformalist position was based on two lines of criticism, 
each of which was rooted in one of the elements in the Cohen-
Pound list. The first realist objection mirrored one of Cohen and 
Pound's charges. As adopted in the antiformalist critique of Lang-
dell and Beale, the charge was that the top-level concepts employed 
in their analysis of contracts and the conflicts of law were neither 
descriptions of social facts nor statements of moral ideas. There 
were at least two senses in which the realist charge made sense. 
First, as Holmes and Yntema claimed, the formalists ignored the 
real and significant differences between various fact situations; that 
is, in their pursuit of overly abstract top-level categories, Langdell 
and Beale sacrificed - or purposely avoided - careful inspections 
of actual factual differences and similarities amo~g the classifica-
tions they created.150 The second sense was set out by Llewellyn: 
that the formalists refused to bend rules and decisions of case law to 
the results that were - or could be determined to be - socially 
desirable. The lack of social fact or moral ideals in this second 
sense is not really a lack of analysis or technical knowledge on the 
part of the formalist, but rather a refusal to use legal reasoning in 
an instrumental fashion.151 
This second realist objection mirrored Cohen ~d Pound's claim 
that formalism was committed to a deductive model of legal reason-
ing. It is not clear what this claim really meant. It probably could 
not mean, as is often claimed, that the "top-level" concepts used by 
the conceptualist are presented as objective, or true a priori.152 If 
we understand Langdell to have been committed to discovering 
legal principles through induction, then the realists must be charg-
ing the formalist with using logic incorrectly either in discovering 
the original "top-level" concepts or deriving the conclusions that 
follow from those concepts.153 But the realist objection cannot 
mean, on a trivial level, that the formalists "obeyed" the canons of 
150. This is the modest realist criticism. It says that the problem with the formalists was 
not that they were not scientists, but that they were bad scientists. 
151. This is the strong realist criticism: "The formalist[] ..• appeal to notions of consis-
tency, harmony, and coherence is evident. The instrumentalists stressed existing wants and 
interests, social facts, available legal machinery, community policy, and the predicted effects 
of alternatives as the primary considerations in lawmaking, not consistency and the like." 
SUMMERS, supra note 82, at 143. 
152. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29. 
153. Summers referred to this criticism of formalism as "deductivism": "[A] judical deci-
sion could not be well justified unless it were strictly entailed by relevant antecedent 
premises." 
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logic or reason, in the sense that the realists flouted those canons. 
The realists respected and employed simple operations of rational 
method, as their own self-styled attempts to develop a legal science 
attest. In truth, the "abuse of logic" claim was not really about the 
method of reasoning employed by the formalist, but about the 
number and types of legal concepts the formalist found useful or 
acceptable.154 
Upon reviewing the realists' antiformalist analysis we can see 
how it was motivated by a deep rejection of the core elements of 
classical positivism. The realist critique of the first element of the 
Cohen-Pound list, the unverifiability of formalist legal theory, led 
naturally to the realist critique contained in the second and third 
elements of the Cohen-Pound list: the autonomy of legal principles 
from either social science or morality and the "abuse of logic." 
Ironically, both of these two flaws were virtues in the eyes of classi-
154. If all the realist meant when he criticized the formalist's "obsession" with logic was 
that the formalist used an inadequate set of initial legal concepts, then he was simply ob-
jecting that formalists were conceptualists. See id. at 155 (noting the confusion between the 
realist critique of the "abuse of logic" and conceptualism). 
Another interpretation of the "abuse of logic" argument comes from Llewellyn. He of-
fered a theory of "rule-skepticism" that held that even if legal reasoning was capable of being 
rational, legal argument ultimately was still indeterminate because there were so many prece-
dents and rules of statutory construction that no judge could apply them in a deductive, 
mechanical fashion. Under Llewellyn's rule-skepticism, indeterminacy had at least two 
sources: the malleability and variety of sources of law, and the variety of common law princi-
ples for interpreting precedent. In the face of such a multiplicity of outcomes, Llewellyn 
argued that to imagine that rational operations alone could ever make up the bulk of legal 
reasoning was simply wrong. Legal reasoning had to take into account, at least, the problem 
of selecting sources of law and selecting methods for the treatment of precedent. See 
WILLIAM TWINING, KAru. LLEWELLYN AND THE REAusT MOVEMENT 203-10 (1973). 
A third interpretation of the "abuse of logic" argument comes from Frank. He argued 
that the formalists were wrong because, to put it simply, judicial reasoning was not really a 
form of rational activity. Frank took seriously Judge Joseph Hutcheson's argument that 
judges are ultimately forced to rely on an alogical, nonrational mental leap that Hutcheson 
called the judicial "hunch." Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgement Intuitive: The Function 
of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1928). Frank's early writing pur-
sued a twofold project. Fust, he tried to explain why Hutcheson was correct. Frank sug-
gested that it was because the sources of indeterminacy went deeper than even Llewellyn 
suspected: The project of trying to expand the range of relevant premises and rules of adjudi-
cation was itself of dubious value, since the facts that one would plug into those rules and 
principles were themselves difficult to identify and often deeply subjective. See Jerome 
Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L. REv. 645 (1932); Golding, supra note 20, at 458-59 
(describing fact skepticism). Second, Frank tried to explain why this deep indeterminacy was 
so frightening to the formalists. For example, he attributed "Bealism" to subconscious psy-
chological longings interpreted through the theories of Freud or Piaget. See FRANK, supra 
note 71, at 60. Ackerman described Frank's interest in Freud: 
While no single work is typical of the Realist movement, Jerome Frank's Law and the 
Modem Mind has worn comparatively well and is probably the most comprehensive 
Realist effort to expose the fallacies involved in the Classical effort to state legal rules 
clearly and to systematize them around fundamental legal principles. Assuming a Freu-
dian point of view, Frank condemned this effort as an immature response to the fact that 
men have only imperfect knowledge and control over reality. 
Ackerman, supra note 83, at 121-122 (footnote omitted). 
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cal positivism. The reason why the realist objected to the autonomy 
of legal principles from either social science or morality was not 
because the formalist pretended for a minute that the content of a 
"top-level" legal concept was devoid of either social or moral con-
tent. The formalist, like the classical Positivist, argued instead that 
the acceptability of the content of a legal concept was irrelevant to 
its existence.155 This is simply the separability thesis and the com-
mand theory at work. Since the formalist was committed to re-
specting the authority of a valid legal concept regardless of its 
content, it should not surprise us that the realist - for whom all 
laws are open to social and moral evaluation - would oppose this 
element of the Cohen-Pound list.156 
It is also easy to understand why the realist would think that the 
formalist was guilty of the "abuse of logic." The command theory 
and the sources thesis required that valid legal principles - how-
ever identified - generate legal conclusions; otherwise legal results 
could not be traced back to the sovereigns that commanded them. 
But, the realists' real objection to the role of logic in legal reasoning 
was not that deductive logic was used to produce results from a 
priori principles, but was rather to the claim that practical reason of 
any variety - deductive or inductive - could be used to constrain 
the results that legal reasoning generated. Regardless of whether 
one adopted Llewellyn's rule skepticism or Frank's more radical 
fact skepticism, the real target of the realist attack on formalism's 
use of logic was the idea that legal reasoning could constrain legal 
results. The real focus of the realist critique of the "abuse of logic" 
element of the Cohen-Pound list was not that it is wrong to think 
that legal reasoning is deductive but rather that it is wrong to think 
that legal reasoning can constrain. 
The idea that legal reasoning constrains legal results is central to 
classical positivism; it is a central assumption upon which the com-
mand theory and sources thesis rely in order to explain how sover-
eigns use the law to constrain human action. Realists opposed 
155. Thus, Langdell's statement that justice is "irrelevant" in evaluating the mailbox rule. 
See LANGDELL, supra note 104, at 20-21. 
156. The separability thesis and the command theory were reflected in those statements 
by Beale that Cook singled out for his typical withering criticism. See Cook, supra note 136, 
at 460 n.10 ("A right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its exist-
ence should follow everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot be called in question 
anywhere." (quoting Beale, supra note 142, at 517)). There is no question that Beale saw a 
connection between his theory of vested rights and the separability thesis: "Law as the law-
yer knows it is absolutely distinct from any rule of conduct based on a moral ground no 
matter how strong," 1 JosEPH H. BEALE, A 'TREATISE ON THE CoNFLicr OF LAWS § 4.11, at 
44 (1935). 
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formalism because it brought to American jurisprudence the 
"model of rules" that formed the core of classical legal positiv-
ism.157 The realists rejected the idea that a legal system could be 
based on a small number of such principles because accepting the 
authority of these principles would bar the rejection of any princi-
ple because it was unattractive from the point of view of either so-
cial science or morality, and would provide constraints on the range 
of legal results available within the legal system. The elements of 
classical positivism that the realists rejected in formalism had to do 
with the capacity of a legal sovereign to limit the legal results avail-
able in a legal system through the objective identification of legal 
rules and the empowering of those legal rules to constrain legal re-
sults. What is concealed in the realists' antiformalist attack on the 
use of deductive logic in legal reasoning is an important and 
profound rejection of Austin's insight that law is an autonomous 
social practice.158 
Legal realism and legal positivism were, in fact, deeply antago-
nistic theories. The tensions between them were not well docu-
mented because they fought under other names. To see the state of 
legal positivism in the United States before 1958, one must look at 
the substance of the debate and not at the misnomers. Whether we 
call the object of our search formalism, conceptualism, analytic ju-
risprudence, Langdellianism, or Bealism is not important. What is 
important is to identify and to understand the relationship between 
157. The term "model of rules" comes from Dworkin, who characterized - accurately, I 
believe - the core of legal positivism as a commitment to the idea that 
[t]he law of a community is a set of special rules used by the community directly or 
indirectly for the purpose of determining which behavior will be punished or coerced by 
public power. These special rules can be identified and distinguished by specific criteria, 
by tests having to do not with their content but with their pedigree or the manner in 
which they were adopted or developed. 
Ronald M Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 17 {1967). Dworkin's de-
scription captures the three elements of classical positivism described at the beginning of this 
article. It is very likely that Dworkin's picture of the model of rules is adequate only for 
classical positivism, and that Hart corrected many of Austin's errors. See HART, supra note 
18, at 79-98 {discussing the distinction between primary and secondary rules). Furthermore, 
to the extent that Dworkin was correct in insisting on a theoretical continuity between Austin 
and Hart, Raz has argued persuasively that the model of rules is not the best foundation for 
legal positivism. See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 
{1972). 
158. The conflation of formalism's inadequate theory of legal reasoning with its poten-
tially adequate theory of law has been noted: 
The distinction between styles of reasoning and theories of law has played an impor-
tant but not entirely clear role in the formalism/instrumentalism controversy. The legal 
realists, for example, associated formalism with a strictly logical or deductive and quasi-
automatic reasoning style, and with theories of law including natural law and judicial 
conservatism. 
Quevedo, supra note 112, at 125 (footnote omitted). 
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these theories and their contemporary rival, realism, and their ulti-
mate heir, positivism. 
ill. LEGAL POSITIVISM AND THE LEGAL PROCESS SCHOOL 
If realism developed, to some extent, in reaction to a specific 
version of legal positivism, was the same dynamic repeated when 
realism itself became the object of attack? Part m first argues that 
a repeat of this dynamic is precisely what happened: the next stage 
in American legal theory came during the decline of realism, and it 
was brought about in part by theorists who were positivists. Sec-
ond, if formalism was, to some extent, an early form of positivism in 
American jurisprudence, did it evolve into another form of positiv-
ism that one can identify in modem theory? This evolution did oc-
cur. The legal process school, which had roots deep in formalism's 
conflict with realism, was a positivist theory based on the Austinian 
core found in formalism. Finally, what if anything, can be recov-
ered from formalism that is of any jurisprudential value? The an-
swer to this question is more complex and will not be given 
adequate treatment in Part m. I will, however, suggest in my con-
clusion that the forms of positivism that followed formalism are at 
least compatible with a number of different approaches to Constitu-
tional law. 
A. The Reevaluation of Realism 
It seems commonly assumed by those who study American law 
or jurisprudence that the legal process school did not possess a legal 
theory of great sophistication. It is rare, for example, to see the 
writings of the important scholars of the 1950s and early 1960s in 
collections that contain realists like Karl Llewellyn and Jerome 
Frank, or fundamental rights scholars like Ronald Dworkin and 
Laurence Tribe. Writers working within the legal process tradition 
did, however, operate with a background theory of law that was a 
version of legal positivism, although this background theory was 
not, at the time, identified as such. 
In fact, looking at Henry Hart's 1951 attack on Justice Holmes's 
alleged legal positivism, one might think that legal process and posi-
tivism were antagonistic theories.159 Hart attacked Holmes's "er-
ror" of separating law and morality; he equated Holmes's 
positivism with the central tenets of Llewellyn-like realism of the 
159. Henry M Hart, Jr., Holmes' Positivism - An Addendum, 64 HARv. L. REv. 929 
(1951). 
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1930s.160 Hart noted that one cannot wholly sever law and moral-
ity, and that the latter plays a complex role in shaping the former. 
Yet Hart was not a natural lawyer or a moral realist - he agreed 
with Holmes that only a fool would believe "that law was always 
right, in the sense of embodying eternal truth. "161 
Hart was an excellent example of someone who suffered a spe-
cific kind of confusion about legal positivism. He equated legal 
positivism with legal realism, which is peculiar - legal positivism 
was the object of realism's attack in the 1920s and 1930s. The great 
irony is that the values that Hart championed in the face of 
Holmes's separation of law and morality were themselves central to 
legal positivism.162 Hart's attack on positivism portrayed in a con-
cise way how the legal process school developed in reaction to -
and out of - the success of legal realism. Just because Hart was 
confused about the equation of legal realism with legal positivism 
does not mean that he was not right about something. He and 
others had begun to detect problems with legal realism, and their 
early criticisms foreshadowed what would eventually become, how-
ever briefly, the new dominant ideology of American law - legal 
process. 
Hart's essay was written during a period of transition in Ameri-
can jurisprudence in which legal realism was coming under serious 
attack from a new generation of legal scholars. Realism, which had 
come into prominence in the late 1920s, had come to dominate aca-
demic legal discourse by the end of the 1930s. Instead of settling 
into a period of comfortable orthodoxy, however, realism in the 
1940s confronted a wave of reaction that caused the movement to 
splinter as some realists began to retract some of their more ex-
treme statements.163 
There were two waves of reaction to the realists. The first was 
directed primarily against realism's first tenet, the temporary di-
vorce of law and morals. For the realist, the practical consequence 
of this temporary divorce of law and morals was that the scientific 
understanding of the law would later allow for its reunion with 
160. "The first part [of Holmes's The Path of the Law] explains what law really is -
something entirely separate from morals •.•• " Id. at 930. 
161. Id. at 936. 
162. Mark DeWolfe Howe attempted to draw attention to this point in his response to 
Hart's essay. See Mark De Wolfe Howe, Holmes' Positivism - A Brief Rejoinder, 64 HARV. 
L. REv. 937, 939 {1951). 
163. See SUMMERS, supra note 82, at 277-78. 
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morals so that law became a "means to an end. "164 The realists, 
however, did not pay much attention to the method by which ends 
were selected or justified. Most realists seemed content to borrow 
from early twentieth-century pragmatism.165 Given the diversity 
among the realists' moral beliefs and the fact that even the most 
relativist of realists approved of the policies of the majority during 
the New Deal, the divorce between law and. morality did not be-
come an issue until fascism began to rise in Europe.166 Regardless 
of whether relativism could be fairly attributed to realism, by 1940 
critics grew concerned that the realists' stinging critique of the oper-
ation of law in a democracy would render meaningless the distinc-
tion between the competing political theories of the Allies and the 
Nazis.167 The second wave of reaction also used fascism as its foil 
164. Herman Oliphant, The New Legal Education, 131 NATION 493, 495 (1930) ("[M]any 
[liberals] are eager to stop talking and begin studying law as a means to present ends."). 
165. See, e.g., JoHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 254-86 {1929); JoHN DEWEY, 
THEORY OF nm MoRAL LIFE 97-101 {1932). Most of the realists did not study moral philos-
ophy beyond developing a rough appreciation for the relationship between pragmatism and 
utilitarianism. See SUMMERS, supra note 82, at 47 ("[Most realists] appeared, at least in their 
theoretical moments, to adopt conventionalist and utilitarian notions of value."); see also 
Walter Wheeler Cook, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHn.osoPHY OF LAW: CREnos OF 
SIXTEEN AMEruCAN SCHOLARS 51, 59-63 {Julius Rosenthal Found., Northwestern Univ. ed., 
1941) {calling for the "application of scientific methods of inquiry to the field of 'values'"); 
Herman Oliphant, Current Discussions of Legal Methodology, 7 A.B.A. J. 241 {1921) (noting 
that law's duty is to advance shared values). Nonetheless, some realists were far more explic-
itly relativistic in their metaethical views. See, e.g., 'THuRMAN W. ARNOLD, SYMBOLS OF 
GOVERNMENT at iv (1935) (noting that law is "symbolic thinking and conduct which condi-
tion[s] the behavior of men in groups"); EDWARD STEVENS ROBINSON, LAw AND nm LAW-
YERS 225 (1935) ("[T]here is not now and never has been a !feductive science of ethics."); 
Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A. J. 303, 306 (1927) (stating that 
human knowledge has "reached the era of relativity"); Underhill Moore, The Rational Basis 
of Legal Institutions, 23 CoLUM. L. REv. 609, 612 (1923) {"Ultimates are phantoms drifting 
upon the stream of day dreams."); Walter Nelles, Book Review, 33 CoLUM. L. REv. 763, 767 
(1933) {"I deny ethical right and ought without qualification."). 
166. As Purcell pointed out: 
Although the young [realist] critics were firm believers in democracy, most of them 
embraced an empirical relativism that raised both practical and theoretical questions 
about the nature of democratic government. 
To harm the cause of democratic governments was the last thing the realists hoped to 
do .••. [They] were all ardent New Dealers who shared a strong hostility to the method 
of juristic reasoning that struck down social welfare laws and wrought what they consid-
ered great human injustices. 
Purcell, supra note 83, at 434, 4~6. 
167. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 316 (1940) {"There is a certain danger 
that the skepticism of realistic jurisprudence may, perhaps very much against the wishes of its 
representatives, prepare the intellectual ground for a tendency towards totalitarianism."); 
Lucey, supra note 23, at 533 {"Democracy versus the Absolute State means Natural Law 
versus realism."); see also Harris, supra note 4, at 179-82 (connecting legal realism with ideal-
ism and suggesting idealism leads to fascism). Lon Fuller and Roscoe Pound endorsed and 
repeated these criticisms of realism. See Fuu.ER, supra note 4, at 89-91; RoscoE PoUND, 
CoNTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY 9 (1940). It should be noted that prominent realists at-
tempted to refute the charge that they were moral relativists. See, e.g., K.N. Llewellyn, Qn 
Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 CoLUM. L. REv. 581, 603 & n.17 {1940) 
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but focused on the relationship between realism and its attack on 
the ability of rules to restrain the state. The coalition that pro-
pounded this view included critics of the New Deal who had never 
forgiven the realists for their support of Roosevelt as well as Catho-
lic law professors who feared that the realists would aid social re-
formers who would overturn those legal rules that protected private 
property and "separate" institutions like the church.16s 
The younger postwar critics for whom Hart spoke were not nec-
essarily sympathetic to either wave of reaction described above.169 
Hart, like many in his generation, was sympathetic to the metaethi-
cal claims of moral relativism.110 When they were younger, Hart 
and his generation supported the arguments that helped the execu-
tive gather new powers. After all, Hart came of age professionally 
in the midst of the New Deal, and many of his colleagues were en-
listed into a war effort that, in the name of fighting fascism, brought 
large sectors of the economy under central state control.171 Hart's 
attack was directed against the realists' picture of adjudication. 
Hart and his generation recognized that realism's primary lesson, 
that judges make the law and do not find it, had a kernel of truth in 
it, but they wanted to refine this truth. They thought that the skep-
ticism of Frank or Arnold went too far. By teaching that all aspects 
of the legal process were shaped by subjective preferences and acts 
of power, the realists risked overlooking the critical ways in which 
rules and principles constrain legal actors. 
In his essay on Holmes, Hart argued that we must look for 
moral claims in law "because an examination of those claims leads 
inexorably to examination of the mechanisms for orderly change, 
and thus to the very heart of the process by which justice can be 
achieved through law."172 Thus, for Hart, Holmes was correct to 
{offering to do "penance" for contributing to the confusion that realism rejected moral 
truth); see also Max Radin, In Defense of an Unsystematic Science of Law, 51 YALE L.J. 1269, 
1275 {1942). 
168. See, e.g., Raoul E. Desvernine, The Creed of Americanism, 11 NoTRE DAME LAw. 
216 {1942); Purcell, supra note 83, at 440. 
169. But see Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561 
{1988) {discussing how Cold War political pressures pushed legal scholars away from realism 
and toward legal process and the antipragmatist political theory that lay behind it). 
170. See Hart, supra note 159, at 936: "[Holmes] revolted against any suggestion that law 
was always right, in the sense of embodying eternal truth. In this, almost all of us today will 
follow him." 
171. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The United States Supreme Court: An Argument on the 
President's Side, HAR.v. ALUMNI Buu.. 767 {1936). 
172. Hart, supra note 159, at 937 (emphasis added). Hart's use of the words "mecha-
nism" and "process" are significant; they reemerge as important elements in his later writings 
and in those of his colleagues. 
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point to the subjectivity of moral judgment but wrong to conclude 
from the simple truth that morality is subjective that legal systems 
cannot organize and constrain the exercise of subjectivity. 
Holmes's sin was not his separation of law and morals - despite 
what Hart says elsewhere in the essay - but his widespread cyni-
cism about the role of reason in law. That is why Hart attacked the 
realist slogan that "[i]t is not what the judges say which is important 
but what they do," for its complete exclusion of "reason and argu-
ment" from law, as opposed to attacking the effort to separate law 
and morality.173 In the 1930s the realists demonstrated that judges 
could act disingenuously and argued that in the right circumstances, 
judicial disingenuity would not be a bad thing. After witnessing the 
abuse of the rule of law in Germany, the postwar critics of realism 
began to attack the disingenuous uses of precedent and doctrine. 
Hart and other postwar critics began to focus on the reasoning 
judges used to justify their decisions. 
B. The Development of Reasoned Elaboration 
In the 1950s legal scholars grew increasingly convinced of the 
importance of practical reasoning in adjudication, and as a result, 
"judging" judicial performances became a popular activity in the 
academy. This new commitment to practical reasoning came to be 
called "reasoned elaboration."174 In this regard, the history of the 
Harvard Law Review Foreword to the annual Supreme Court sur-
vey {hereinafter "Foreword") is a useful lens through which to chart 
the development of reasoned elaboration as a critical institution.11s 
The legal process school's critique of realism should not be seen 
merely as a reaction to the excesses of realism but in fact should be 
seen as a principled attempt to resurrect positivism by reshaping 
formalism's inadequate theory of adjudication. The legal process 
school's work in this area did not take place only in the shadows of 
the doctrinal scholarship of the Forewords. The response to the re-
173. Id. at 933. Hart was referring in part to FRANK, supra note 71, at 121-26 and Joseph 
W. Bingham, What Is the Law?, 11 MICH. L. REv. 1, 16 {1912). 
174. Legal reasoning, in its various forms, has always been at the center of debates about 
law. See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN lNTRooucnoN TO LEGAL REAsoNING {1948). By say-
ing that "reasoned elaboration" resulted from a renewed interest in practical reasoning in 
law, I am suggesting two things. Fll'St, that in comparison to the preceding period, reasoning 
regained importance in the eyes of legal scholars. Second, that a group of scholars were self-
consciously attempting to develop a theory of practical reasoning for the legal problems of 
their day; not that the methods they ultimately adopted were novel or had never been used 
by other legal scholars earlier in American history. See also Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: 
The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 601 (1993). 
175. See Peller, supra note 169, at 571 (noting connection between Forewords and devel-
opment of legal process). 
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alist critique of formalism was set out both in the Forewords and in 
other, more theoretical texts, such as Henry Hart and Albert 
Sacks's The Legal Process.116 
The theory of reasoned elaboration was built in stages, culmi-
nating in Henry Hart's famous 1959 Foreword. The first Foreword 
was published in 1951 and served as simply what its title promised: 
a short introduction written by a member of the faculty to the stu-
dent-authored summary of important Supreme Court decisions of 
the previous year. The Foreword eventually evolved into an institu-
tion in its own right, in which a major scholar not only reviewed the 
past year but took the opportunity to set out a substantive theory of 
constitutional law.111 But even the earliest Forewords were, despite 
appearances, more than a survey. The theme that dominated the 
first decade of the Foreword was the question of the Supreme 
Court's competence at legal reasoning. The very first Foreword set 
the tone of the debate by stating the accusation that the Vinson 
Court was "crippled" by the presence of lazy and incompetent 
justices.178 
Louis Jaffe, the author of the first Foreword, suggested that the 
weakness of the Court caused the Justices to hear a smaller propor-
tion of appeals than ever before.179 Jaffe did not say whether he 
thought the Court had reached the proper result in the cases he 
reviewed. His stated concern was with what he called the Court's 
"relative lack of institutional awareness and pride. "180 More than 
anything else, he wanted to see more open debate and clearer ex-
planations by the Court of its decisionmaking processes. Jaffe ar-
gued that the Court, as an institution, had a duty to produce legal 
reasons that the nation could use in its ongoing debate over the 
meaning of the Constitution.181 As the decade progressed, the 
176. HART & SACKS, supra note 17. 
177. Perhaps one of the earliest examples of this use of the Foreword is Alexander M. 
Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 
40 (1961), which was the foundation for ALExANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANOEROUS 
BRANCH (1962). 
178. Louis L. Jaffe, The Supreme Court, 1950 Term - Foreword, 65 HARV. L. REv. 107, 
107 (1951) ("['The Court was] crippled by the presence of three or more lazy, incompetent 
justices .... So ... it shirk[ed] the elementary business of guidance and direction."). 
179. Jaffe endorsed the criticism that "there is a suspiciously large number of denials in 
cases of apparent first importance." Id. at 108-09; see also Fowler V. Harper & Alan S. 
Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term -An Appraisal of Certio· 
rari, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 293 (1950). 
180. Jaffe, supra note 178, at 113. 
181. Id. at 114. Jaffe blamed legal realism for the decline in the Supreme Court's institu-
tional performance: "If a reason can be assigned [for this decline] •.. it may in some measure 
be due to an overstressing by the 'realists' and 'liberals' of the political function of the 
Court." Id. at 114. Jaffe noted that the return of political decision making was a little ironic: 
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Supreme Court's performance, as measured on the scale of its mas-
tery of legal reasoning, became the central axis along which criti-
ques of the Court were mounted. Eventually the rhetoric of blame 
directed toward realism disappeared, but we cannot ignore the role 
this rhetoric played in laying the foundation upon which the legal 
process school developed reasoned elaboration. 
In the 1954 Foreword, Albert Sacks praised the Warren Court's 
segregation cases but focused most of his attention on the Court's 
use of "summary opinions" to dispose of some of the year's most 
difficult legal issues.182 The essay not only analyzed the reasoning 
in the Court's decisions, it also attempted to demonstrate that in a 
significant number of cases, the Court provided no reasons at all 
where a decision to overturn or affirm demanded an explanation. 
In these cases, "[t]he difficulty is not in the result reached, but in 
the absence of explanation of what was decided."183 Sacks was con-
cerned with more than just the fact that a summary decision pro-
duced no precedent and provided no guidance for the public. He 
was also concerned that summary opinions risked undermining the 
legitimacy of the Court's power.184 In the next group of Forewords, 
the Court was criticized for its denial of certiorari in clearly ripe but 
controversial cases.18s In the Foreword discussing the 1954 Term, it 
was noted that the Court evaded not only the predictably politically 
sensitive race and loyalty-security cases, but even an uncontrover-
sial, albeit difficult conflict-of-laws case.1s6 According to that Fore-
word, the evasion of difficult decisions and the messy results 
produced by such evasions were as unprincipled as political 
judging.187 
"There is irony in the possibility that the 'realists' who insisted for so long that the Court's 
work was not law but politics have made good their claim .... The brand of politics [however] 
will not necessarily satisfy the hopes of the 'realist' ..•. " Id. at 107. 
182. "The term 'summary opinion' as used here is not meant to include all per curiam 
opinions • . . . Rather, the term includes those per curiam opinions in which the reasons for 
the decision are either entirely omitted or set forth in a few sentences." Albert M Sacks, The 
Supreme Court, 1953 Term - Foreword, 68 HARv. L. REv. 96, 99 (1954). 
183. Id. at 103. 
184. "At stake is the value which the Court handled so carefully and so well in the Segre-
gation Cases, the acceptability of the Court's decisions to lower courts and to the Bar as a 
whole." Id. at 103. 
185. "There will be no praise here for 'judicial statesmanship.' ... Too often 'judicial 
statesmanship' is used, not to describe wise judicial opinions, but to praise unstated and even 
unjudicial reasons for decisions or failure to decide." Robert Braucher, The Supreme Court, 
1954 Term - Foreword, 69 HARv. L. REv. 120, 120 (1955). 
186. Id. at 127 (discussing Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955)). 
187. Id. at 127 ("[A]ltemative grounds of decision and even sheer dicta have traditional 
and legitimate roles in guiding lower courts, government agencies, the bar and the people •.•• 
[S]uch pronouncements may perform real public service."). 
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The next stage in the development of reasoned elaboration was 
reflected in Ernest Brown's attack in 1958 on the Supreme Court's 
practice of reversing lower court opinions through per curiam opin-
ions.188 He challenged the suggestion that, in many cases, the 
Court, on the basis of the record, the briefs for and against the peti-
tion for certiorari, and nothing more, could have had enough infor-
mation to determine that the lower court's decision had been 
"clearly erroneous."189 So as not to appear as if he were pursuing 
this argument for political ends, Brown chose as his example a set 
of cases "remote from the livelier political and social controversies 
of the day" - the relative status of government and commercial 
liens190 - and concluded that the Court's disposition by per curiam 
reversal conformed to no rational pattern.191 Brown's concern was 
not only that the lack of reasoned decisionmaking deprived the na-
tion of an iinportant legal resource, or that the Court was avoiding 
hard cases - to put it bluntly, he was worried that the Court's new-
found taste for per curiam reversals was evidence of the Court's 
inadequate abilities. 
Fmally, in 1959, Hart attempted to synthesize the earlier criti-
cisms and offered a cure to the Court based on the values of rea-
soned elaboration. Hart looked back upon the recent criticisms of 
the Court and concluded that its "failures [were] threatening to un-
dermine the professional respect of first-rate lawyers for the incum-
bent Justices of the Court."192 Hart saw a relationship between the 
rise in summary and vacuous opinions and the rise in individual 
dissents and fragmented majorities. He argued that if the Court 
had more time to deliberate and reflect, it would produce more 
carefully reasoned opinions, and if all nine Justices were to reflect 
188. The Foreword was dedicated to the examination of this "increasingly frequent prac-
tice." Ernest J. Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term - Foreword: Process of Law, 72 
HARv. L. REv. 77, 77 {1958). 
189. Id. at 80. 
190. Id. at 82-87 {discussing United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 {1958); 
United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 {1956); United States v. Colotta, 350 
U.S. 808 (1955)). 
191. Id. at 94 {"It is difficult to resist the conclusion that improper disposition of a case is 
some indication of less than complete familiarity and understanding."). 
192. Henry M Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of 
the Justices, 13 HARv. L. REv. 84, 101 {1959). Hart was in fact endorsing the verdict of two 
other legal process scholars, Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington, who in 1957 had noted 
the Court's tendency toward "an increasing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic statement." 
Alexander M Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and Judicial Process: The 
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1957). They argued that for the Court to come up 
with the correct result without correct reasoning did not further constitutional law because 
"such a decision does not attempt to gain reasoned acceptance for the result, and thus does 
not make law in the sense which the term 'law' must have in a democratic society." Id. at 5. 
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fully on each issue, there would be greater unanimity among the 
nine Justices.193 In this case, the right answer would win the assent 
not only of more of the Court, but of the legal community and the 
nation as well. Thus, the legitimacy and persuasive power of the 
Court would be strengthened by better legal reasoning.194 
The fundamental proposition supported by each succeeding set 
of Forewords was that a judgment accompanied by a reasoned justi-
fication - whatever its political outcome - was better than a judg-
ment alone even if the latter reflected the right result. The authors 
of the Forewords believed this for three reasons. First, as Jaffe sug-
gested, in a realist contest of wills within the judiciary, it is difficult 
to predict whose politics will win; on the other hand, the demand 
for a reasoned justification limited the extent to which a single 
political perspective could capture the Court. Second, as Sacks and 
Brown suggested, judicial statesmanship - through the use of the 
denial of certiorari and per curiam affirmances and reversals - de-
nied the nation a crucial resource. The reasoning behind the 
Court's decisions was critical to the creation of understandable and 
guiding precedent; and furthermore, only by revealing its reasoning 
could the Court enable people to grasp the principle underlying a 
decision to let precedent stand. Third, as Hart suggested, there was 
likely to be a relationship between the quality of a decision's under-
lying reasoning and the likelihood of the decision's being right. The 
best way to ensure that the Court actually engaged in sufficient rea-
soning about a case was to demand to see the process in writing; 
further, the best way to ensure that the Court reasoned well about a 
193. Hart was assuming, of course, that legal reasoning is a bit like shooting at a target: 
the more people and more attempts there are, the greater the likelihood of hitting the "right" 
answer. Hart attributed this result to the phenomenon of the "maturing of collective 
thought" Hart, supra note 192, at 100. According to Hart, 
Ideas which will stand the test of time as instruments for the solution of hard problems 
do not come even to the most gifted of lawyers in twenty-four hours. Indeed, they do 
not come with dependability to any single individual even in much longer periods of 
study and reflection. Such ideas have ordinarily to be hammered out by a process of 
collective deliberation of individuals, gifted or otherwise, who recognize that the wisdom 
of all, if it is successfully pooled, will usually transcend the wisdom of any. 
Id. Hart revealed a classical liberal assumption in this statement Like Mill or Madison, he 
was skeptical of idealism and the utility of abstract reasoning; he placed more faith in the 
operation of the marketplace of ideas, where truth, which exists, is uncovered through the 
constant friction of conflict and debate. It is interesting that, at the same time Hart made this 
argument, "pluralism" in political science, which attempted to defend a modernized version 
of Madison, was becoming dominant within its own field. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A 
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956). 
194. Furthermore, Hart suspected that eventually the number of petitions going up to the 
Court would decline if it took fewer cases: "[I]ts dockets would be freed of large numbers of 
cases which now come there only because of the uncertainties which are generated by the 
failures of reasoning of previous opinions." Hart, supra note 192, at 125. 
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case was to demand that it review its reasoning process often and 
among as many of its members as possible. 
Thus, reasoned elaboration was a theory of adjudication in 
which reason served three functions: it controlled political willful-
ness, it provided the public with principles around which action 
could be planned, and it helped increase the likelihood of the right 
outcome.195 It is clear that the realists would have denied each of 
these propositions. The idea that political decisions could be lim-
ited by institutional arrangements was, of course, one of the first 
myths attacked by realism. Similarly, legal realists belittled the 
value of the public exposition of principles by the courts, arguing 
that rulemaking was an act of mythmaking. Finally, the realists 
would have been mystified by the idea that there was a "right" legal 
answer to which the court could be held accountable and towards 
which judges could be directed through institutional reform.196 On 
the other hand, in rejecting the realist model of legal reasoning, the 
legal process school was resurrecting and reinterpreting the core 
features of classical positivism. · 
The extraordinary interest in adjudication in the Forewords was 
an attempt by realism's critics to advance beyond formalism's fail-
ure to grapple with the problem of legal induction. The legal pro-
cess school's interest in controlling political willfulness reflected an 
interest in a theory of constraint that took seriously the separation 
of law and morality. Its interest in the public exposition of principle 
reflected an attempt to provide a liberal and attractive interpreta-
tion of classical positivism's command theory of law. Furthermore, 
195. Hart seemed most concerned with the Court producing the right answers to the sub-
stantive legal questions presented in the case; he did not raise the question of why the Court, 
as opposed to another branch of government, should endeavor to produce the right answer. 
Wechsler was the first legal process scholar to draw an explicit connection between the meth· 
odology of reasoned elaboration and the justification of judicial review. See infra text accom-
panying notes 232-38. 
196. There was, in fact, a realist reaction to the reasoned elaboration critique of the 
Court. Judge Thurman Arnold responded to Hart's Foreword with a strongly worded cri-
tique in which he attacked Hart's premise that law-appliers acted differently from lawmakers. 
Thurman Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1298, 1311 (1960). Arnold 
questioned whether Hart's ideal could ever be a reality, and he concluded by rejecting the 
idea of the "maturing of collective thought": 
There is no such process as this, and there has never been; men of positive views are 
only hardened in those views by such conferences. 
The only kind of court that could successfully follow Professor Hart's prescription 
would be a court composed of men without deep seated convictions about current na-
tional problems ... ; such a court might be found in a Trappist monastery. 
Id. at 1312-13. In the following year's Foreword, Erwin Griswold rejected Judge Arnold's 
critique: "Arnold's argument wholly fails .•.• To me 'the maturing of collective thought' is a 
profound reality." Erwin N. Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term - Foreword: Of 
Tune and Attitudes - Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 14 HARv. L. REv. 81, 85 (1960). 
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its attempt to develop strategies for discovering the right result in 
adjudication reflected an attempt to take seriously the sources the-
sis and to hold judges accountable to the sources of law in Ameri-
can constitutional law. 
C. The Jurisprudential Foundations of Legal Process 
Advocates of reasoned elaboration in the 1950s had their own 
jurisprudential text that supported their view of constitutional adju-
dication. The generation of Harvard scholars that attacked the re-
alist legacy also took part in an ongoing project led by Hart and 
Sacks that eventually resulted in a collection of materials entitled 
The Legal Process. The manuscript remained unpublished for 
thirty-six years, but its typewritten pages had been copied in various 
formats and used frequently at Harvard as well as other law 
schools.197 The Legal Process does not have a reputation as one of 
the major texts of American jurisprudence.198 Yet a brief examina-
tion of the materials reveals that the volume contains - amidst the 
very technical discussions of case law and legislative processes - a 
substantial one-hundred-page discussion of the philosophy of law. 
This section will briefly sketch the theory of law set out by Hart and 
Sacks and then argue that their theory of law is rooted in legal 
positivism. 
1. Hart and Sacks's Theory of Law 
The section in The Legal Process on jurisprudence was entitled 
"Introductory Text Notes on the Nature and Function of Law." It 
should come as no surprise that Hart and Sacks began the chapter 
with a rejection of legal realism. They stated that their theory of 
law "reject[ s] the teaching of a vast body of literature which has 
accumulated during the last half century seeking to equate the 
methods of the various social sciences, and in particular of law, with 
the method of the natural sciences."199 Hart and Sacks put into this 
category Felix Cohen, Walter Wheeler Cook, Jerome Frank, and 
197. The editors of the 1994 Foundation Press edition are to be credited for facilitating 
the long-overdue publication of The Legal Process. In addition, Professors Eskridge and 
Frickey have written a very thoughtful critical introduction to the book. See William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at li-cxxxvi. 
198. I do not mean to suggest that The Legal Process was not highly regarded in the 
academy. It influenced a wide range of legal scholarship in areas as diverse as procedure, 
legislation, and statutory interpretation. See id. at cxxv-cxxvi (noting the influence of The 
Legal Process in legal scholarship). I do think, however, that it has not been given the same 
regard by legal philosophers. This trend may be changing. See, e.g., Duxbury, supra note 
174, at 653-69. 
199. HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 107. 
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Oliver Wendell Holmes. They noted that "in the American legal 
tradition ... the notion that law can somehow be drawn from the 
behavior patterns of the people has been [linked to] the notion that 
ethics is a body of thought to be distinguished sharply from law,"200 
a position that Hart and Sacks rejected. On the other hand, Hart 
and Sacks did not reject the temporary divorce of law and morality. 
Immediately after criticizing Holmes for separating law and moral-
ity, they explained that they saw the relationship between law and 
morality as based on the principle of "institutional settlement," 
which "requires that a decision which is the due result of duly estab-
lished procedures be accepted whether it is right or wrong - at 
least for the time being. "201 Hart and Sacks therefore recognized 
that there is no necessary connection between law and morality, 
and therefore embraced at least one central tenet of legal positiv-
ism, the separability thesis. 
The principle of institutional settlement reflected Hart and 
Sacks's attempt to find an instrumentalist justification for the sepa-
ration of law and morality. They argued that since law was an insti-
tutional procedure that established the conditions necessary for 
community life to perform its role in the development of man, the 
perfection of law as an institution was separate from the identifica-
tion of the ends that it would be used to pursue.202 For them, the 
test was not whether the institutional procedure in question tended 
directly to promote the development of man; it was whether the 
institutional procedure promoted the conditions necessary for the 
complete development of man. If community life is the condition 
necessary for the complete development of man, and the total satis-
faction of valid human wants is the ultimate purpose of community, 
then it follows that for Hart and Sacks a "law" is any institutional 
procedure that promoted the total satisfaction of valid human 
wants.203 
Hart and Sacks did not mean that the law has to be tested 
against a specific moral code, as some of the Catholic natural law-
200. Id. at 108. 
201. Id. at 109. 
202. "[T]he ultimate test of the goodness or badness of every institutional procedure and 
of every arrangement which grows out of such a procedure is whether or not it helps to 
further" the task of "establishing, maintaining and perfecting the conditions necessary for 
community life to perform its role in the complete development of man." Id. at 102 (quoting 
Joseph M. Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAw 91, 96 (Arthur 
E. Sutherland ed., 1956)). 
203. Id. at 104. That the total satisfaction of valid human wants is an ultimate objective is 
indicated by the fact that it is referred to as "the great desideratum." Id. 
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yers from the 1940s argued.204 Had they believed that, Hart and 
Sacks would have found themselves'in the natural law camp after 
having just avoided the realists. Instead, they avoided this unwel-
come result by demanding that the definition of a valid human want 
ultimately refer back to the principle of institutional settlement.2os 
The principle of institutional settlement tells us to treat some wants 
as valid or invalid according to the norms imposed upon us by our 
legal system. But this puts us back to the point where we began: 
the principle of institutional settlement and Hart and Sacks's defini-
tion of law are consistent because, ultimately, a law is an institu-
tional procedure that helps to establish the conditions necessary for 
community life to achieve its own ends. Hence, their statement that 
"law is concerned essentially with the pursuit of purposes"206 went 
right to the heart of legal process as a positivist theory of law. 
Law was wholly instrumental for Hart and Sacks, and it was 
about achieving society's purposes - whether for good or for 
evil.207 They believed that although it was possible to have many 
different legal systems promoting many different purposes - some 
moral, some not - it was impossible to construct a legal system 
that at its most basic level did not issue purposive commands. This 
claim is, in essence, the command theory of classical positivism.2os 
204. This is not to suggest that all natural lawyers share in the neo-scholastics' simple-
minded test for law. I bring the neo-scholastics up only because they, along with Lon Fuller, 
were the sort of natural law theorists writing during the 1940s and early 1950s. Although 
they differed in the type of test they applied, both the neo-scholastics and Fuller used moral-
ity as a test for the existence of a law or legal system. 
205. See HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 112 ("To the extent that doubt is possible 
about the validity or ranking of certain human wants, or of certain wants for certain people, 
the procedure of institutional settlement often operates to remove the doubt."). 
206. Id. at 108-09. 
207. It is for this reason that I believe that Fuller would find Hart and Sacks' definition of 
law unacceptable. He would have to make the same argument against them that he made 
against H.L.A. Hart's form of legal positivism. See Fuller, supra note 2, at 661-72 (arguing 
that the interpretation and creation of law is necessarily driven by moral standards, even if 
those standards are unacknowledged). But see LoN FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 223 
n.32 (2d ed. 1969) (suggesting that Henry Hart and he might agree on the ends of law). To 
say that, at a minimum, law performs a coordinating function is consistent with recent theo-
ries of legal positivism. See, e.g., JosEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAw 116-21 (1979); RAz, 
supra note 148, at 101-04. 
208. An objection one might raise to the foregoing analysis is that Hart and Sacks said 
that their theory of law-as-purposive-commands was itself based on a claim of morality. One 
could rightly point to the following passage: 
[I]t is important to see that this distinction ••• is not in a just sense a distinction between 
law and morals. It is a distinction rather between one aspect of morals in relation to law 
and another. For the proposition that settled law should be respected, until it is duly 
changed - that a decision is in some sense "right" simply because it has been duly made 
- is itself an ethical concept, resting on the recognition that defiance of institutional 
settlements touches or may touch the very foundations of civil order, and that without 
civil order, morality and justice in anybody's view of them are impossible. 
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The only claim that positivism could not concede, and that Hart and 
Sacks's arguments did not imply, is that the identification of the 
norm to which one has a moral duty to obey necessarily relies upon 
the truthfulness of a moral claim. Hart and Sacks's position is com-
patible, however, with a plurality of mutually exclusive social sys-
tems because it says nothing more than that one has a duty to 
promote those conditions that allow a community to flourish. Un-
less one operates with an unnaturally narrow definition of what it 
means to flourish, or is skeptical of the possibility of a variety of 
social systems being able to promote flourishing, Hart and Sacks's 
definition of law is consistent with a variety of legal systems, not all 
of them based ori a single, or objective, moral truth.209 
Hart and Sacks were clearly concerned with focusing on law as 
an authoritative system. Building on the basic definition of law ex-
amined above, they argued that legal systems are "general directive 
arrangements": 
The establishment of a system of institutionalized procedures of set-
tlement necessarily implies general understandings about the kinds of 
questions which each of the procedures in the system, whether official 
or private, is going to settle and something about how it is going to 
settle them. The system has necessarily to include one or more insti-
tutions authorized to reach additional general understandings for han-
dling new problems or dealing more effectively with old ones.210 
This description corresponds with the position developed by H.L.A. 
Hart about the relationship between primary and secondary rules, 
which in turn grounded Hart's argument for the existence of a rule 
of recognition that would provide members of the community with 
a social rule for legal validity.211 Although Hart insisted that his 
HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 109. If opponents of positivism want to claim this passage 
as proof that Hart and Sacks believed in a necessary connection between law and morality, 
then they have reduced that connection to a mere tautology. All Hart and Sacks claimed in 
this quote is that the. duty to obey the law is itself a reason based in morality. This argument 
is not at all uncontroversial, but even if it were true, it is not clear to what extent it serves the 
antipositivist. All the positivist needs to argue is that the existence condition for a legal sys-
tem, or the definition of a rule of recognition, need not rely on claims about morality. See 
M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE LJ. 950 (1973). 
209. The claim that all humans thrive in communities is not an exclusive basis for a natu-
ral law - or any other - argument. This claim could be made by a positivist with utilitarian 
tendencies like Bentham or a positivist with natural rights tendencies like H.L.A. Hart. I am, 
however, assuming that when Hart and Sacks refer to "duly established procedures" they are 
referring to nothing more than conformity with the procedures that the system requires of 
itself. It should be noted that by using the locution "due result of duly established," Hart and 
Sacks invoke an important, albeit controversial, phrase from the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., 
Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War (pt. 1), 24 
HARv. L. REv. 366, 368-73 (1911). 
210. HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 113. 
211. H.LA. Hart argued that a legal system relies upon primary rules to distinguish 
which normative problems with which it will concern itself. These primary rules, in tum, 
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"social rule thesis" represented a complete rejection of Austin's 
command theory, Hart's alternative shared with Austin the basic 
premise that the ultimate rule of a legal system was, in some sense, 
obligatory.212 The great difference between Austin and Hart was 
that the former believed the obligation arose from the threat of 
sanction, while the latter thought it arose from a more complex psy-
chological phenomenon called the "internal point of view."213 
Finally, Hart and Sacks's idea that law was a system of general 
directive arrangements that creates a set of human obligations dem-
onstrates their debt to the sources thesis. If one of the purposes of 
the principle of institutional settlement was to determine who can 
decide certain questions, and to ground a decisionmaker's authority 
in practical reasoning distinct from moral reasoning, then, like Ben-
tham, Hart and Sacks were committed to the idea that every legal 
result had a "pedigree" and ultimately a human source.214 
generate secondary rules that make up the system of legal obligations we face every day. See 
HART, supra note 18, at 91-99. 
212. For Austin, any law is obligatory in the crude sense that one is "obliged" to obey a 
gunman's instructions. See Hart, supra note 2, at 603. In contrast, rules of recognition were 
obligatory in that, to the extent that they were accepted by the bulk of "officials of the sys-
tem," these officials "regard [them] as common standards of official behaviour and appraise 
critically their own and each other's deviations as lapses." HART, supra note 18, at 117 (em-
phasis added). 
213. See HART, supra note 18, at 89-91. Raz noted that Hart's account of "duty" in The 
Concept of Law was only obscured by the concept of the internal point of view. See RAz, 
supra note 148, at 148 n.3 (2d ed. 1980). Raz's observation leads me to suspect that Hart 
erroneously focused on the motivation for members of a legal system to regard a rule as a 
norm, as opposed to the more important question of the definition of a norm. I think this is 
illustrated by Schauer's suggestion that Austin's phrase "general prescription" better cap-
tures what we mean by a rule than the word "command." FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING 
BY nm RuLES: A Pmr.osoPmCAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN 
LAw AND IN LIFE 24 n.11 (1991). 
To the extent that the command theory relies upon the rather unreal notion that every 
law is necessarily backed by a sanction, it is easy to see why Hart and any other positivist 
would reject it It is harder to explain, however, how the clearly positivist claim that legal 
norms are "entrenched generalizations," id. at 64, does not entail the further claim that legal 
norms have the "peremptory force of exclusionary reasons," id. at 89 (citing RAz, supra note 
207, at 3-33). The view of positivism I have just described - which, admittedly, is not Hart's 
- seems to include important features of the command theory. I explore this issue in much 
greater detail in SEBOK, supra note 12. 
214. One might think that a connection between Hart and Sacks and H.L.A. Hart is un-
likely, given the obvious debt to Lon Fuller owed by Hart and Sacks and their many refer-
ences to Fuller in the chapter under discussion. Fuller, of course, engaged in a fierce debate 
with H.L.A Hart of which Hart and Sacks were quite aware. Nonetheless, it is my contention 
that regardless of what they may have thought, Hart and Sacks mounted an analysis of law 
substantially similar to H.L.A. Hart's. In the one place where Hart and Sacks discussed 
H.L.A. Hart - a lengthy footnote - they took issue with Hart's analytic definition of the 
concept of a "duty." Their amended definition, however, fits into the positivist mode and not 
at all the mode of a natural lawyer like Fuller: 
A duty is a position of a person in relation to an authoritative directive arrangement in 
which the person is obliged to do something, or not to do it, or do it if at all only in a 
particular way, subject to some officially imposed disadvantage for failure to comply. 
2110 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:2054 
Hart and Sacks's theory of law relied upon many, if not all, of 
the same elements found in the definition of classical positivism. 
Frrst, Hart and Sacks's claim that law is instrumental implies an em-
brace of the separability thesis because the principle of institutional 
settlement presupposed that the test for law is whether it helps a 
community achieve its ends, whatever those ends might be. Sec-
ond, Hart and Sacks's claim that law is purposive reflected the core 
ideas of the command theory that legal norms are general and obli-
gatory; the fact that they might have preferred H.L.A. Hart's expla-
nation of the obligation to Austin's is not important. Third, Hart 
and Sacks's claim that one of the primary tasks of a legal system is 
to identify who can decide various cases entailed their acceptance 
of the sources thesis, since the principle of institutional settlement 
required litigants to accept outcomes based on their pedigree and 
not their conformity with justice. 
2. Hart and Sacks's Theory of Adjudication 
Hart and Sacks drew a connection between their definition of 
law as institutional settlement and the theory of reasoned elabora-
tion developed in the Forewords. They set out a typology of differ-
ent types of law possible under their theory and suggested that the 
Anglo-American system had opted for one particular theory, the 
theory of reasoned elaboration. What made reasoned elaboration 
attractive, according to Hart and Sacks, was that it imposed two 
important duties on the decisionmaker. The first was consistency or 
uniformity: the "principle of law that like cases should be treated 
alike."215 The second obliged the decisionmaker to understand the 
purpose behind a legal argument before he attempted to apply it: 
"[E]very statute and every doctrine of unwritten law developed by 
the decisional process has some kind·of purpose or objective, how-
ever difficult it may be on occasion to ascertain it or to agree ex-
actly how it should be phrased."216 These two values of reasoned 
elaboration - consistency and purpose - were essential features 
of a legal system. 
In their theory of adjudication, which was based on a typology 
of distinctions, Hart and Sacks distinguished between types of laws, 
types of purposes laws could serve, and finally, types of discretion 
law gives. In constructing this typology, Hart and Sacks carefully 
HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 129 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
215. Id. at 147. 
216. Id. at 148. 
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avoided confusing types of laws - how a norm is promoted - with 
the different purposes law promoted - the content of law. Hart 
and Sacks distinguished between laws that were rules and laws that 
were standards. A rule was "a legal direction which requires for its 
application nothing more than a determination of the happening or 
non-happening of physical or mental events - that is, determina-
tions of fact. "217 The application of a standard did not require 
merely the happening or nonhappening of an event; it required a 
"qualitative" change in circumstances.218 An example of a rule 
would be the prohibition against driving faster than fifty-five miles 
per hour, and a familiar standard in law would be the due care re-
quirement in torts. Hart and Sacks next noted that the purposes a 
law served could be distinguished between policies and principles. 
"A policy is simply a statement of objective. E.g., full employment 
•••• "219 In comparison, a "principle also describes a result to be· 
achieved. But it differs in that it asserts that the result ought to be 
achieved and includes, either expressly or by reference to well-un-
derstood bodies of thought, a statement of the reasons why it should 
be achieved."220 
Finally, Hart and Sacks distinguished between "continuing dis-
cretion" and "noncontinuing discretion." Continuing discretion oc-
curred when "the power-holder is without obligation to relate in 
any formally reasoned manner the grounds upon which he acts in 
one instance with those upon which he acts in another."221 Non-
continuing discretion was the opposite: the powerholder cannot 
"think of himself as in the same position as a legislator taking part 
in the enactment of the [norm] in the first place."222 He must relate 
the decision to the norm in a reasoned fashion. 
Our legal system could have given judges a lot more continuing 
discretion, but Hart and Sacks observed that it did not.223 Such a 
legal system would still have law, just not very much of it. The rule 
217. Id. at 139. 
218. Id. at 140. 
219. Id. at 141. 
220. Id. at 142. 
221. Id. at 144. 
222. Id. at 143. 
223. Id. at 162. Martin Golding, a legal philosopher at Columbia who was sympathetic to 
legal process, made much the same point in a discussion of American constitutional law: 
"Our legal system has no privileged status. Not only are systems possible that differ from 
ours in content, but so also can principled decisions occur within the framework of such 
systems .••• Principled judicial decision-making is possible in a tyranny." Martin P. Golding, 
Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 35, 42-43 (1963). 
Bentham made the same point in BENTHAM, supra note 48, at 10. 
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or standard th~t authorized judges in the first place would be law 
because it would be directive, authoritative, and general. But the 
reasoning in which judges would then engage after they determined 
the scope of their discretion would not be legal reasoning -
although it could nonetheless be a valid form of reasoning. This is 
because the judges would have been given continuing discretion; 
and someone acting under continuing discretion cannot, within the 
scope of that discretion, claim to be employing legal reasoning since 
legal principles and policies are used to con_trol discretion.224 
If a decisionmaker is free to choose to obey or not the guidance 
of either a principle or a policy, then the fact that the principle or 
policy is authoritative, general, and directive is not the deci-
sionmaker's reason for action. Rather, it is simply the content of 
the principle or policy that is doing the work; the relation of the 
principle or policy to the decisionmaker is the same as if the words 
had been delivered as advice from a well-intentioned friend: the 
listener is absolutely free to adopt or ignore them.225 The use of 
principles and policies to constrain discretion authorized by law is 
called "reasoned elaboration.';226 
The desirability of using legal norms to control judgment instead 
of granting continuing discretion depended on the extent to which a 
given society wanted to organize its social life around the values of 
consistency and obedience to purpose. Hart and Sacks never 
imagined that a legal system could be a pure instance of discretion; 
the question was about matters of degree. Even where judges are 
given a vast amount of discretion it must be true that those judges 
have that authority because of a legal process whose application did 
not itself allow for continuing discretion. For Hart and Sacks, the 
realists' interest in discretion was basically right but misplaced: dis-
cretion mattered to the legal theorist because wherever discretion is 
found, attempts to control it also will be found, and that is where 
reasoned elaboration enters the picture.227 
224. HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 147. 
225. This analysis adopts an understanding of discretion that is relatively uncontroversial. 
It conforms, for example, with Dworkin's use of the term in the chapter entitled "The Model 
of Rules I" in Taking Rights Seriously. See DwoRKIN, supra note 6, at 31-39. 
226. HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 143. 
227. Thus, Hart and Sacks pointed out that the key to understanding the process of adju-
dication was not, as the realists would have it, deciding whether or not all law allows discre-
tion, "for reasoned elaboration and uniformity of application are always called for up to the 
point where discretion begins - in defining, in other words, the permitted scope of discre-
tion. The problem is [therefore] one of the appropriate degree of elaboration." Id. at 146 
(emphasis added). 
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The relationship between the tenets of reasoned elaboration de-
rived from the Harvard Forewords and the underlying theory of law 
developed by Hart and Sacks was that good judging, according to 
the legal process school, necessarily involved a self-conscious search 
for the limits of discretion set out in the law. Just like the authors of 
the Forewords, Hart and Sacks grounded their rejection of "polit-
ical" decision.making on their distinction between continuing and 
noncontinuing discretion. Hart and Sacks gave this distinction ana-
lytic clarity. If judicial decision.making was to be constrained by 
law, then judges should not rely on the sort of reasons used by legis-
lators. Similarly, the rejection of "judicial statesmanship" in the 
Forewords was based on the two values of reasoned elaboration. 
To deny certiorari in one case and not in another when the two 
were, from the perspective of legal principle, alike, was to violate 
the requirement of treating like cases alike. To generate summary 
reversals without any explanation was to belie the underlying prin-
ciple that each law has a purpose, in the form of either a principle 
or a policy, to which a judge can relate his decision. Thus, Hart's 
recommendation that the Court take advantage of the "maturing of 
collective thought" was based on Hart and Sacks's claim that law is 
a set of general directive arrangements that can "speak from one 
point in time to another"; that is, that there is a command that laws 
communicate and that the interpreters of that command can get it 
right or wrong.228 
D. Wechsler and the Downfall of Legal Process 
The theory of reasoned elaboration seems both workable and 
attractive. Yet it is apparent that despite the presence of The Legal 
Process in the Harvard curriculum, its reputation as a theoretical 
text and even as a teaching material has declined.229 Not only has 
Hart and Sacks's theory lost its audience, but it has developed a 
distinct and unsavory reputation as a theory steeped in "conserva-
tism and procedural fetishism."230 To observers, Hart and Sacks's 
theory met "a formidable opponent in the Warren Court."231 Rela-
228. Id. at 113. 
229. The legal process movement has been "sapped, if not altogether drained [of its vital-
ity]" since the 1960s. Vmcent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The 
Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 Aruz. L. REv. 413, 473 (1987). By the 1980s legal process had 
"collapse[d]." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: 
Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 Mica L. REv. 707, 742 (1991). 
230. Norman Dorsen, In Memoriam: Albert M. Sacks, 105 HAR.v. L. REv. 1, 12 (1991) 
(contesting this reputation). 
231. Jan Vetter, Postwar Legal Scholarship on Judicial Decision Making, 33 J. LEGAL 
Eouc. 412, 417 (1983). 
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tions between Hart and Sacks's supporters and the Supreme Court 
turned sharply antagonistic when Herbert Wechsler introduced the 
theory of neutral principles into the history of legal process. 
Wechsler's 1959 Holmes Lecture - Toward Neutral Principles 
of Constitutional Law232 - was published in the same issue as 
Hart's Foreword. It is the best remembered of all the legal process 
writings because it used reasoned elaboration to challenge the 
Supreme Court's reasoning in the most pressing problem in consti-
tutional law at the time; by assuming that challenge, it drew the 
attention of a wide audience of lawyers and nonlawyers.233 Because 
Wechsler used a version of reasoned elaboration to criticize the 
Supreme Court's performance in cases involving the all-white pri-
mary,234 the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants,23s and 
segregation in public education,236 his essay became an infamous 
symbol of the legal process school's hostility to civil rights. In fact, 
the essay prejudiced an entire generation of liberal scholars to the 
point where few chose to look past Wechsler's presentation of rea-
soned elaboration before rejecting the project out of hand. 
1. The Jurisprudence of Neutral Principles 
Wechsler used reasoned elaboration to answer Judge Learned 
Hand's charge, made a year earlier, that judicial review by the 
Supreme Court should be exercised only within very narrow lim-
its.237 Wechsler argued that the Court "cannot escape the duty of 
deciding whether actions of the other branches of the government 
are consistent with the Constitution."238 He questioned the criteria 
that can justify the Court's exercise of judicial review. Wechsler 
began by denouncing the idea that a judge should choose a verdict 
based merely on its results, because that would turn the courts into 
"naked power organ[ s ]," not courts of law.239 The essential element 
232. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. 
REv. 1 (1959). 
233. Some years later, Wechsler commented that he doubted that he would have "pro-
voked substantial disagreement" had he not tested his theory against the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Herbert Wechsler, The Nature of Judicial Reasoning, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 290, 
294 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964). 
234. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
235. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
236. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
237. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RioHrS (1958). For an excellent discussion of Hand's 
theory of judicial review, see GERALD GUNTHER, LEArurao HAND 226-72 (1994). 
238. Wechsler, supra note 232, at 10. 
239. Id. at 12. Wechsler did not specify who endorsed the view that judges should decide 
cases according to their political preferences, but since he cited to Fuller in developing it, I 
assume that Wechsler attributed this view to the various instrumentally oriented realists, such 
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of legal reasoning was that "it must be genuinely principled, resting 
with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on 
analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is 
achieved. "240 · 
There are four elements to Wechsler's idea of neutral principles. 
First, a judge should not decide a certain way because he approves 
of the results of the verdict. Second, a judge must test his neutrality 
by ensuring that cases like the one at hand have been decided in a 
similar fashion, as would be "others that the principles imply."241 
Third, although a principle or policy in a law may be the result of a 
political process and may reflect political interests, a judge must not 
decide whether to apply242 that political principle or policy on the 
basis of reasons unrelated to the political ends of that principle or 
policy. Fourth, and finally, the reasons a judge may use to apply the 
principles or policies found in the law must be presented in a form 
of reasoned explanation unlike the sort of justifications required of 
politicians.243 
Wechsler's theory of neutral principles was clearly rooted in the 
theory of reasoned elaboration. The demand that a judge not de-
cide because he approves of the effects of his decision was a practi-
cal application of Jaffe's caution against political judging or Hart 
and Sacks's distinction between continuous and noncontinuous dis-
cretion. The demand that judges test themselves to see if they have 
decided a case the same way they have decided other cases, like the 
criticisms of the Court's seemingly political use of certiorari and per 
curiam, was another practical application of Hart and Sacks's dis-
tinction between continuing and noncontinuing discretion. The rec-
ognition that the principles or policies a judge had to apply 
neutrally are themselves not neutral but the result of politics, sim-
ply repeats Hart and Sacks's point that the purpose of adjudication 
is to discover where law ends and the realm of continuing discretion 
begins. Finally, the demand that judges publicly explain their rea-
soning was, as has been pointed out above,244 one of Henry Hart's 
main points: there are norms embedded in the law for judges to 
discover, and the dual pressures of public explanation and thorough 
as Cook and Oliphant, whom Fuller attacked. See Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case 
Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 376 (1946). 
240. Wechsler, supra note 232, at 15. 
241. Id. 
242. Wechsler in fact used the word "application." Id. 
243. Id. at 16. 
244. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text. 
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review by multiple parties helps to push judges toward better -
more accurate, that is - discoveries. 
According to these criteria, the Supreme Court had not suc-
ceeded in deciding according to neutral principles in civil rights 
cases. As if borrowing from the Forewords, Wechsler noted that 
the Court had disposed of important cases through opaque per 
curiam opinions.245 The most important test of the Court's per-
formance according to neutral principles, however, came when 
Wechsler discussed the reasoning contained in the written opinions 
in a number of major race cases, including Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation. 246 With regard to the white primary cases, Wechsler argued 
that since the decision could not be extended to parties excluded on 
the basis of religion, there could be no "neutral principles" support-
ing what he thought was a v~ry attractive result.247 In the case of 
restrictive covenants, Wechsler noted that the decision in Shelley v. 
Kraemer248 could be logically extended to cases that Wechsler was 
sure the Court would not affirm, proving that there was no neutral 
principle to support the attractive result.249 Finally, with regard to 
the school segregation cases, Wechsler - with a heavy heart -
criticized the reasoning of Brown. He said the Court was disingen-
uous. The Court really meant to declare that racial segregation was 
a denial of equality in principle, but the Court's decision appears to 
be based on the force of empirical fact. Wechsler was concerned 
that the Court's real argument - that racial segregation is wrong in 
principle - could not be upheld without infringing bigots' right not 
to associate. He thought that someone should be able to identify a 
principle in the Constitution whose neutral application would result 
in placing minorities' rights over bigots', but no one seemed capable 
of writing the opinion - including Wechsler himself.250 
245. Wechsler reviewed the per curiam disposal of five censorship cases and noted that if 
the Court could not come to an agreement in these cases of obvious importance, "[i]s it not 
preferable ••• indeed essential, that if this is so the variations of position be disclosed?" 
Wechsler, supra note 232, at 21. He then made the same critique of the Court's extension of 
the antisegregation principle in Brown to public facilities such as parks and pools by per 
curiam decision. Id. at 22. 
246. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
247. Wechsler, supra note 232, at 29. 
248. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
249. Wechsler, supra note 232, at 31. 
250. Id. at 34. 
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2. Critical Reaction to Neutral Principles 
Because of his criticism of the race cases, Wechsler's essay be-
came notorious; furthermore, because he was seen as applying Hart 
and Sacks's principles, Wechsler was seen as speaking for the legal 
process school. This perception was unfortunate, because his dis-
cussion of reasoned elaboration was incomplete, and his application 
of it to the race cases was simply wrong. 
There were three types of response to Wechsler's article. The 
first group - the realist critics - rejected the concept of neutral 
principles in its entirety and not just in its application. The second 
group - the internal critics - took issue with Wechsler's criticism 
of the race cases; they thought he had misunderstood the legal pro-
cess principles upon which the cases were decided. The third group 
- the conservative critics - took Wechsler's argument and turned 
it into an argument for judicial restraint and original intent. 
The realist critics recapitulated the debate we have already seen 
in the Forewords. They had four main criticisms. First, the realists 
argued that Wechsler was incorrect in asserting that judges should 
not be concerned about the consequences of their decisions.2s1 Sec-
ond, the realists rejected the demand for generality.252 Third, the 
realists challenged Wechsler's claim that when two constitutional 
principles were in conflict, as happened in the school segregation 
cases, a unifying neutral principle could be found to mediate be-
tween them.253 A court trying to apply Wechsler's theory would 
therefore always be faced with either choosing one constitutional 
principle over another for nonlegal reasons or doing nothing, which 
251. Thus, Eugene Rostow declared that "Wechsler's lecture ... represents a repudiation 
of all we have learned about law since Holmes [and] Pound [with their] path-breaking pleas 
for a result-oriented, sociological jurisprudence, rather than a mechanical one." Rosrow, 
supra note 80, at 28. 
252. Addison Mueller and Murray Schwartz argued that the term " 'generality' leads no-
where. A decision holding a statute which forbids all Negroes to drive automobiles unconsti-
tutional because it discriminates against Negroes enunciates a reason which is general." 
Addison Mueller & Murray L. Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral Principles, 7 UCLA L. 
REv. 571, 577 (1960). For similar reasons, Arthur S. Miller of Emory Law School and Ron-
ald F. Howell, a political scientist at Emory, who saw themselves as building on the realists' 
work, rejected Wechsler's use of the word "neutraµty" in relation to constitutional adjudica-
tion. They cited scholarship from various disciplines outside law to demonstrate that "neu-
trality or objectivity is essentially impossible of attainment." Arthur S. Miller & Ronald F. 
Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 661, 676 
(1960). 
253. Mueller and Schwartz argued that "the difficulty we find ... is that there will always 
be a point at which an extension of the logic of any constitutional principle of decision will 
run into the similarly extended logic of competing principles." Mueller & Schwartz, supra 
note 252, at 586; see also Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: 
Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 192-93 (1968). 
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in effect would always preserve the status quo. Fourth, the realists 
argued that Wechsler's demand for generality was a sham because 
what would qualify as "sufficient" generality in Wechsler's model 
was not determined by legal reasoning but by reference to current 
public sentiment.254 Neutral principles, which were supposed to 
constrain the judge or the majority, were in fact defined by the 
judge or the majority.25s 
The internal critics were those who were either sympathetic or 
indifferent to Wechsler's theory of law and objected only to his spe-
cific application of it to the race cases. Judge Louis Pollak, in the 
first of his two articles on Wechsler, endorsed the theory of neutral 
principles.256 He argued that in the area of civil rights, the Court 
could have used reasoned elaboration to derive more durable prin-
ciples to support the Court's results.257 While this is not the proper 
254. Thus, Jan Deutsch argued that since "one man's 'relatively fundamental rules of 
right' may well be another man's 'particular set of ethical or economic options' ••• historical 
context may well determine the proper classification of a given principle as either a 'funda-
mental right' or a 'particular opinion.'" Deutsch, supra note 253, at 195. 
255. In labeling these reactions to Wechsler's essay "realist," I do not mean to diminish 
the importance of the behavioralist study of public law which was beginning to reach matur-
ity in the late 1950s. To take but one example, it is clear that the work of Glendon Schubert 
applies a realist point of view in that it emphasizes that value preferences and policy attitudes 
determined judicial decisions. Schubert's understanding of the Constitution was similar to 
that of the older realists: From a behavioral standpoint, the Constitution is what a majority 
of Justices agree it ought to be said to mean, or what the President or Congress may declare 
by speech or action. In an even broader sense, however, Schubert held that the Constitution 
is embedded in "the consensually dominant patterns of values that constitute American polit-
ical ideologies." Glendon Schubert, The Future of Public Law, 34 GEo. WASH. L REv. 593 
{1966); see also Glendon Schubert, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Change, 16 J. Pun. L. 16, 38 
(1967). The new realism, wrote Martin Shapiro, "is basically an attempt to treat the Supreme 
Court as one government agency among many - as part of the American political process, 
rather than as a unique body of impervious legal technicians above and beyond the political 
struggle." MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAw AND Pouncs IN nm SUPREME COURT: NEW AP-
PROACHES TO PounCAL JURISPRUDENCE 15 {1964). 
On the other hand, Peller argued that the techniques of behavioralism and other forms of 
"value free" social science were inextricably interrelated with the legal process school's pro-
ject of legitimizing the sort of interest-group liberalism portrayed in Daniel Bell's theory of 
the "end of ideology." See Peller, supra note 169, at 585 (citing DANIEL BELL, THE END OP 
IDEOLOGY: ON nm EXHAurnoN OP PounCAL IDEAS IN nm FIFTIES (1960)). 
256. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor 
Wechsler, 108 U. P Ii. L. REv. 1, 5 {1959). 
257. It is interesting to note that some of Wechsler's realist critics attacked Pollak for 
stating that "if the Court decisions in recent race cases 'are not supportable on the basis of 
neutral constitutional principles, they deserve to be jettisoned.' " Miller & Howell, supra 
note 252, at 682 (quoting Pollak, supra note 256, at 31). In the restrictive covenant case, 
Pollak argued that the principle should have been that the state cannot "assist[ ] a private 
person in seeing to it that others behave in a fashion which the state could not itself have 
ordained." Id. at 23. With regard to the all-white primary, Pollak argued that the Court had 
the right principle, but should have based its decision on the Fifteenth Amendment, since it 
"impose[d] on the states a heavier affirmative duty than does the Fourteenth." Pollak, supra 
note 256, at 13. Further, Pollak conceded that the Warren Court's attempt to decide Brown 
on the basis of educational quality was doomed to failure. Pollak literally rewrote the opin-
ion basing the wrong of segregation both on the stigma it currently produced in America and 
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place to engage in a lengthy review of Pollak's - or others' -
arguments, in retrospect it seems that the internal critics had the 
better argument as a matter of the development of constitutional 
law. 
Martin Golding, a philosopher at Columbia and a "friendly 
critic" of Wechsler, stated: "I believe that without overstretching 
Professor Wechsler's language what I have to say can be fairly 
found in it .... "258 Golding, like Pollak, thought that the Constitu-
tion contained a neutral principle that would prohibit segregated 
schools. Unlike Pollak, Golding attempted to use the equal protec-
tion language in Cooper v. Aaron259 to illuminate the meaning of 
neutral principles.260 Golding's methodological criticism of Wechs-
ler suggested that he would have Wechsler rethink the theory of 
neutral principles in a manner consistent with Hart and Sacks.261 
Golding thought that Wechsler was correct to note that the 
Supreme Court had to base its decision only on values found in the 
Constitution.262 But Golding was baffled by Wechsler's claim that a 
constitutional value must be so general that it never conflicts with 
another constitutional value.263 Golding's suggestions improved 
Wechsler in a way that brought him closer to legal process as devel-
oped by Hart and Sacks. 
on the fact that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to 
forbid the use of state power to stigmatize Blacks, who were newly freed from slavery when 
the Amendment was written. Id. at 28; see also Louis Henkin, Some Reflections on Current 
Constitutional Controversy, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 637, 653 (1961) ("I, like Professor Pollak, 
believe that the particular cases which bother Professor Wechsler can be justified on 'neutral 
principles' although the Court perhaps did not do so effectively. But Professor Wechsler's 
basic thesis seems to me unchallengeable."). 
258. Golding, supra note 223, at 36. 
259. 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) ("The right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds 
in schools so maintained is indeed so fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the 
concept of due process of law."). 
260. Golding, supra note 223, at 56 ("[P]rincipled decision requires sameness of treat-
ment in public education - unless some justification can be offered for the different treat-
ment ••.. "). 
261. Golding noted that in general, ''principled legal judgment is not so much a matter of 
content as it is of form •••• Principled judicial decision-making is possible in a tyranny." Id. 
at 42-43. 
262. "A legal system, then, may broadly fix the starting-points of deliberation . . . • [Our 
legal system] has no higher guide than the Constitution itself." Id. at 43. 
263. Golding stated: 
I fail to grasp Professor Wechsler's position if it consists in the statement that one ought 
to, or even can, supply "neutral principles" for "choosing" between competing values. I 
can, of course, choose between two competing values by reference to a third value which 
is more comprehensive or supreme, that is, when there is already an ordering of values. 
Id. at 48. It is interesting to note that Golding's first insight - that the law can set out a 
series of "ordered" values - was echoed by some members of the Fundamental Rights 
School. See Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL L. REv. 703 
(1980). 
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The third group, the conservative critics of Wechsler, saw them-
selves as the true heirs of the theory of reasoned elaboration. Their 
interpretations of Wechsler and legal process were so different from 
Hart and Sacks's original theory, however, that they should be seen 
as usurpers of the legal process tradition, not heirs. The conserva-
tive critics were skeptical about the objective existence of moral 
concepts and thought that the moral language of the Constitution 
could have no referent other than the original intent of its authors. 
Through their intervention, the conservative critics succeeded in 
making original intent - or interpretivism - the ultimate stage of 
legal process. The most prominent of this group was Alexander 
Bickel. Bickel's primary idea - perhaps forged during his time as 
clerk to Justice Frankfurter in 1954 - was that while it is true that 
the Justices must obey the demands of reasoned elaboration, it is 
also true that the Supreme Court is a political institution and that 
sometimes the demands of principle must be ignored for the mo-
ment if the Court is to survive to promote principle in the future. 
Thus, Bickel implicitly approved of the very same tendency toward 
"judicial statesmanship" that was criticized by other legal process 
scholars in the early Forewords.264 
In his 1961 Foreword, Bickel celebrated various techniques for 
the denial of certiorari - dismissal for lack of ripeness, jurisdiction, 
and so on - as "passive virtues" that allow the Court to avoid giv-
ing the "right" answer when, in a sense, the truth would be too 
costly.26s Bickel's concern was shared by Philip Kurland, another of 
Frankfurter's former clerks. In 1964, Kurland accused the Court of 
insisting "that its rulings be carried to their dryly logical ex-
tremes."266 His warning was intended to produce the opposite re-
sult from that hoped for by Pollak or Henkin, who wanted to see 
264. BICKEL, supra note 177, at 173 ("It will not do to exalt an individual claim to particu-
lar justice over all other problems that adjudication may have to solve and over all other 
consequences that it entails."). 
265. See Bickel, supra note 177. 
266. Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term - Foreword: "Equal in Origin 
and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. 
REv. 143, 165 {1964). Ironically, Bickel and Kurland criticized the Court for taking legal 
reasoning too seriously - just the opposite argument made by Hart and others in the Fore-
words a decade earlier. As Purcell noted: 
In The Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel had seen the courts as the special voice of rea-
son, uniquely suited to elaborate proper principles; the political process had appeared 
erratic and given to excess. When principles became "ideological" in the late sixties and 
Bickel's primary goal shifted from achieving moral reform to ensuring social tranquility, 
the judgment had to be reversed. The judiciary became erratic, the political system 
rational. · 
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HAR.v. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 521, 554 {1976). 
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Wechsler's theory vindicated through its extension to every avail-
able incidence of the appropriate principle. 
Robert Bork carried Wechsler's project further toward the con-
servative camp than anyone else. He argued in 1971 that "[w]e 
have not carried the idea of neutrality far enough."267 Bork argued 
that for too long the theory of reasoned elaboration concerned only 
the application of principles and had ignored the derivation of these 
principles. Bork agreed with Wechsler that the principles in ques-
tion are certainly nonneutral in their content, since they were the 
product of political choices. Bork challenged, however, what he 
saw as the realist notion that a judge should be able to replace the 
lawmaker's nonneutral preferences with his own nonneutral prefer-
ences: "If [a judge] may not choose lawlessly between cases in ap-
plying principle X, he may certainly not choose lawlessly in defining 
or in choosing X .... "268 Bork's statement was a non sequitur. The 
original theory of reasoned elaboration assumed that judges can in 
fact be directed by law to apply standards that require the "working 
out" of a system of belief in their application, or even - recall that 
according to Hart and Sacks a judge could be authorized to act like 
a legislator - to assume varying degrees of continuing discretion. 
Bickel and Bork nonetheless raised difficult questions for their 
legal process colleagues. Their writings suggest that the internal 
critics were wrong to attack Wechsler's conservative interpretation 
of Hart and Sacks. If anything, Bickel and Bork would have argued 
that Wechsler did not go far enough with his own argument. Bickel 
and Bork assumed that Wechsler, had he adopted the terminology 
of The Legal Process, would have endorsed the view that the Con-
stitution provided for noncontinuing discreton. Furthermore, they 
would have agreed with the internal critics that Wechsler must have 
believed that the Constitution commanded judges to determine the 
limits of their own discretion. What Bickel and Bork rejected was 
the internal critics' claim that Wechsler should have recognized that 
the Constitution commanded judges to exercise discretion when in-
terpreting the moral language of the Fourteenth Amendment. As 
we shall see, Bickel and Bork were convinced that noncontinuing 
discretion was impossible where the law incorporated moral 
commands. 
Since Hart and Sacks rejected the idea that the Constitution 
commands judges to exercise continuing discretion in order to 
267. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41 IND. 
LJ. 1, 7 (1971). 
268. Id. at 8. 
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achieve the Constitution's purposes,269 the issue upon which Bickel 
and Bork and the internal critics differed was how a Wechslerian 
judge should interpret the rules and standards that limit judicial dis-
cretion. In fact, the real question relates to the interpretation of 
constitutional standards since very few norms in the Constitution 
are rules; with the exception of the age requirements and a few 
other provisions, very few constitutional determinations rely upon 
the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event. Therefore, a judge 
must adjudicate according to constitutional standards. Note that 
the application of a standard cannot be an act of continuing discre-
tion, or what H.L.A. Hart would call "rule-making."270 It is an ex-
ample of elaboration or interpretation of existing law, not the 
creation of new law. We know from Hart and Sacks, however, that 
all standards are based in either principle or policy. 
Bickel and Bork thought it was clear that Wechsler understood 
- as the internal critics did not - that discretion cannot be 
cabined by a standard derived from a principle. A policy, according 
to Hart and Sacks, is "simply a statement of an objective."271 Given 
that the application of a standard already required the judge to in-
terpret the instant case in the context of "the quality or tendency of 
happenings in like situations,"272 it would seem that a Wechslerian 
judge ought to be able to identify an objective if he were to base his 
decision on policy. In common law, the identification of policy 
objectives is a constant concern of tort and contract scholars - for 
example, on~ group of commentators thinks it is something like 
economic efficiency.213 But no answer based on policy-driven goals 
is helpful at the level of constitutional adjudication. It is doubtful 
that Hart and Sacks thought that constitutional standards like due 
process could be based on policy. They probably believed that pol-
icy could be a foundation for standards in other parts of the law, 
like common law or statutory law, whereas constitutional law is 
269. Hart and Sacks thought that, although common law judges may have once had such 
discretion, the Constitution gives complete continuing discretion only to Congress and the 
President, and only within their prescribed spheres of activity, for example, budget creation 
or cabinet selection. See HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 152-55. 
270. See HART, supra note 18, at 135. 
271. HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 141. 
272. Id. at 140. 
273. The literature on this question is enormous. See generally Gumo CALABRESI, THE 
CoST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS {1970); JULES L. CoLEMAN, 
MARKE'I's, MORALS AND THE LAW (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAw (3d ed. 1986). But see, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEoAL STUD. 
191 (1980). 
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rooted only in principles.274 But if reasoned elaboration in consti-
tutional law relies upon the derivation of standards from principles, 
then it follows that Hart and Sacks must have had some idea of 
what kind of principles could do the job. It was precisely Bickel 
and Bork's contention that the genius of Wechsler's argument was 
that it exposed the sad fact that there are no principles that can do 
the work of underpinning a constitutional standard. According to 
Hart and Sacks, a principle describes a rationale for the achieve-
ment of a goal; it limits the sort of reasons a judge can have for 
action to reasons that are part of a "closely thought out and justi-
fied" system.275 Bickel and Bork's challenge was to ask, whose sys-
tem of thought? The judges'? The original founders'? 
Both Bickel and Bork were skeptical about the existence of 
"systems of reason." For example, Bork argued that in morality as 
in economics, people's preferences are, at a certain level, impossible 
to justify or explain through reason.276 Because systems .of moral 
reasoning are in principle impossible, all the law can do is embed 
the majority's choices - representing the result of practical moral 
reasoning by the majority at that moment - about what the Con-
stitution should command judges to do on specific, well-defined oc-
casions. When an occasion comes to pass for which the majority 
has not provided, and there is nothing in the Constitution to com-
mand the judge one way or the other, a judge without continuing 
discretion should defer to the next level of instructions in the Con-
stitution, which happens to refer to the democratic process by 
which the majority generates specific responses to concrete 
problems.277 
Bickel was skeptical of the existence in constitutional law of 
what Hart and Sacks called "standards." In The Least Dangerous 
274. Hart and Sacks disagreed with Harry Wellington on this point Wellington based his 
analysis of constitutional language on the similarity between constitutional principles and 
common law principles. See Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional 
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE LJ. 221 (1973) [hereinafter Wel-
lington, Common Law]; see also Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 
YALE LJ. 486 (1982) [hereinafter Wellington, Judicial Review]. Wellington's most recent 
views on this subject have been outlined in HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE 
CoNSTlTUTION: THE SUPREME CouRT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION {1990), and his 
views have changed somewhat since the 1973 article. For the purposes of this essay, which is 
primarily on the legal process school and its evolution from the 1950s to the 1970s, I have 
chosen to focus primarily on Wellington's views as set out in the earlier essays. 
275. HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 142. 
276. Bork, supra note 267, at 10 ("There is no principled way to decide that one man's 
gratifications are more deserving of respect than another's or that one form of gratification is 
more worthy than another."). 
277. Id. 
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Branch, an early study of this problem, he merely alluded to this 
skepticism,278 while in his last writings Bickel revealed a full-scale 
value-skepticism quite similar to that of his colleague and friend 
Bork - and quite similar to that of some of the more extreme real-
ists whom both he and Bork scorned. Bickel, like Bork, did not 
argue that the Founders could have embedded principles into the 
Constitution but chose not to; both Bickel and Bork argued that the 
Founders could not have successfully embedded principles even if 
they had tried. Bickel wrote that he came to realize that, although 
concepts of justice and injustice were once thought to have some 
stable content, "[t]he words are used in a different sense now [the 
late twentieth century] because they are no longer rooted in a sin-
gle, well-recognized ethical precept."279 In making this argument, 
Bickel in fact denied the existence of the distinction between princi-
ple and policy set out by Hart and Sacks. The inescapable implica-
tion of his writing was that, in the end, all government under law, 
whether by legislatures or by courts, was rooted in policy.280 
The final conservative critic of Wechsler's neutral principles was 
Harry Wellington. He attempted to distance himself from Bickel 
and Bork by interpreting legal process through the lens of common 
law interpretation. Wellington noted that the problem of interpret-
ing rules and standards in terms of principles and policies2s1 was not 
new - Anglo-American courts had dealt with this problem since 
the early history of the common law. Wellington admitted that it 
was rare that constitutional interpretation would be grounded in 
policy,282 and therefore focused his discussion about constitutional 
adjudication on the problem of interpreting legal rules by reference 
to principle. He pointed out that in either common law or constitu-
278. "Which values, among adequately neutral and general ones, qualify as sufficiently 
important or fundamental or whathaveyou to be vindicated by the Court against other values 
affirmed by legislative acts?" BICKEL, supra note 177, at 55. 
279. ALEXANDER M BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 84 
(1970). 
280. Id. at 177. 
281. Wellington accepted some of Hart and Sacks's terminology. He adopted their dis-
tinction between principle and policy but not between rules and standards; the latter distinc-
tion he simply collapsed, and called any legal norms enforceable by a judge a "rule." 
Wellington, Common Law, supra note 274, at 223-25. 
282. Wellington noted that the Supreme Court can take policy into account when it is 
asked to interpret a congressional statute, such as the National Labor Relations Act or a 
portion of the Constitution to which instrumental goals have been attributed (such as the 
First Amendment). When the Constitution is being interpreted and the Court disagrees with 
the legislature on the nature of the constitutional provision's instrumental goals, Wellington 
counseled the Court to defer to the more competent judges of policy - elected officials. See 
id. at 269-70. 
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tional law, the problem Bickel and Bork raised is the same.283 If 
judges can locate coherent, closely reasoned moral systems with 
which to interpret tort law, why can they not find such systems 
when faced with problems in constitutional law? The possibility of 
moral-type reasoning does not change because a judge puts down a 
Restatement of Torts and picks up the Constitution. 
Wellington seemed to concede to Bickel and Bork that a princi-
ple embedded in a law cannot remain a useful source of "close rea-
soning" over time. Because he doubted that the law can express 
moral principles adequately or fully, Wellington recommended that 
a judge refer not to a system of moral reasoning as it ideally would 
have been set out in the law, but rather to the "conventional moral-
ity" of one's time.284 According to Wellington, conventional moral-
ity is the only sure moral concept at the judge's disposal; the 
alternative is judicial deference whenever the Constitution's in-
structions are not clear.285 Wellington's theory, therefore, was a 
well-intentioned attempt to save the intelligibility of principle in the 
application of constitutional standards, but did so only at the cost of 
making the content of those principles rely upon current conven-
tional preferences, which ultimately tum out to be the preferences 
of the majority.286 
Calling Bickel, Bork, and Wellington "conservative" critics of 
Wechsler suggests a bit of a double entendre.287 The conservative 
283. Wellington argued that a judge who wants to apply a principle in a tort case must 
perform the same interpretive act as a judge applying a principle in a constitutional case. The 
judge takes the moral point of view of the common law principle he is applying. Wellington, 
however, steadfastly denied Bickel and Bork's claim that a judge who applied a moral term 
necessarily was falling into natural law: "[The judge] must take a moral point of view. Yet I 
doubt that one would want to say that a court is entitled or required to assert its moral point 
of view. Unlike the moral philosopher, the court is required to assert ours." Id. at 244. 
284. "Conventional morality is not necessarily the best morality and makes no claim to 
be, as does, and perhaps is, the great philosopher's." Id. at 280. 
285. It seems that for Bork, Bickel, and Wellington, a moral principle embedded in a law 
could only be interpretable and acted upon if it were framed as a rule - that is, a clear norm 
whose action could be clearly determined by the occurrence or nonoccurrence or some act. 
A paradigm example of this would be Justice Hugo Black's reading of the First Amendment's 
Free Speech Clause, see HUGO L. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 17-18 (1968), or the 
almost universally accepted reading of the Thirteenth Amendment - the prohibition of 
slavery. 
286. Wellington claimed that current conventional morality might be 
countermajoritarian, but his argument is unpersuasive. See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST 63-69 (1980). One might observe that, in his attempt to defend neutral princi-
ples, Wellington had all but conceded Deutsch's criticism. See Deutsch, supra note 253. 
287. In the beginning of his career, Bickel saw himself as a political liberal, and Welling-
ton, to some extent, still sees himself that way. Ely notes that Bickel, who was "a Robert 
Kennedy liberal ..• as late as 1968," may have moved toward political conservatism by the 
end of his life. ELY, supra note 286, at 71. Wellington has consistently supported the 
prochoice position from the perspective of "political morality." See, e.g., WELLINGTON, supra 
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critics claimed to be conservative in their method of interpretation 
of the Constitution. They disclaimed any relationship between 
their personal politics and either the norms they claim the Constitu-
tion commands or the particular liberal or conservative color of 
those norms. This double entendre has force only to the extent that 
the observer cannot help but notice that given the political climate 
of the 1950s and 1960s, the civil rights gains achieved by the deci-
sions that Wechsler criticized were supported by political liberals 
and opposed by political conservatives. Furthermore, these gains 
were not likely to have been produced by the political system left to 
its own democratic devices.288 
E. Legal Process, Positivism, and Reason 
As a result of the critical reception of Wechsler's article, the 
legal process school was soon seen only through the lens of the con-
servative version of neutral principles. A combination of forces 
guaranteed that Wechsler, Bickel, and Bork's interpretation of legal 
process soon became what people believed to be legal process. The 
conservatives obscured Hart and Sacks's actual understanding of 
the role that principles played in constitutional adjudication and as 
a result created a very specific version of legal positivism that was, 
in its own way, as unattractive as legal formalism. As with formal-
ism, which foundered on an inadequate theory of legal reasoning, 
the conservative interpretation of legal process took Hart and 
Sacks's positivist theory of adjudication and attributed to it an inad-
equate theory of legal reasoning that was deeply skeptical of moral 
principles. 
It is clear that Hart and Sacks believed that laws can contain 
moral principles. The claim that moral principles can be part of the 
law is perfectly consistent with the separability thesis, the command 
theory, and the sources thesis. Furthermore, they suggested that 
laws can incorporate moral principles not only through the exercise 
of noncontinuing discretion but through the reasoned elaboration 
of moral terms as well.289 This latter point is one of the most im-
portant contributions the legal process school could make to im-
note 274, at 297-311. Bork has been more cryptic as to his political preferences, although he 
has dedicated a portion of his latest book to rebutting the charge that his judicial record or 
academic writings reveal that he is a conservative extremist. See ROBERT H. BoRK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 323-36 (1990). 
288. This point was profoundly illustrated in RICHARD KLuoER, SIMPLE JusnCE (1975), 
and well understood by the Supreme Court in the 1950s, see, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 177, at 
245-47. 
289. HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 145-48, 159-61. 
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proving upon formalism's simplistic application of the sources 
thesis. But, according to the conservative critics, Hart and Sacks 
were misled; only rules can put into effect the lawmaker's prefer-
ences. Since all one has to do to apply a rule is determine a matter 
of fact, it makes no difference what the source of the rule is - it 
could be the result of the operation of reason or merely the expres-
sion of an ill-considered preference - in either case, it would mani-
fest itself as a fact that can be determined without interpretation.290 
That is why Wechsler and his conservative critics assumed that 
although a law can contain a command that expresses the 
lawmaker's preference about some state of affairs at some certain 
time, a law cannot contain a command that expresses the 
lawmaker's preference that the judge apply the lawmaker's "system 
of reason."291 
A standard, however, cannot implement the lawmaker's prefer-
ences if those preferences are based on principles. Under the Hart 
and Sacks model, in order to apply a standard, one must do more 
than observe a fact: one must make a "qualitative appraisal [of 
facts] in terms of their probable consequences, moral justification, 
or other aspects of general human experience. "292 But according to 
Bickel and Bork, a person simply cannot make a qualitative ap-
praisal of another's system of reasoning and still faithfully obey his 
own will. On the other hand, they argued, a person can make a 
qualitative appraisal of another's preferences based on policy and 
still faithfully obey his own will.293 Why should this be? What 
makes a standard based on principle different from a standard 
based on policy? A standard based on policy would have to be a 
statement of an objective that is knowable without necessarily 
knowing anything about the reasons for it being preferred. Such an 
objective would have to be knowable without the interpreter need-
ing to understand, agree, or disagree with the thought process that 
generated the stated preference. 
290. This is consistent with a Razian "exclusionary reason." See R.Az, supra note 207, at 
32-33. 
291. See supra text accompanying notes 274-78. 
292. HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at 140. 
293. Bickel and Bork did not explicitly say this. It is a conclusion I force upon them 
because of the obvious yet sometimes overlooked point that the Constitution does not con-
tain many rules. Constitutional litigation focuses, for the most part, on the interpretation of 
standards such as due process, cruel and unusual, and the like. See supra text accompanying 
note 269. 
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There are "naked" preferences like this in politics all the 
time.294 One example is when something is declared the "prefer-
ence" of the group because more people voted for it than the other 
choices. When Hart and Sacks spoke of policy, they meant "naked" 
preferences.29s This feature of policies - that they can be acted 
upon without the law-applier understanding why the preference 
was preferred - held the key to Bickel and Bork's assumption that 
a standard can only be based upon a policy. The achievement of a 
policy is a matter of empirical fact: if I do not need to understand 
the reason why the lawmaker preferred the thing she commanded 
me to do in order to identify it as the thing I must do, then I must 
be able to tell what it is - and whether or not it has been brought 
about - simply as a matter of empirical observation.296 It turns 
out that the reason Bickel and Bork approved of standards that 
were based on policies is because these were legal norms that 
did not require qualitative appraisal of another's system of 
reasoning.297 
Bickel and Bork basically felt that legal commands can only 
communicate matters of fact to their listeners. They certainly 
would not deny that, through the establishment of factual condi-
tions, legal commands have the power to communicate when some-
one was entitled to act with continuing discretion - for example, 
that the Constitution gives the President the power to propose a 
budget without regard to any restriction. Because, however, they 
denied that there can be any conceptual space between the applica-
tion of matters of fact - the province of adjudication - and the 
application of continuing discretion - the province of politics -
they denied that law-appliers can perform reasoned elaboration on 
principles in the same way they can on simple, empirically verifiable 
terms. These conservative critics did not accept Hart and Sacks's 
idea that the law can be based on principles; for them law was ulti-
mately a system of rules. 
294. This term is borrowed from Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitu-
tion, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984). 
295. A policy may be a matter "of unreasoned preference." HART & SACKS, supra note 
17, at 142. 
296. The policy of "bringing inflation down to six percent" is a good example, as would 
be the policy of ''minimizing traffic accidents." See id. at 159 (providing similar examples of 
"full employment" and "the promotion of the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining"). 
297. It therefore turns out that a standard designed to promote a policy is essentially the 
same as a rule designed to promote a policy - the former may simply be a more complex 
version of the latter. 
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Laws, however, often contain moral terms. Bork put more en-
ergy than Bickel into developing an answer to this problem. In his 
argument, since laws must ultimately refer to empirically verifiable 
terms, the moral terms found in the law - such as "cruel" or "un-
fair competition" - must refer to empirically verifiable events, 
which, in the case of normative terms, can only mean the intentions 
of the authors of those terms.298 Following Bork, most conservative 
legal process scholars turned to original intent as a necessary tool 
for interpreting the normative lan$uage of the Constitution. Those 
who joined with Bork eventually came to be known as "interpre-
tivists. "299 As a result of the conservative critics' rejection of Hart 
and Sacks's idea that legal principles can express moral principles, 
interpretivism has become the modern face of legal positivism. 
Bickel and Bork's position is what many think positivism must 
say.300 Positivism and legal process could have taken a different 
path; Bickel and Bork were wrong about the relationship between 
legal principles and moral principle. 
One reason why it is easy to dismiss Bickel and Bork is that 
their desire to base law on empirically verifiable rules seems 
grounded in their moral skepticism.301 Bickel and Bork, however, 
have another, more serious argument. If one assumed that moral 
skepticism was wrong, and believed that moral terms had objective 
·298. "Legislation requires value choice and cannot be principled in the sense under dis-
cussion .... The bare concept of equality provides no guide for courts." Bork, supra note 
267, at 10-11. Elsewhere Bork has stated that: 
All that counts is how the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at 
the time. The original understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in secon-
dary materials, such as debates at the conventions, public discussion, newspaper articles, 
dictionaries in use at the time, and the like. 
BoRK, supra note W, at 144. 
299. See, e.g., RAouL BERGER, GoVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 'TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE FoURTEENIH AMENDMENT (1977); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to 
Harvard, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. REv.117 (1978); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living 
Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REv. 693 (1976); see also RoNAID DwoRKIN, A MATIER OF PRIN-
CIPLE 34-57 (1985) (discussing intention in legal theory); ELY, supra note 286, at 1-9 (discuss-
ing interpretivism); Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential 
Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1063, 1090-92 (1981) 
(discussing Berger and Bork); Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul 
Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1979) (book review). 
300. The degree to which this final version of Bickel and Bork's position that law is a set 
of rules resembles Dworkin's description of positivism as a "semantic theory of law" is 
uncanny: 
['The positivist believes that] we will understand the legal process better if we use "law" 
only to describe what lies within the core of that concept, if we use it, that is, to cover 
only propositions of law true according to the central or main rule for using "law" that 
everyone accepts, like the propositions of the highway code. 
DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 40 (emphasis added). 
301. In fact, there is no reason to believe that all interpretivists are moral skeptics. 
Neither Berger nor Monaghan displays skeptical tendencies. 
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content, then the problem facing the judge is that the moral terms 
ar~ too powerful. Assuming a judge could construct a system of 
reason through which to give content to a moral term, he would 
then have to apply that system of reason to a legal dispute to which 
the Constitution had not commanded the term be applied. Hart 
and Sacks assumed that a system of reason is like a specialized and 
clearly limited rule, under which only some legal problems are 
subsumed. 
But moral systems of reason are large, global theories of practi· 
cal action, under which all acts are potentially reevaluated. If by 
"system of reason" they meant to include a set of moral principles 
whose norms were not applicable to every putative legal problem 
faced by the courts, how is this set of principles cabined so that 
every legal problem that comes before the court is not necessarily 
subject to the same set of moral principles? According to Bickel 
and Bork, in the end, Hart and Sacks can reject moral skepticism, 
but only at the cost of embracing natural law. 
A positivist can make two responses to this argument. First, not 
all "systems of reason" are systems of moral reasoning. For exam· 
pie, not all forms of practical reasoning are forms of moral reason· 
ing.302 Second, not all systems of practical reasoning that 
incorporate moral principles must be insatiable in the way Bickel 
and Bork implied. They were making the same assumption that the 
natural lawyers made; they assumed that the principles invoked by 
a law are global and thus if one aspect of justice is invoked in one 
part of the law - for example, equal protection - then every 
other aspect of justice - for example, autonomy or welfare rights 
- must necessarily be entailed.303 Bickel and Bork's real argu· 
ment, once one gets beyond the moral skepticism, shared a com· 
mon foundation with the natural law school; they just chose one 
extreme on the spectrum as opposed to its alternative. 
Both conservative legal process and natural law, in assuming 
that legal norms must be either matters of empirical fact or global 
systems of moral reasoning, made an unwarranted leap that re· 
302. See, e.g., JosEPH RAZ, PRAcnCAL REAsoNs AND NoRMs 107-23 {2d ed. 1990} {ad-
dressing varieties of normative systems). 
303. There were a number of contemporary natural law critics of Wechsler who champi-
oned such "insatiable" moral terms. See, e.g., Myres S. MacDougal, Perspectives for an Inter-
national Law of Human Dignity, 1959 AM. SoCY. INTI.. L PRoc. 107, 130 {1959)); Miller & 
Howell, supra note 252, at 691-92 (arguing that a judge should interpret the Constitution in 
order to promote either "human dignity" or "welfare") (citing ALEXANDER H. PEKEus, The 
Case for a Jurisprudence of Welfare, in LAw AND SOCIAL AcnoN 1 (Milton R. Kovitz ed., 
1950); Mueller & Schwartz, supra note 252, at 588 {indicating that judges must select the 
fundamental rights the Constitution is designed to protect). 
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vealed a certain assumption about practical reasoning. Both ap-
proaches assumed that if the legal system authorized a law to 
interpret some of its institutional rights according to a norm, then 
the truthfulness - or validity according' to some outside standard 
- of the norm becomes a reason to apply the norm to questions of 
institutional rights for which no authorization had been given by the 
legal system.304 But that assumption ignores that the reason the 
norm has any force at all with regard to the interpretation of the 
institutional rights of the legal system is because it was authorized 
by that system. Its authorization, being provisional, can never val-
idly assume more authority than was granted initially. The condi-
tional status of legal norms was the lesson of Hart and Sacks's 
distinction between grants of continuing and noncontinuing 
authority.305 
CONCLUSION 
The real story of the development of formalism, realism, the 
legal process school, and, ultimately, of the current state of modem 
theories of constitutional interpretation, is the story of the evolu-
tion of classical legal positivism from its crudest Austinian model of 
rules to its more sophisticated recent reinterpretations. What is sad 
is that, for a variety of reasons, the main core of positivism has been 
obscured, and its basic merits left unappreciated. Th.is is because 
whenever positivism has risen to the ascendancy in this country, it 
has been hobbled by its connection to a flawed theory of adjudica-
tion. On the one occasion when it appeared that American positiv-
ism might repair this flaw - Hart and Sacks's legal process - the 
noble attempt was pulled back into disrepair by conservative forces 
who ultimately remade legal process, and by extension legal positiv-
ism, into a tool for their own partisan interests. The fundamental 
strengths of the modem refinements of classical positivism remain 
unrefuted, however, and the challenge still remains to reconstruct 
304. See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Constitutional Adjudication: Relative or Absolute Neutral-
ity, 11 J. PUB. L. 48, 61 (1962) (responding to Wechsler and arguing that it would be a good 
thing if judges had continuing discretion in constitutional cases). 
305. Martin Golding makes exactly the same point when he points out that "principled 
decisionmaking" - i.e., reasoned elaboration - is very similar to moral decisionmaking 
except for two provisos. First, "a legal system is able to stipulate in a large measure the 
principles that must be employed in deliberation," and second, "a legal system may stipulate 
what grounds are and what grounds are not legitimate grounds" for adopting new principles. 
Golding, supra note 223, at 42. Because legal systems can cabin the scope of moral princi-
ples, unlike a system of moral decisionmaking, the legal system can stipulate where and until 
what point moral reasoning will be employed. See id. at 43 ("A legal system, then, may 
broadly fix the starting points of deliberation and the criteria of relevant distinctions."). 
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American legal positivism into a theory of law with an adequate 
and persuasive theory of adjudication.306 
306. I hope to explore this project in much greater detail in my book, SEBOK, supra note 
12. 
